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EXECUTIVE SIIMMARY 
In the early 1990s IDRC began to explore the possibility of 
transferring innovative, technological advisory services from 
Asia and Canada to Central America to address the problems of 
small and medium-size manufacturers (SMIs) : low productivity, 
outdated technology, inadequate marketing, low product quality, 
and poor management skills. 
These problems were to be addressed through business advisory 
services and networking. As of July 1998, five advisory units 
were linked together in a regional network that was supported by 
a coordinating unit with links to Canada. This network was called 
CAISNET - the Central American Industrial Support Network or "la 
Redn in Spanish. 
Although the first unit was established in Guatemala in 1994, the 
idea for CAISNET was developed by CODETI in 1991. Between 1994 
and 1997 six units were set up, one in each of the Central 
America countries and two in Honduras, at an estimated total cost 
of $3.5 M for IDRC and for its regional sponsors. In March 1996, 
CAISNET received additional funding of $1.1 M from CIDA1s PAR 
program to expand and strengthen its network. 
Since IDRC1s agreements and the CIDA funded PAR contract 
terminate in the next six months, the Canadian donors commis- 
sioned an evaluation of the performance, sustainability and 
impact of the CAISNET project. 
The key finding of the evaluation is that the national units are 
providing needed and beneficial advisory services to SMIs in five 
of the eight major industrial centers in the region. Although the 
impact of these services cannot be determined in any quantifiable 
way, they seem to be satisfactory to the SMIs, the paying 
beneficiaries. To date, none of the national units or the network 
are sustainable. A "best guess estimateN is that the units have 
achieved an earnings to cost ratio of between 2% to 50%. The 
coordinating unit is 100% funded by donors except for the 
services of one professional. 
The major conclusion of the evaluation is that the "value added" 
of the network to SMIs is nil. If CAISNET were simply five 
national units connected regionally via the Internet, the same 
quality of service could have been provided to more SMIs at 
substantially lower costs. 
Because the funding arrangements supporting CAISNET are 
terminating shortly, the major recommendation of the evaluation 
is to fund a bridging proposal for one year to allow a smooth 
transition to the next phase of CAISNET. Over twelve months the 
priorities should be for: 
National Units: Improve operational performance and earnings 
Coordinating Unit: Terminate the existing contracts and provide 
technical assistance to the units 
Sponsoring Bodies: Fully integrate the units into their 
organization 
FECAICA : Determine the "value addedN of its network 
and present an operational proposal to CIDA 
and IDRC by March 31, 1999 
The Alliance : With FECAICA, develop a proposal for 
institutional strengthening of FECAICA 
members and/or develop a proposal for BTOs. 
Seek funding for this proposal outside of the 
CAISNET project . 
CRC Sogema/PAR: 
IDRC : 
CIDA and IDRC: 
Extend the FECAICAIPAR contract to April 30, 
1999. Settle all outstanding payments. 
Close the agreement with CONICIT for UDATE. 
Terminate existing contracts. Fund the 
bridging proposal. Hire a Bridging 
Manager/CAISNET Project Manager. Hire outside 
legal services to determine the ownership of 
the tools. 
The Bridging Proposal and the Framework for the proposed new 
phase are outlined in the other report of this evaluation. 
At a minimum, CIDA and IDRC should continue to fund the national 
units connected regionally via the Internet. 
The evaluator found that all CAISNET players are deeply committed 
to a regional network that has links to Canada. The evaluator 
shares this commitment. The challenge is, therefore, to develop a 
network model that can be articulated in terms of benefits to 
SMIs . 
EVALUATION FINDINGS 
Proi ect Rationale 
1. The primary target group for this project, SMIs, are a 
small, of ten overlooked, but important segment of the 
region's industrial sector. 
- - 
2. CAISNET meets IDRC1s, CIDA1s and the Central American 
Governments1 economic and development goals. 
Results at the Proiect Beneficiarv Level 
1. Depending on the reference plan consulted, CAISNET is over 
or under the number of clients expected to be reached during 
the funding period. The network served 506 clients. This was 
106% of the IDRC target but only 75% of the PAR target in 30 
to 36 months. 
2. The intended impact on the firms in terms of increased 
competitiveness and profitability cannot be demonstrated 
from client files. Informal surveys indicate that while 
firms are satisfied with the services received, they are not 
able to quantify their benefits in the usual business terms. 
3. The national units have provided acceptable consulting 
services to the regional target market but these can be 
considerably expanded. Only 3% to 4% of the estimated number 
of regional SMIs have paid for the business advisory 
services offered by CAISNET. 
4. The consulting services are not as accessible to SMIs as 
they could be. Only one of the five units offers services at 
the same rates to both members and non-members of the 
Chamber or Association. Consulting rates vary from US $12 to 
$45 per hour (US $96 to $360 per day). These rates are 
generally lower than private sector management consulting 
firms. The SMIs, donors and Governments surveyed, however, 
consider rates beyond US $25 to US $30 per hour, (US $200 to 
$240 per day), as too high. 
5. CAISNET services are usually, though not always, focused on 
SMIs. Between 7% to 25% of clients are large firms with more 
than 100 employees in the three most active units. 
6. There has been no consistent gender-disaggegated reporting 
on clients served. Few female SMI owners have, however, been 
clients of CAISNET. 
Network Results 
1. CAISNET claims to provide advisory services to the region 
but it operates in only five of the eight major industrial 
centers in Central America. Services are not available in 
San Pedro Sula in Honduras, Panama City and Belize City. 
2. The regional network was created to enhance services to SMIs 
by sourcing information and technology from other countries. 
From the interviews and documentation the evaluator was 
unable to discover any SMI which had received benefits from 
other countries in the region. The major and most important 
finding of the evaluation is that the ttvalue addedt1 of the 
regional network to SMIs is insignificant. 
In fact, if CAISNET were simply five national units 
connected regionally via the Internet, the same quality of 
services would have likely been provided to more SMIs at 
substantially less cost to the donors and to the sponsoring 
agencies . 
3. CAISNET1s link with Canada, again intended for the purpose 
of enhancing benefits to SMIs, contributed little to project 
results. There were no business deals reported between 
clients of CAISNET and Canadian firms. The main benefi- 
ciaries of the Canadian connection were FECAICA and its 
members, the delivery channel to SMIs, and not its primary 
target group, the SMIs. 
The Project Delivew Channel 
General Observations 
1. There is apparent confusion over the name of the Project. It 
has been called CAISNET, CODETI/FECAICA/CAISNET, 
FECAICA/CAISNET, and CODETI/CAISNET. 
2. There is apparent confusion over the "ownershipH of the 
project. The units appear to be "foreign projectstt in the 
Chambers and Associations. The coordinating unit appears to 
be the property of CODETI. Several participants indicated 
they wanted the donors to transfer the project to their 
stewardship, suggesting that they thought the donors owned 
the project. 
The National Units 
1. Six national units were set up but only five are connected 
to CAISNET. The other unit, UDATE in Honduras, is non- 
functional but it is still an "official" network unit from 
IDRC's administrative perspective. 
The 
1. 
The five national units employ 29 persons (20M/9F). The 
professional staff have university degrees in engineering, 
computer science and/or business, and experience in 
industry, varying from 8 to 16 years to 0 to 2 months. As 
most of the technical advisors are young, they must, 
therefore, work harder to establish their credibility with 
SMI presidents and managers. Unit staff are keenly committed 
to this project despite start-up difficulties. They are a 
critical resource in the success of this project. 
It appears as if three units are on the verge of becoming 
international donor project administrators and/or multi- 
purpose membership service centers. They were intended to be 
single-purpose business advisory centers. This dilution 
distracts staff time and effort from generating revenues. 
As a group the technical advisors are highly regarded by 
their sponsoring organizations but they are poorly treated 
as employees. Those with a high degree of education and 
experience are inadequately paid. Few CAISNET employees have 
access to the social benefits of other Chamber or Associa- 
tion employees. The unit's incentive package is poorly 
structured. Many of the more desirable training 
opportunities involving travel have gone to unit directors 
or Chamber and Association representatives who infrequently 
interact with clients, rather than to the technical advisors 
who service clients continuously. 
The Information Advisor contributes little to the unit's 
services to SMIs and to its earnings. 
Most units have adequate computer equipment and office 
furniture, although additional purchases in several units 
would add to the efficiency of the technical advisors. 
The units could improve the effectiveness of their 
consulting service if each unit were equipped with an 
overhead and a screen for client presentations. 
Only one unit, Nicaragua, has adequate office facilities. 
Several units are housed in cramped quarters compared with 
the space allocations of other departments and divisions 
within the Chamber or Association. 
Coordinating Unit 
The coordinating unit services provided by CODETI under a 
subcontract agreement with FECAICA, have been, generally 
speaking, adequately performed. 
The subcontracting agreement FECAICA signed with CODETI was 
inadequate. It specified the tasks expected but did not 
include a budget for the services CODETI was to provide. 
This lead to the impression that CODETI was "enrichingn 
itself from project funds when, in fact, the cost of the 
coordinating units services were distributed among the 13 
activities of the FECAICA/PAFt contract budget. This budget 
was apparently reviewed and approved by all FECAICA members. 
The coordinating unit staff doubled from two under the 
IDRC/FECAICA/CICR structure to four under the FECAICA/PAR 
structure. This increase was justifiable because of the 
greater administrative complexity and expanded activities of 
the FECAICA/PAR project. 
The cost of the coordinating unit is fully supported by 
donors1 funding with the exception of the services of the 
CODETI President's wife, an experienced international 
development professional. Her full-time services are 
provided free of cost to CAISNET by CODETI. 
It is not clear whether or not FECAICA/CICR made their 
required local contribution of approximately $84,000 to 
support the work of this unit as agreed to with IDRC. 
The existing structure of the network is too expensive for 
the network members to sustain over the long term. 
FECAICA has no long-term plan as to how the unit's operating 
costs will be funded after donor funding ends. 
FECAICA members are highly dissatisfied with the quality of 
the services provided by CODETI. Still, several unit 
directors, important ltclientsll of CODETI, think the 
coordinating unit is doing a reasonable job, given the 
circumstances. Most of the units' staff are indifferent, do 
not know, or would not comment. 
The evaluator finds that much of the personal antagonism 
towards CODETI, specifically its President, comes from the 
complex structure of the project. Among key project 
decision-makers, including donors, there is incomplete and 
inaccurate knowledge of contractual agreements and budget 
structure. Complexity often leads to confusion and misun- 
derstanding. 
Pilot Proiect and Diaqnostic Tools 
1. The pilot project, conceived by CODETI and funded by IDRC, 
an agency specializing in applied research, was poorly 
structured as an experiment. Nevertheless, the diagnostic 
tools under testing were successfully developed and 
transferred to the national units. 
2. The use of the tools varies with the skill and ability of 
the unit's advisors and the unit's business strategy. 
Inexperienced advisors use the tools the most. Experienced 
advisors, with well honed diagnostic skills, use them less. 
Units with a strategy to provide consulting services for 
continuous productivity improvement, rather than for one-off 
problem-solving, use the tools the most. There appears to be 
a strong correlation between repeat contracts and the use of 
the diagnostic tools. They identify many problems that then 
"requireH advisory services to help find solutions to these 
problems. 
3. It is difficult to identify which organization owns the 
diagnostic tools. The only CAISNET player with no claim to 
the tools is CRC Sogema/PAR. Each of the other organizations 
involved in the network, CODETI, the Industrial Chambers and 
Associations, the Units, FECAICA, IDRC, CIDA and CONICIT, 
appears to have a legitimate claim to "ownershipn based on 
the multitude of uncoordinated, signed agreements related to 
this "project goodu. 
Proiect Manaqement 
1. FECAICA was the appropriate organization to sponsor and 
endorse the regional network. It was, however, unsuitable as 
the executing agency for the FECAICA/PAR contract and for 
the IDRC/FECAICA/CICR grant agreement. The simplest 
explanation for this is the fact that it had no managerial 
and institutional delivery capacity. 
2. CAISNET has no project manager. There is a Canadian CAISNET 
coordinator, a Canadian Liaison Officer, a Regional Network 
Manager, a Coordinating Unit Director, five Unit Directors, 
a PAR Program Manager, and an IDRC Project Manager. CAISNET, 
however, which includes all of these players, has no manager 
who is ultimately responsible and accountable for ensuring 
that the results have been achieved on time and in budget. 
3. The CAISNET steering committee was poorly structured. It did 
not serve the needs of the CAISNET participants nor the 
donors. FECAICA, which represented its members on this 
committee, did an inadequate job of communicating the 
results and decisions of this committee to its members. 
4. The Unit's Technical Committee, (or Advisory Committee), 
when it meets regularly appears to significantly improve the 
performance of the unit. Also the unit's connection to the 
network is strengthened because of the frequent interaction 
with the coordinating unit director. Although meetings of 
these committees were required under IDRC agreements, they 
were held in only one of the five units on a continuing 
basis. 
5. The decision by FECAICA in May 1998, in which the Chamber of 
Costa Rica was delegated the coordination and executing role 
of FECAICA, did not significantly improve the problem of the 
lack of a project manager. If anything, it slowed the 
administrative and approval process. It may also have been 
inappropriate for the Chamber of Costa Rica (or for that 
matter any FECAICA member), to accept this delegated 
authority. National chambers have national action mandates 
from their paying membership. They can participate in 
regional projects but do not usually manage them. In 
addition, FECAICA may have illegally delegated its 
contractual fiduciary authority according to section 103 of 
the contract. 
6. The Chamber of Costa Rica, delegated the authority it 
received from FECAICA to the Director of UATI. When 
interviewed in July, however, this director did not appear 
to have an extensive knowledge of the major governing 
documents of the CAISNET project such as the seven project 
plan& and budgets, or its twelve major contracts and sub- 
contracts. In addition, the UATI director is in a conflict- 
of-interest situation since he is in a position to make 
decisions about the budget from which he is a recipient. 
Proiect Contracts 
1. CAISNET is supported by seven different contracts with 
funding from two Canadian donors. This contract framework is 
inappropriate and unmanageable and has resulted in 
inefficient allocation of the total Canadian financial 
support provided to CAISNET. 
2. The PAR contract, while providing resources to strengthen 
CAISNET, changed the network's character. Formerly, under 
the IDRC structure, the network was a loosely affiliated 
federation with each unit having a high degree of autonomy. 
From March 1996, the network became more centralized in 
response to the reporting and payment conditions of the PAR 
contract. This contract required a unified network profile 
of plans, activities, results and expenses. 
- 
3. The IDRC agreements demanded little from the recipients in 
terms of compliance. The focus of the reporting was national 
units, not the network. Budget lines were deliberately 
simple. Advances were generous. No proof of payment was 
required in reporting. Timeliness of reports mattered only 
in terms of future payments. 
4. From the start of the FECAICA/PAR contract, the reimburse- 
ment system has been slower than the 45 days agreed to in 
the contract. The evaluator found $189,000 in outstanding 
bills, most between 60 to 120 days overdue. 
Proj ect Budsets 
1. The FECAICA/PAR budget was unbelievably complicated, even 
for an experienced project evaluator. There were thirteen 
itemized activities with no cost items such as salaries or 
travel identified. The FECAICA members interviewed who had 
signed the contract indicated they had signed without fully 
understanding its budget details. An activity budget was a 
PAR Program requirement. 
2. CAISNET did not have a total project budget. Among the seven 
different contracts it was impossible to determine who was 
paying for what salary, the name of the person who received 
this payment, and what the salary level was. In both the 
IDRC agreements and the FECAICA/pAR contract all salary 
support costs were lumped together under "Personnelw. No 
person could tell the evaluator how many persons were paid 
for by CAISNET in its totality. Even CODETI, with its good 
records, required further research to answer this question. 
3 .  There was little coordination among the titles of the budget 
lines between the IDRC agreements and the FECAICA/PAR 
contract. Consequently, the relatively straightforward 
expense items for the units were complicated unnecessarily 
by categories related to donor project budgets. 
1. No unit came close to achieving self-sufficiency during this 
period. In the IDRC plans, two of the five units, Costa Rica 
and Guatemala, were estimated to reach self sufficiency by 
December 1998. This did not happen. The estimated self- 
sufficiency of these two units was 28% and 13% respectively 
at the end of March 1998. 
2. The estimated self-sufficiency achievement of the units was 
between 2% and 50% of total costs. Figures on earnings 
ratios to total costs were unavailable, or, if available, 
inadequate. 
3. Although the units are beginning to look as if they will be 
able to sustain themselves, they have not been managed in a 
focused effort to reach this goal. 
4. The national sponsoring organizations all contribute towards 
the operation of the units, some covering staff and office 
operating costs, others only operating costs. At present 38% 
of the staff positions are supported by the national 
chambers, (11/29), with the other positions supported by 
three main donors. All of the units cover most of their 
operating costs from earnings or from national chamber 
funding. 
5. The financial statements upon which sustainability estimates 
are based are not reliable. They are presented as (a) expen- 
ditures to project budgets, rather than as revenue and 
expense statements, or (b) if reported as revenues and 
expenses, they have not been reported reconciled to bank 
accounts. 
MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section covers the 17 major recommendations of the 
evaluation. 
1. Discussion of the Evaluation Re~orts: There is a lack of 
information (and much misinformation), about this project among 
CAISNET participants. IDRC and CIDA, the Steering Committee and 
FECAICA members, are to ensure that all of the CAISNET staff, 
(including secretaries), receive their own copies of these two 
reports so that everyone involved, from the bottom to the top, 
can decide in a participatory manner on the future of this 
project . 
The bridging period has been designed to enable this process of 
participatory consultation and discussion to be carried out while 
services to SMIs continue. 
The method of arriving at these decisions as well as the 
decisions taken will be a demonstration of how the regional 
network of CAISNET functions. 
2. Continued Su~port: The success of the network, or rather of 
the three units of this network, Costa Rica, El Salvador and 
Guatemala, in targeting SMIs, is the basis for a recommendation 
to CIDA and IDRC to continue funding CAISNET. Before a second 
phase is funded, however, a bridging period is necessary to allow 
for a smooth transition to the new phase. 
3. Bridgins Support: A bridging phase of thirteen months should 
be financed jointly by CIDA and IDRC based initially on the 
status quo staffing as of September 30, 1998. 
The estimated cost of this is $520,000 [see bridging report.] 
An option for the Bridging Phase is to extend the FECAICA/PAR 
contract. This is not recommended for two reasons: first, CRC 
Sogema/PAR1s repayment structure has created difficulties in the 
project management and is a source of continual frustration among 
the units, the coordinating unit, and The Alliance. Second, PAR 
itself is a project, and will terminate shortly. 
4. Priorities Durins the Bridging Phase: The national units are 
to improve their operational performance and their self- 
sufficiency. The coordinating unit is to terminate the existing 
contracts and provide technical assistance to the units to 
improve their operations. FECAICA and its members are to 
determine their long-range plan for the network. 
No regional or Canadian linkage activities should be supported 
during this period. This will enable network sponsors to 
concentrate on decision-making and implementing recommendations 
made in the evaluation. 
5. Conditional Future Support: CIDA and IDRC should continue to 
support CAISNET in the short and medium term provided the network 
sponsors develop a document describing the network and its "value 
addedH characteristics. Also required is a plan with cash flow 
projections and funding sources identified for the networks1 
eventual operation without Canadian donor assistance for its core 
costs, (salaries, office operations costs, and network coordina- 
tion costs). The plan should include recommendations for the 
project steering committee (or Board of Directors), and also 
include a job description of the key manager, if any. 
Since FECAICA and is members are the sponsors of this network, 
the evaluator is leaving the decision to them to decide what they 
want. The evaluation report does, however, contain several 
options to guide their decision-making process. FECAICA should 
consider developing its plan to one year beyond 2002 if they plan 
for a continuing network. The Network Plan is to be presented to 
CIDA and IDRC by March 31, 1999. 
The services of the coordinating unit are available to FECAICA 
during the bridging phase for this plan development. 
6. Next Phase: If a satisfactory network plan has not been 
presented to CIDA and IDRC by March 31, 1999; then, when the 
bridging phase ends on September 30, 1999, Canadian funding 
should be only for the national units until they reach 
sustainability. 
7. pilot Proiect: The pilot project nature of CAISNET should be 
declared over and a conscious decision taken about its future. 
8. Canadian Aspect of CAISNET: The long-term, general connection 
of CAISNET to Canada, should be ended. 
The CAISNET project description states that its unique feature is 
the fact that it is a regional network connected to a Canadian 
one. CAISNET should, however, be described as a regional network 
only which could, for a certain time period, and for defined 
results, have one or many Canadian connection (s) . 
9. Proiect Name: The name of the project should be only 
"CAISNETV. All other names should be dropped as confusing and 
misleading. 
If the project structure for the new phase is the same five 
national units with or without a coordinating unit, however, the 
project name should be changed to F E C A I C A  as a more accurate 
description of its functioning. 
10. Ownershi~ofAISNET: The ownership of the CAISNET project, 
as per its legal persona, should be confirmed as follows: 
10.1 Donor's Role: The creation of CAISNET has been assisted by 
IDRC funding and strengthened by CIDA funding through the PAR 
project; but CIDA/PAR and IDRC in no way "ownI1 the project, nor 
do they have any partnership in the project beyond the date and 
funding obligations listed in their agreements. In no way it is 
appropriate to "transfer the project" to the institutional 
beneficiaries. From the donor's perspective, the project is 
already theirs. What is needed is for the owners to accept full 
responsibility for what is already theirs. 
10.2 Industrial Support Units: Each of these national units is 
"ownedM and operated by their respective sponsoring chamber or 
association. They are incorrectly called "national unitsu 
implying a separate legal entity. These units are in fact, 
departments or divisions of their sponsoring organizations. 
These units are, therefore, to be fullv integrated into the 
Chamber or Association with regards to its personnel policy, 
organizational structure, annual work planning and accountability 
structure. 
If any FECAICA members do not wish to continue to own an 
industrial support unit, they should make this decision as soon 
as possible so that a new sponsoring organization can be located 
over the bridging period. Or, alternatively, the unit can be 
legally registered as an organization, its constitution drawn up 
and approved, and its membership and Board of Directors 
established so that it can participate in the network on the 
strength of its own institutional performance. 
10.3 Coordinatins Unit: Under the provisions of the FECAICA/CICR 
and FECAICA/PAR agreements, the coordinating unit is the 
responsibility of FECAICA. Hence, FECAICA is to be considered its 
legal owner. FECAICA as a federation of members, is providing the 
services of the coordinating unit to its members to assist them 
to set up and operate successful consulting services to SMIs, and 
to coordinate regional activities and links with Canada. 
Since FECAICA does not have project implementation capacity, 
contracting the coordinating unit services to an individual, a 
private firm or to a foundation is a reasonable alternative. 
If FECAICA does not wish to assume ownership and responsibility 
for this unit, including its eventual long term funding, this 
decision should be made as soon as possible so that alternative 
long term arrangements can be made. 
10.4 CODETI: CODETI is a Costa Rican foundation providing 
coordinating unit services to FECAICA for the management of 
CAISNET. Because of the circumstances of this contract, CODETI 
has legal representation for CAISNET under the FECAICA/PAR 
contract terms and conditions. Legal representation is not, 
however, legal ownership of the CAISNET project. References to 
the project as "the CODETI/CAISNET projectl1 should, therefore, be 
dropped. 
11. Making of Decisions C o n c e r n i n s i  
Network : 
FECAICA and its members are to discuss and decide on the 
"networkn aspects of CAISNET; that is, the purpose and structure 
of the network and the types of activities the network wishes to 
carry out. These discussions should be both visionary and 
concrete and could include consultations with other national and 
regional organizations which provide services to SMIs. Several 
options to be considered are discussed in the section of the 
report titled "value added of the networkn (page 55.) 
12. The name of the Steerins Committee Should be Chansed to the 
Proiect Steering Committee for the Duration of the Donor's 
Partici~ation in it. 
should include permanent and non-permanent members. 
The permanent members should be: 
a representative from the national Chambers and Associations 
of Industry 
a representative from each of the funding agencies 
others as appropriate 
The non-permanent member should be: 
a representative of the Canadian organization which is 
working with the network for the period of their association 
with the network 
Other Steerins Committee Sub-Committees: There should be no sub- 
committees of the PSC. The existing executive committee, project 
approval committee and technical sub-committee under the 
FECAICA/PAR structure should be abolished. 
Decision-Makinq: Wherever possible, decisions should be made by 
consensus. In the case of a vote, however, the permanent members 
should be the only voting members. 
Secretariat Functions: The PSC is to designate a person to carry 
out the secretariat functions. This person could be the Project 
Director, the Network Manager, or Coordinating Unit Director. 
This person is usually, but not always, a non-voting member. 
Roles and Reswonsibilities: The purpose of the PSC is to 
facilitate the implementation of the donor-funded project. The 
PSC could become, (or already is), the nucleus of the Board of 
Directors of the network emerging from the project which 
continues network operations after donor funding ends. 
The role of the project steering committee is to: 
1. decide on the overall project strategy and orientation 
2. review the annual workplan of the project, and, depending on 
the contracting of the project, approve this plan 
3. monitor progress to expected results at the national level 
and at the regional level 
4. review the financial position of the project and, depending 
on the contracting of the project, approve the budget 
5. develop and approve on behalf of the network, project 
proposals for modernization of SMIs for submission to other 
interested donors 
6. recommend corrective action to steering committee members to 
ensure that the minimal standards of the network are 
maintained 
7. facilitate donor coordination if more than one donor is 
involved 
Limitations of the Committee: The review of the workplan and the 
financial position does not replace or supersede the respons- 
ibility of any contracting organization with its donor to manage 
and report on their financial obligations and commitments to 
achieve agreed-on results. The final responsibility to approve 
plans and budgets and subsequent changes rests with the donor and 
the contracting organization, and not with the project steering 
committee. The committee's role is to recommend changes. 
Transition: The transition from the existing steering committee 
to the new steering committee will occur during the bridging 
phase. The existing committee will terminate with the approval of 
the final progress and financial reports from FECAICA to PAR. 
Duration: The new PSC will function for the duration of the 
funding agreements with the donors. 
After Donor Funding: Whether or not the steering committee 
continues functioning to supervise and monitor activities of the 
network depends on decisions concerning the long-term network 
structure and its program. 
Post-donor funding activities would likely be to coordinate 
activities of the network, to review performance and funding 
issues related to the coordinating unit, to review performance of 
the network manager (if any), and to develop additional regional 
projects for the network to implement in partnership with other 
international donors or Central American governments. 
14. CAISNET Proiect Manaser: The bridging project manager is to 
become the CAISNET project manager for the bridging period from 
October 1, 1998 to September 30, 1999. The bridging project 
manager, hired and supervised by IDRC, will manage the bridging 
period contracts and will supervise the contracts and performance 
to results of: 
1. The Chamber of Industries of Costa Rica for the perforamcne 
of UATI 
2. The Industrial Association of El Salvador for the 
performance of UNATI 
3. The Chamber of Industries of Guatemala for the performance 
of UTEPYMI 
4. The National Association of Industries of Honduras for the 
performance of UNATIH 
5. The Chamber of Industries of Nicaragua for the performance 
of UNAPI 
6. CODETI for the performance of coordinating unit services. 
The President of CODETI is to be designated the director of 
the coordinating unit. 
15. Manasement Transition: The President of CODETI is to conclude 
his services as the Network Manager under the FECAICA/PAR 
contracts when the activities of this contract terminate. He will 
subsequently be designated as the director of the coordinating 
unit, reporting to the bridging project manager, (the CAISNET 
manager), under the bridging contract with IDRC. 
The APRO representative, as the CAISNET Canadian Coordinator 
under the IDRC-FECAICA/CICR agreements, is to tender his 
resignation effective September 14/98 when the IDRC/FECAICA/CICR 
and ~~~C/Alliance agreements terminate. 
The administrative supervision of CICR under the IDRC arrangement 
should also terminate effective September 14, 1998 [note - CICR 
has no similar administrative supervisory provision under the 
FECAICA/PAR contract.] 
16. New Phase - The Coordinatins Unit (option): The coordinating 
unit is to provide services to the national units to assist them 
in developing their consulting practise in a more efficient and 
effective manner. In addition, when project activities and 
funding are available for network activities, the coordinating 
unit can manage these on behalf of the network under a pre- 
approved plan and budget. The tasks of the coordinating unit are 
to: 
provide technical assistance to the unit directors for the 
management of their units 
provide advice to the Chamber or Association Executive 
Directors on the integration of the unit into the Chamber 
and Association structure and management 
organize regional technical training 
facilitate the sharing of information among the units 
maintain a data base in support of the unit's activities 
maintain the network's data base on performance, staffing, 
and financial self-sufficiency for reporting to donors and 
monitoring purposes 
manage the network travel budget (between countries and from 
the region to Canada) 
provide secretariat services to the project steering 
committee and participate in these meetings as a non-voting 
member 
assist the Canadian business linkage partner to coordinate 
the visits of Canadians to the region and the travel to 
Canada of any network members or participating SMIs 
conduct impact assessments of the national units' services 
to SMIs 
manage and administer the coordinating unit's funds and any 
funds that have been provided for common network activities. 
write project proposals on behalf of the network under the 
guidance of the network Board of Directors/PSC. 
Staffins (optional) : The sponsoring organization should review 
the required tasks, the available financial means, and forecasted 
needs. At a minimum, there is likely to be a need for a director, 
an assistant, and a secretary. 
Contracts: The functioning of the unit can be contracted to a 
foundation as has been the case with CODETI, or to an individual 
or to a private sector firm. The contract should specify the work 
they are expected to do and include a budget for their services. 
If the intention of FECAICA is not to have a sustainable 
coordinating unit, options for contracting the services of a 
coordinating unit have been provided under the "Value Addedu 
Network section of this report (page 55). 
17. owners hi^ of the Diagnostic Tools Needs to be Clarified bv 
Outsid : Seven organizations 
appear to have reasonable grounds to claim ownership of these 
tools, including IDRC and CIDA. These donors should jointly hire 
an outside lawyer as mediator. Ideally, this person will be fully 
bilingual, (Spanish-English), a specialist in intellectual 
property law in Canada, and have knowledge of and experience with 
the intellectual property laws of Costa Rica and the other 
Central American countries. This mediator will review the legal 
depositions of each of the seven groups attesting to their claim. 
The results of this mediation should be binding on all parties 
concerned. 
18. The National Units are to Im~rove their O~erations in Six 
Areas: annual ~lanninq, - ~ersonnel ~olicies and com~ensation. 
financial management. operational ~rocedures/client services, and 
facilities and eaui~ment over the bridsinq - period. 
The recommendations for these improvements are included in this 
report. The bridging project manager will conduct a rapid 
institutional assessment of each unit in June 1999 and report the 
findings to the Chambers and the Unit Director at the end of the 
appraisal. He should also issue a report to the Chamber, the 
Unit, IDRC and CIDA. 
The purpose of this appraisal is to ensure that the agreed to 
recommendations have been implemented. The Assessment Grids for 
the Appraisal are included on page 30 of the Bridging Report. 
19. 
































Industrial Association of Honduras 
Association of Provincial Research Organizations of 
Canada 
Salvadorian Industrial Association 
Chamber of Industries of Nicaragua 
Central America Industrial Support Network 
Chamber of Industries of Costa Rica 
Canadian International Development Agency 
Chamber of Industries Guatemala 
Company for Technological and Industrial Development of 
Central America 
National Council for Science and Technology - Honduras 
National Council for Science and Technology- Costa Rica 
Coordinating Unit CAISNET 
Federation of Industrial Chambers and Associations of 
Central America 
Federation of Small and Medium-Size Enterprises of 
Guatemala 
Interamerican Development Bank 
International Development Research Centre 
Latin America Regional Office (IDRC) 
National Industrial Support Units 
Regional Support Program 
Project Steering Committee 
Small and Medium Enterprises 
Small and Medium Manufacturing Firms 
Unified Industrial Diagnosis System For the Improvement 
of Competitiveness 
Industrial Support Unit of Costa Rica 
National Unit for Technical Assistance to Small and 
Medium Enterprises (Honduras) 
National Unit for the Support of Small Industries of 
Nicaragua 
National Industrial Support Unit of El Salvador 
National Industrial Support Unit of Honduras 
Technological Unit for the Development of the Small and 
Medium Sized Industries of Guatemala 




Alliancew was established in May 1996 by the merger of the 
Canadian Manufacturers Association (CMA), founded in 1871, and 
the Association of Canadian Exporters, founded in 1946. The 
Alliance is governed partially under the Special Act that created 
the CMA and partially by the Canadian Corporation Act. 
Headquartered in Toronto with offices in ten provinces, it 
represents more than 3,500 manufactures and exporters. In June 
1996, the Association of Provincial Research Organizations of 
Canada, (APRO) , joined the Alliance. 
T  (APRO) 
Founded in 1969, and independently incorporated in 1984, APRO1s 
members are the seven most important technological centres in 
Canada. They are located in Alberta, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, 
Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan and the Northwest Territories. At 
the height of its activities APRO represented more than 5,000 
research and development professionals, business advisors, and 
technology and information specialists. The association merged 
with The Alliance on June 19, 1996. APRO ceased to exist as an 
organization; its former members, however, meet as the Science 
and Technology Committee of The Alliance. 
CIDA: The Canadian International Development Agency is the lead 
government agency responsible for Canada's development 
assistance. Established in May 1958, CIDA1s purpose is to support 
sustainable development in developing countries in order to 
reduce poverty and to contribute to a more secure, equitable and 
prosperous world. CIDA supports six strategic programs areas: 
basic human needs, women and development and gender equity, 
infrastructure services, human rights, democracy and good 
governance, private sector development and the environment. CIDA 
had a staff of 1,200 and a budget of $1.8 billion in 1996/97. 
CODETI: Registered in 1991, CODETI (Company for Central America 
Industrial and Technology Development), is a legally registered 
foundation located in Costa Rica. CODETI worked with CONICIT from 
1991 to 1994 to undertake specific cases of technology transfer 
among companies and technology centres in the region. The results 
of these studies strongly supported the creation of national 
industrial advisory services, joined and supported through a 
Central American regional network. CODETI and IDRC held 
discussions with FECAICA in 1994 to explore their interest in 
this network. In 1995, under the IDRC grant to FECAICA and the 
Chamber of Costa Rica, CODETI1s President was named as the 
director of the coordinating unit. In 1996, under the FECAICA-PAR 
contract, the President of CODETI was named the Network Manager 
in addition to his role as Coordinating Unit Director. CODETI 
staff provided the services of the coordinating unit. 
FECAICA: The Federation of Chambers and Industrial Associations 
of Central America comprises the five Central America 
Organizations that represent the industrial sector of the region. 
Its members are the Chamber of Industries of Costa Rica, 
Industrial Association of El Salvador, Chamber of Industries of 
Guatemala, Industrial Association of Honduras, and the Chamber of 
Industries of Nicaragua. FECAICA is run by a Board of Directors, 
comprising the presidents of the five member groups. The 
presidency rotates among the five counties at regular intervals. 
Meetings are held bi-monthly at which members1 representatives 
regularly "networku and decide on regional issues. FECAICA 
maintains a office in Guatemala City to execute and follow up 
directions from the Board of Directors and the President. It is 
registered as a non-profit organization in Guatemala. 
International ( IDRC) Founded in 1970 
by the Parliament of Canada, and governed by an international 
board of 20 Directors, IDRC provided the first seed capital to 
CAISNET. IDRC's core mission is to initiate, encourage, support 
and conduct research into the problems of the developing 
countries. It is funded by a grant from the Canadian government 
which in 1997/98 totalled $88.1 Million, of which 24% is 
dedicated to its African program, 21% to Latin America and 18% to 
Asia. IDRC also co-funds projects with other donors and the 
private sector and implements projects directly related to its 
mandate. Most of IDRC's 380 staff are located in its headquarters 
in Ottawa. It has seven regional offices with the Latin America 
Regional Office (LARO) in Montevideo, Uruguay. Both the LARO and 
headquarter offices have been involved in the development and 
funding of the CAISNET project. 
PROJECT ORGANIZATIONS 
CAISNET: The Central American Industrial Support Network Project 
consists of five National Industrial Support Units (NISUs) 
throughout Central America and a coordinating unit. CAISNET 
provides a regional approach to support for small and medium-size 
industries or manufacturers, (SMIs), through its national 
advisory services and its information sharing network. CAISNET 
members also coordinate their efforts on issues of common 
interest and promote business linkages among SMIs in the region. 
CAISNET collaborates with The Alliance to facilitate business 
linkages between the region and Canada. 
Three years were required to establish the network as the first 
national unit was funded in February 1994, the coordinating unit 
in May 1995 and the last unit in February 1997. From March 26, 
1996, CAISNET received funding support to strengthen its network 
from PAR. FECAICA is the network sponsor. CAISNET is a project. 
It is not a legally registered institution. The legal represen- 
tation, however, on behalf of CAISNET, under the FECAICA/PAR 
contract, is held by CODETI. 
NISUs: The National Industrial Support Units, the sites of the 
CAISNET network, operate in the five Central America countries. 
They are: 
V The Industrial Support Unit of Costa Rica (UATI) established 
in July 1994 and located in the Chamber of Industries of 
Costa Rica, in San Jose. The second phase of the Unit 
started in January 1997. The UATI receives funds from IDRC 
and FECAICA/PAR. The Chamber is responsible and accountable 
for the Unit. 
V The Technical Unit f o r  the Development for the Small and 
Medium-Size Industries o f  Guatemala (UTEPYMI) established in 
June 1994 was the first national unit set up. It was 
sponsored initially by the Federation for Small and Medium- 
Size Enterprises (FEPYME) and in the first two years was 
located in different offices before moving to its present 
location in the Chamber of Industries of Guatemala, in 
Guatemala City. In January 1997, when IDRC renewed its 
second phase support to the Unit, its agreement was signed 
with CIG. UTEPYMI also receives funds from FECAICA/PAR. The 
Chamber is responsible and accountable for the Unit. 
V The National Industrial Support Unit o f  El Salvador (UNATI) 
established in September, 1996 and located in the 
Salvadorean Industrial Association (ASI) in Salvador City. 
This Unit receives direct funding from the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) - National Productive Enterprises 
Association (ANEP) besides the funds from IDRC and 
FECAICA/PAR. The UNATI operates under an administrative 
agreement between ANEP-ASI-CODETI; however, AS1 is 
responsible and accountable for the Unit. 
V The National Unit for the Support o f  Small Industries o f  
Nicaragua (UNAPI) was established in April 1997 with funds 
from IDRC and FECAICA/PAR and is located in the Chamber of 
Industries in Managua. CADIN is responsible and accountable 
for the Unit. 
V The National Industrial Support Unit of Honduras' funding 
was approved in May 1994 by IDRC for a grant to the Honduran 
Council of Science and Technology (COHCIT) , a government 
agency. However, the memorandum of understanding between 
IDRC and COHCIT was not signed until May 1996. The unit, 
under the name of UDATE and located in the Technology 
University of Honduras, started its operations shortly 
thereafter. IDRC grant agreement with COHCIT expired in May 
1998 and was not renewed due to poor performance. 
The National Industrial Support Uni t of  Honduras (UNATIH) , 
established with PAR funding in November 1997, is located in 
Tegucigalpa. UNATIH has no IDRC funding. It has an agreement 
of cooperation signed with UDATE and CODETI; however, no 
collaboration has resulted from this agreement. AND1 is 
responsible and accountable for UNATIH. 
CAISNET Coordination Unit: was set up in April 1995 with IDRC 
funding to FECAICA. Collaborative agreements were signed between 
FECAICA and the Chamber of Costa Rica for administrative and 
supervisory services and between FECAICA and CODETI for the 
management of the unit and the provision of coordinating unit 
services. This unit was initially located in the Chamber of 
Industry of Costa Rica but moved its offices to a separate 
location in 1995. This unit works to increase the effectiveness 
of the advisory services provided by the national units and to 
facilitate regional linkages and linkages with Canada. Under the 
FECAICA/PAR contract CODETI was appointed the Network Manager and 
the Director of the coordinating unit. The coordinating unit 
provides administrative and reporting services for FECAICA. The 
coordinating unit is not a legally registered institution. It is 
a project site. 
CAISNET Steerins Committee: The governing body for the CAISNET. 
project began operations in 1995. It meets bi-annually, usually 
for two days, to consider policy and strategic decisions and to 
oversee the operations of the project. 
The current members are: the President and Secretary General of 
FECAICA; the Vice President for International Trade and the 
Chairman of the Science and Technology Committee of The Alliance 
(the former CMA and APRO representatives), the Senior Project 
Officer of IDRC and the Network Director. The project director 
for CRC Sogema/~AR program also attends as a non-voting member. 
The Steering Committee is a project mechanism created to provide 
overview and supervision to the CAISNET project. It is not a 
legally constituted accountability structure. 
PAR Proqram: Programa de Apoyo Regional is a five year, $14.0 M 
CIDA funded project which began in February 1995. PAR'S goal is 
to promote an equitable process of economic modernization in the 
Central America region. PAR supports two major activities: a $10 
M Regional Initiative Fund and a $750,000 Study Fund, which 
finance proposals from Canadian and Central American partners to 
facilitate the transfer of management techniques and technology 
and to strengthen the mechanisms of regional participation in the 
modernization process. The program is implemented by CRC Sogema, 
a Canadian private sector consulting company located in Montreal 
with a project office in San Jose, Costa Rica. The PAR program is 
scheduled to end in February 2002. It is not known whether or not 
PAR will have a second phase. CRC/Sogema holds the legal repre- 
sentation for PAR in Central America. 
INTRODUCTION TO THE REPORT 
BACKGROUND 
The beginning of CAISNET is unclear. The original project 
managers have left IDRC. The files for CAISNET1s start up are in 
IDRC1s Montevideo office and the IDRC department that sponsored 
this initiative no longer exists. Only one person from this 
period remains - Jorge Monge, the President of CODETI. His 
history of the creation of CAISNET is found in the annex. 
The evaluator's understanding is summarized below. 
In the early 1990s IDRC began to explore the possibility of 
transferring innovative, technological advisory services from 
Asia and Canada to Central America to address the problems of 
small and medium-size manufacturers: low productivity, outdated 
technology, inadequate marketing, low product quality, and poor 
management skills. 
As part of these initiatives, IDRC, through its Corporate 
Initiative Branch (CIB) Ottawa and LARO offices, and the Science 
and Technology Department of the Organizations of American States 
(OAS), sponsored a meeting to discuss the applied technology 
development of the region. Subsequently, researchers from Costa 
Rica and Brazil joined efforts to submit a proposal to IDRC for 
the establishment of a pilot initiative for Central America to 
promote north-south and south-south transfer of technological 
knowledge. In December 1991 IDRC funded this proposal. It was 
sponsored by CONICIT, the National Council for Science and 
Technology of Costa Rica, which selected Jorge Monge as 
researcher for the project. 
In 1994, based on the promising results of CONICIT1s work, IDRC 
funded two industrial support units as pilot projects: one in 
Costa Rica with the Chamber of Industry and the other in 
Guatemala with the Federation of Small and Medium Enterprises. 
Concurrently, IDRC approached FECAICA to discuss establishing 
similar units on a regional basis, with the idea of a "networku 
among them to provide for a regional approach to industrial 
support. During this period, the idea of a regional network was 
strongly supported by the President of the Costa Rican Chamber, 
who was also the President of FECAICA. 
In November 1994 FECAICA1s Board approved the CAISNET project 
idea which was presented to IDRC for funding. The original 
proposal was a three year, $1.5 M project. When IDRC received 
budget cutbacks from the Canadian Government, the proposal was 
reduced to $394,000 over 31 months. Scaled back were elements 
relating to technology transfer, joint ventures, Canadian support 
and monitoring to preserve the essential elements: establishing 
the co-ordinating unit as the network hub, supporting the 
national units in start-up, and testing and adaptation of the 
diagnostic tools. 
From 1994 to 1997 IDRC funded three additional units in Honduras 
(UDATE), in El Salvador (UNATI), and in Nicaragua (UNAPI), with 
the timing for the establishment of these units based largely on 
IDRC1s availability of funds. From the beginning, IDRC had 
received favourable response to possible additional funds from 
IDB and CIDA through its PAR program. In March 1996, after a 
successful project submission to a competitive bid, PAR signed a 
$1.1 M contract with FECAICA for 30 months. 
EVALUATION CLIENTS 
The primary clients of the evaluation are the funders of CAISNET: 
IDRC, CIDA/PAR, FECAICA and its members; its implementors: 
FECAICA, its members, The ALLIANCE, and CODETI; and its 
supporters: the Governments of the Central American countries. 
The beneficiaries of CAISNET are the small and medium-sized 
industries or manufacturers (SMIs.) 
EVALUATION PURPOSE 
The purpose of the evaluation is to provide an independent 
assessment of the performance of CAISNET, that is, its 
effectiveness and efficiency in serving SMIs, its effect and 
impact on this target group, and its sustainability. This report 
also fulfils IDRC1s formal requirement for an end-of-funding 
review. 
STRUCTURE OF THE EVALUATION REPORT 
The report is divided into four sections: Part I - The 
Effectiveness of CAISNET covers the results and impacts on SMIs; 
Part I1 - The Efficiency of CAISNET covers the operations of the 
national units, the coordinating unit, the regional and Canadian 
networks, and the steering committee; Part I11 - The 
Sustainability of the Network, and Part IV - Lessons Learned. 
This report is to be read in conjunction with the other report 
from this mission, titled "CAISNET Bridging Proposal and New 
Phase  proposal^, September 1998. 
EVALUATION SCOPE 
CAISNET has benefited from many donors. This evaluation will 
assess the overall performance of CAISNET and not exclusively any 
donor's funded portion. 
CAISNET1s operational performance was evaluated in July, 1997 at 
the mid-point of the PAR contract. Fifteen recommendations were 
provided to re-align the project's activities. This evaluation 
does not cover the adequacy of implementation of these 
recommendations. 
In addition, the focus of the evaluation is on the results and 
sustainability of the last three years. Previous years' 
operations have not been covered. 
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
The evaluation was conducted during June and July, 1998. The 
first month covered the review of IDRC1s correspondence and 
administrative files, plus project reports. Phone and/or personal 
interviews were held with IDRC, CIDA, EDC, Program Bolivar, The 
Alliance, CRC Sogema (Montreal) and Interica. 
The field mission was conducted from July 4th to 24th, beginning 
and ending with a visit to the coordinating unit in Costa Rica. 
All five national units were visited and separate discussions 
held with Executive Directors of the Chambers, the Unit 
Directors, and the available technical and support staff. In 
addition, two to three SMIs were visited per country. In each 
case the unit's file of the SMI was reviewed, including the 
contract, invoices, and any reports, training material or 
information provided to clients. Where time permitted, other unit 
files were reviewed. 
The evaluator also met with IDB representatives in El Salvador 
and in Costa Rica. 
EVALUATION LIMITATIONS 
Unfortunately, due to limited field time, CRC/Sogema (Costa Rica) 
correspondence files were not reviewed. However, each national 
unit's correspondence files with PAR was read, so, in the opinion 
of the evaluator, this was a minor limitation. 
A major limitation of the assignment was the design of the field 
work. The evaluator was asked to assess the network's performance 
and discuss details of a second phase and a bridging phase. The 
network assessment involved meeting all five units. When this was 
completed, no time remained to revisit the units to discuss the 
details of the bridging and the second phase. 
BASIC PROJECT DATA 
PROJECT SllMWARY DESCRIPTION 
Proiect Name: CAISNET, Central America Industrial Support 
Network. Also called, CODETI-CAISNET, FECAICA-CAISNET, and 
CODETI-FECAICA-CAISNET. 
Project Description: CAISNET consists of five units in each of 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, and 
a coordinating unit in Costa Rica. The national units are hosted 
by the National Chambers and Associations of Industry in each 
country, which are members of FECAICA. Although the headquarters 
for FECAICA is in Guatemala City, the network coordinating unit, 
sponsored by FECAICA, is located in Costa Rica. This regional 
network is linked to Canada through The Alliance. 
:The goal of CAISNET is to improve the 
competitiveness, productivity and technical capacity of small and 
medium-sized industrial (manufacturing) firms. (SMIs) . Its 
purpose is to provide a regional collaborative approach to 
supporting SMIs through networking and advisory services. 
-: SMIs with between 10 to 100 employees. 
Proiect Fundinq: CAISNET has had three stages of funding: the 
first was its formation stage from 1991 to 1994, the second, its 
launch stage from 1994 to 1997, and the third, its strengthening 
phase from 1996 to 1998. 
IDRC funded the formation stage through its Ottawa and LARO 
offices. For the second phase, five of the six units were set up 
by IDRC and one by PAR. The strengthening phase was funded by 
CIDA through PAR. 
Besides Canadian supporters, two other donors, IDB and 
Fedecooperacion (Holland), are involved. As well, and most 
importantly, funding has come from the National Chambers and 
Industry Associations. 
Proiect Budgets: CAISNET was funded through eleven different 
contracts from 1991 to 1998, consequently a total project budget 
has never been drawn up. Had there been, the estimated total 
project budget over this period, excluding other donors' funding, 
would have been $4,605,414 of which $3,150,131 (68%) has been 
provided by Canadian donors and $1,454,683 (32%) from members of 
the network spent in local currency. 
For Canadian donors, approximately $2,050,131 (65%) has been 
committed from IDRC and $1,100,000 (35%) from CIDA through PAR. 
The highest local contributor is estimated to have been AS1 at 
$179,109 and the lowest, FECAICA/CICR for the coordinating unit 
at $84,300. [Expenditures from these local contribution budgets 
were not, however, confirmed in this review.] 
Proiect Outputs and Expected Results: Project outputs are the 
services, goods, and training that the project implementors are 
expected to complete by project termination. As this evaluation 
considers CAISNET as a whole, its outputs have been taken from 
the most common wording in the eleven project documents with the 
exception of output # 6. This output has been defined as 
"business technology opportunities (BTOs) established between 
Canadian and Central American firms or between firms in the 
regionN. The evaluator finds this output statement inadequate, 
since Mopportunitiesll are not established, they are always 
present. The intent of BTOs is a successful business deal, so 
output # 6 has been restated below. The project outputs are: 
1. national units established 
2. industrial advisors trained 
3. industrial advisors providing services to SMIs 
4. diagnostic tools developed, tested and in use 
5. coordinating unit set up and supporting the network 
6. business contracts signed between Canadian and Central 
American firms or between firms in the region for sales, 
joint ventures, licensing agreements, business purchases, or 
distributor agreements. 
7. funding raised to cover the costs of the network from 
earnings, FECAICA members, or other donor proj ect s . 
None of these outputs, however, have quantifiable measures 
attached to them in project documents. 
The expected result of CAISNET at the purpose level is improved 
productivity and profitability for SMIs and, at the institutional 
level, the managerial and financial sustainability of CAISNET. 
MAJOR CHANGES FROM ORIGINAL PLAN 
To date, six major changes from the original project plan have 
been made. They include the following: 
1. The Canadian Gatekee~er: The word "gatekeeperu means a person 
who controls access to and makes available, resources and 
information. It is frequently used in conjunction with the 
functioning of the global Internet. 
The Gatekeeper was an advisor to the Coordinating Unit Director, 
based in Canada. He was responsible for the coordination and 
development of the Canadian linkages. The Canadian Gatekeeper 
played an active role in CAISNET from project conception to June 
1996 when APRO merged with The Alliance. Shortly thereafter, the 
project liaison officer, hired on contract by The Alliance, 
assumed most of the Gatekeeper's functions. 
The change to The Alliance improved project efficiency because 
The Alliance, unlike APRO, is a functioning Canadian network with 
offices throughout Canada. The liaison officer, therefore, did 
not have to "developu the Canadian network as had the APRO 
gatekeeper. 
2. Steerins Committee: The membership and functions of this 
committee changed under the FECAICA/PAR contract. Initially the 
national units were committee members, however, from April, 1998 
onward, they were represented by FECAICA's Secretary General and 
President. As well, the committee's mandate appeared to change 
from a traditional project steering committee to a Board of 
Directors of the parallel Canadian and Central America networks. 
This change negatively affected project decision-making because 
national units were not directly consulted for major decisions. 
3. Proiect Manaser: Initially, CAISNET did not have a network 
manager. Each unit was responsible and accountable for its own 
activities and the coordinating unit was responsible for the 
network activities between the region and Canada. 
Under the terms of the FECAICA/PAR contract, FECAICA appointed 
the President of CODETI as the Network Manager in addition to his 
IDRC role as Coordinating Unit Director. The FECAICA/PAR contract 
assumed the five units acted in a coordinated manner with 
standardized operations, whereas, under IDRC contracts they had 
been highly autonomous, though loosely affiliated in a network 
facilitated by FECAICA. The FECAICA/PAR contract structure 
centralized information, resources (staff and money), and 
decision-making in the coordinating unit for invoicing, reporting 
and managing the exceedingly complicated project budget. 
Consequently, the role of the Network Manager became more 
prominent over the last thirty months of CAISNET operations. 
It does not appear as if a centralized network structure had been 
agreed to by FECAICArs members even though they signed a contract 
with PAR representing their network in this manner. Consequently, 
there was friction between the sponsoring organizations which saw 
themselves as the unit managers, and the Network Manager, who 
attempted to "manageN the units under the terms of his agreement 
with FECAICA, which had been agreed to by all FECAICA members. 
This confusion over management responsibilities created 
unnecessary conflicts. 
4. Proiect Funding: Under the IDRC agreements, the Central 
American organizations received advances over the duration of 
their agreements and reported on expenditures twice a year. In 
contrast, the FECAICA/PAR funding was a refund program, whereby 
approved activities were paid for in advance by the participants, 
and the supporting invoice and documentation submitted through 
the coordinating unit to PAR for reimbursement. The CRC 
Sogema/PAR policy, as stated in the contract, was to pay all 
invoices within 45 days. 
However, THE major problem of the PAR contract was its late 
payment of invoices. During the mission, the PAR Director 
indicated that the delayed payments had been improved. However, 
the evaluator found outstanding bills totalling $189,000, with 
most between 60 to over 120 days in arrears. This created 
considerable hardships to the Chambers, which, in addition to 
funding their local contribution, had to use their cash flow to 
finance the poor administrative performance of CRC Sogema. This 
slowed implementation, and in one case, prevented unit advisors 
from participating in network training activities. 
5. Donor Coordination: Although CIDA and IDRC have been funding 
CAISNET separately since March 1996, collaboration between them 
only began in earnest in early 1998. IDRC project files show that 
coordination with CIDA had been anticipated as early as 1994. Had 
this occurred, the contracting and reporting structures could 
have been harmonized and simplified, thereby saving time and 
energy. 
6. : Until April 1998, 
CAISNET appeared to be Iton target". While there were differences 
among participants, these were overcome to facilitate the higher 
objective of regional collaboration. 
In May 1998, following the announcement of a joint IDRC and CIDA 
evaluation, and of a possible future phase with additional 
funding from Canada, there began a series of letters and meetings 
demanding changes in PAR activities and the coordinating unit. 
The evaluator did not speak with all of the key players in this 
highly heated debate, as several were away on vacation. However, 
from the evaluator's experience, the discussions appeared 
typical of the jockeying for control of the next phase (and 
budget), that is common when projects undergo evaluation for 
possible next-phase support. 
The evaluator found that these actions slowed project progress. 
They also, in the opinion of the evaluator, undermined the 
credibility of network members, which could in the long term 
jeopardize future funding. 
PROJECT RATIONALE 
TARGET GROUP : 
The CAISNET project targets registered small and medium 
manufacturers with between 10 and 100 employees. According to the 
original CAISNET proposal to PAR, in the early 1990s there were 
approximately 11,000 registered manufacturing firms in the five 
countries of which approximately 80% or 8,800 were small and 
medium firms. There was no further data verifying the size of the 
target population by country. 
In 1996, FEDEPRICAP, with funding from PAR, carried out a five 
county study investigating the medium-size manufacturing firms in 
the region. According to this study, a medium-size firm has 
between 20 to 150 employees. Using this data, adjusted to the 
CAISNET target group definition, the target population of CAISNET 
would be between 11,000 and 16,000 firms: approximately 3,000 
firms of between 20 to 100 employees, and a further 9,000 to 
13,000 firms of between 10 to 19 employees. 
NWMBER OF MANUFACTURING FIRMS BY EMPLOYEE SIZE 
Notes: The data for Costa Rica is from 1994, El Salvador from 1993, Guatemala 
from 1993, and Nicaragua from 1995. There was no data available for Honduras. The 
evaluator has assumed approximately 1,100 Honduran medium-size firms and 
approximately 2,000 small firms. Though the national data is incomparable, it 
provides a "best guess1' estimate of the target population size for CAISNET. 




The FEDEPRICAP survey indicated two important characteristics of 
the industrial sector relevant to CAISNET. The first is that 
medium firms comprise only 10% of the manufacturing sector. The 
greatest majority of firms, 86%, are small with under 19 
employees. Only 4% of firms have more than 100 employees. This 
reinforces the importance of small firms in this project. 
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The second characteristic indicated by the FEDEPRICAP survey is 
the underdeveloped manufacturing sector in Nicaragua, which has 
only 5% and 12% of the number of registered firms as El Salvador 
and Costa Rica respectively. This implies that the self- 
sufficiency strategy for Nicaragua should be to assist all firms, 
since the unit cannot generate sufficient revenues for its 
oprations from the less than 400 firms in the SMI target group. 
The Problems of SMIs: 
The FEDEPRICAP survey confirmed the situation of SMIs as reported 
by CAISNET: low productivity, obsolete equipment, inadequate 
marketing, low product quality, inadequate attention to cash 
management and capital asset structure, little export experience, 
and poor management skills. They also stated that much of the 
industrial base is related to agro-industry. 
In conducting interviews, the evaluator found a high incidence of 
family ownership structure in these firms, which adds familial 
problems to business ones especially in management issues. Very 
few of these firms use outside business services of any nature. 
Even common business services like those provided by accountants 
and lawyers are typically supplied by sons, cousins, brothers or 
uncles. 
With the opening of the Central American marketplace, and the 
increasing awareness of globalization, SMIs are aware that they 
must change. However, they perceive that there are no affordable 
and reliable services targeted to their needs. Once they are 
presented with services, especially those supported by 
respectable national institutions, they are at least willing to 
consider outside assistance. 
The evaluation finds that the target beneficiaries have been well 
selected with SMIs being an important niche of the industrial 
sector, and a group of SMEs with specific needs. The problems of 
the SMIs were clearly well understood by project designers. 
RELATIONSHIP TO IDRC'S POLICY AND PROGRAMS 
CAISNET was approved by IDRC under its program theme "Technology 
and the Environmentn, which included assistance to the SME sector 
and the introduction of cleaner production processes. In 1997, as 
part of its corporate revitalization process, this program theme 
was widened to the Small, Medium and Micro-Enterprise Innovation 
and Technology (SMMEIT) program, of which CAISNET is an important 
element. SMMEIT1s implementation strategy supports a combination 
of research, pilot projects and networking. 
CAISNET was not a typical IDRC research project. It was more 
operational than most because of the need to hire and train staff 
and equip offices. It was approved as a pilot project, with the 
areas under investigation being the diagnostic tools, the 
creation and sustainability of the national units, the regional 
network, and the linkage of this network to its Canadian 
counterpart. 
The evaluation found that CAISNET fit within IDRC's policies and 
programs and was one of its most innovative initiatives. 
RELATIONSHIP TO CIDA'S POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 
CIDA has six programming priorities. CAISNET falls within the 
private sector priorities which promote sustained and equitable 
economic growth by supporting private sector development in 
developing countries, and the women in development and gender 
equity priority which promotes the full participation of women in 
business and economic development. 
CIDA1s Central American program has three main themes: social 
reform/social equity, environment and natural resource 
management, and economic modernization. CAISNET falls within two 
of the program themes: social equity and economic modernization 
which aims to create strategic and institutional alliances 
between the region and Canada aimed at regional economic 
integration. CIDA1s operational strategy is to "think regionally 
and act nationally" which permits responsiveness to initiatives 
at the national level. Here again, the evaluation confirmed that 
the CAISNET project meets the policy and program objectives of 
CIDA. 
RELATIONSHIP TO REGIONAL POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 
The Central American governments, individually and collectively, 
have been developing policies, programs and regulations to expand 
the productive base of their economies and to encourage greater 
competitiveness. In 1993, a new system of tariffs was introduced, 
harmonizing nomenclature and rates. Trade agreements have been 
signed this decade among regional members, with Mexico, and with 
other Latin American countries. 
Presidential meetings have consistently confirmed the importance 
of the productive sector and backed this up with modernization of 
its regulatory environment. 
The evaluation confirms that the CAISNET project meets priority 
objectives of the Central American governments. 
EFFECTIVENESS 
SERVICES TO SMIS: 
Based on unit records, 506 SMI clients paid for consulting 
services from January 1996 to September 1998. This is 
approximately 3% to 4% of the regional target population. Almost 
all of these SMIs clients were from the three established units: 
Costa Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala. 
Comparing national results to target population, Costa Rica has 
achieved a market penetration rate of 11%, Guatemala 8% and El 
Salvador 2%. Honduras and Nicaragua have spent longer than 
anticipated in start-up and could benefit from mentoring 
assistance from the more successful units to accelerate their 
growth. Notably, Nicaragua has reached 2% of its estimated target 
population with only ten firms as clients. 
SERVICES TO SMIS - UNIT RECORDS 











* 36% of El Salvador's SMI clients, (approximately 30 firms), 





























Performance to Proiect Plans: 
Project plans gave little attention to results. They were not 
mentioned in the IDRC grant agreements. The IDRC approval 
documents have a number stated, however, given its obscure 
wording and placement in the document, no one but an evaluator 
would recognize it as an important indicator. The FECAICA/PAR 
contract is the same. Expected results appeared only in the LFA, 
a document so confusing to persons not experienced with project 
management that it could mistakenly be dismissed as unimportant. 
Depending on the CAISNET plan used, the number of SMIs served was 
more or less than the number initially planned. IDRC estimated 
that 476 clients would be reached during the 36 months from 
January 96 to December 98. PAR'S estimates for less time (30 
months), were 40% higher at 666 clients. Accordingly, from IDRC's 
perspective, the project exceeded its goal by 6% whereas from the 
PAR perspective, only 71% of the planned target was met. Since 
the unit directors were not aware that these targets existed, the 
differences between the plans hardly mattered. Not surprisingly, 
there was no reporting to planned results in the six progress 
reports of this period. 
PLANNED SERVICES TO SMIS - IDRC 






































PLANNED SERVICES TO SMIS - FECAICA/PAR 
April 1996 to September 1998 
I[ Unit/Time Apr-Dec 96 Jan-Dec 97 Jan-Sept 98 TOTAL 11 
I costa ~ i c a  I 34 I 71 I 45 I 150 A 
( 1  El Salvador I 23 49 50 122 11 
11 Honduras 23 49 50 




1 Nicaragua 23 49 50 
I I I I 
Manasement Records : 
34 
TOTAL 
All unit directors have some system of tracking their unit's 
progress. This is a record of what has been achieved to date, 
instead of a comparison of results to an approved plan. Only one 
unit - UNATI has a plan, by month, showing planned versus actual 
results. This, however, was not used as a management tool since 
it was two months out-of-date when presented to the evaluator. 
45 71 
Records of client services are kept in two locations: the unit 
office and the coordinating unit office. Before the FECAICA/PAR 
contract, each unit reported in non-standard formats and time 
periods to IDRC. Because the FECAICA/PAR contract required one 
network report, the coordinating unit attempted to standardize 
the data. Overall, timeliness of reporting improved under the PAR 
period, however, there were still unexplained discrepancies 
between the unit's reports and those of the coordinating unit 
office. For example, the following chart from the coordinating 
unit's records for 1997 shows 127 services versus the 172 
services reported by the units. 
Source: FECAICA/PAR contract, LFA, modified to calendar year. 
137 
150 1 
289 240  666 
SERVICES TO SMIs - COORDINATING UNIT RECORDS 
JANUARY TO DECEMBER 1997 
The major difference between the two reports is the definition of 
what constitutes "a SMI serviceu for reporting purposes. Some use 
the number of contracts signed in a year, some the number of 
invoices paid, and others the number of invoices issued. In 
general, these differences are significant only when the number 
of SMI clients is the only indicator of the project. When the 
goal is self-sufficiency, the important data is the number of 
clients served, consulting rates, and earnings revenue. 








Records of services to clients are the most basic form of record 
keeping required in a project like CAISNET. This inconsistent 
data suggests that the project was involved in too many other 
activities too soon before the fundamental systems were in place. 
Cost Effectiveness of Results Achieved 
While 506 paying customers is a valiant achievement, the number 
of clients is considerably less than a functioning network at 
this stage of its development, costing close to $4.6 M, should 
have achieved. (The average cost per client, including local 
contribution = $ 9 , 0 0 0 . )  The reasons for the poor performance are 
varied: slow start-up, turnover of personnel, poor working 
environment, unmotivated advisors due to low salaries, network 
regional activities taking precedence over client services, other 
chamber duties unrelated to the unit's mission, CAISNET politics, 
servicing other donor's SMI programs which benefit clients but do 
not earn consulting revenue, attending training courses, and 
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The main reason that results are not higher, however, is that 
client service targets and expected billings were not emphasized 
and given management attention by IDRC, the Chamber or 
Association Executive Director, and CRC Sogema/PAR. Data on 
clients and revenues earned were almost always deeply buried in 
reports. Rarely were they given front page prominence. 
A note of caution: a simple numbers approach to consulting 
services is not recommended. Unit directors instinctively know 
that success is a combination of the number of clients, repeat 
business, and the value and duration of contracts. What is needed 
for reporting are simple instruments to measure and track these 
key variables. 
PERFORMANCE OF THE REGIONAL NETWORK AND ITS LINKS TO CANADA 
The purpose of creating a regional network with links to Canada 
was to establish a mechanism whereby the national unit could 
assist SFIs to access new technologies and technological 
information. How this network mechanism was to work in day-to-day 
practise was not well explained in the project documents. The 
evaluator assumed that "accessing new technologies~ from the SFIs 
perspective meant machines or information that were sold or 
bought through joint ventures, direct sales or licensing 
agreements. 
There were NO reports of any SMI which received new technology 
from another Central American country or from Canada as a result 
of their contract with the unit or the regional network. The only 
business deals associated with CAISNET were service contracts for 
CAISNET training, technical assistance or studies. 
From 1996 to 1998, at least 25 SMIs received visits from 13 
APRO/~lliance members who conducted investigative and sectoral 
studies and from two Canadian consultants who conducted the IS0 
9000 and IS0 14000 courses, including in-plant demonstrations. In 
some sense the SMIs visited acquired "informationn through these 
visits. However, the amount of value added to SMIs was small 
compared with the cost of the regional network and its links to 
Canada. Neither did any deals result from the visits to Canada of 
the 30 Central Americans from FECAICA and the unit staff. 
The evaluator's finding is that the Walue addedw of the network 
from the SMIsl point of view, is nil or, more likely, negative, 
since network activities and politics have consumed a large 
amount of time and energy which could have been productively used 
in consulting services. The recommendation based on this finding 
is that the rationale and value added of the regional network and 
its links to Canada must be re-examined by network members from 
the point of view of concrete benefits to SMIs. 
IMPACT OF SERVICES ON SMI PERFORMANCE 
The impact of the services on SMIs cannot be determined with any 
precision, The general impression is that clients are nsatisfiedlf 
with the services received and feel they have experienced 
"positive changesn as a result. The evaluator met with 12 firms 
or 2% of the number of clients served. On a scale of 1 to 10, the 
firms rated the services between 6 to 8. Most firms had not hired 
consultants before and found the experience of "outside eyesw 
beneficial. They were not, however, able to quantify these 
benefits. 
Impact assessments conducted by the units are essentially 
informal. For two units, clients complete an evaluation form at 
the end of their contract. The ones returned show high satis- 
faction, but few are returned and the questions are vague. Three 
unit directors randomly call their clients to check on their 
level of satisfaction. Only one unit provides a "services 
guaranteed or your money refunded" attribute, which no one has 
used to date. 
The original IDRC project plan included impact studies as 
"research activitiesff. These were never carried out because their 
funding was to come from "earningsu which were used for higher 
priorities such as salaries. The majority of the unitsr files 
show typical consulting service behaviour: once an assignment 
ffproductff has been delivered and the fees collected the file is 
closed, with no further follow-up. However, El Salvador and 
Guatemala have adopted a marketing strategy based on continuous 
performance improvements resulting in follow-on contracts of 
between 30 to 40% of their client base. 
THE REASONABLENESS OF IMPACT INDICATORS 
The project documents indicate that the expected impacts included 
a "wish listu of changes without any conscious thought as to how 
these would be measured, who would measure them, at what cost and 
over what time period. The IDRC list includes improved product 
quality, lower production costs, improved export opportunities, 
increased employment, improvement in environmental practises, 
increased competitiveness, improved profitability, and an 
increase in the company's share of GDP. The FECAICA/PAR list is 
basically the same with two additions: improved strategic 
position and innovation. 
The issue of what it is practical for consulting services to 
monitor as "impactu when clients are paying for services, needs 
to be carefully studied. It is unlikely that a common measurement 
for all SMIs can be found, since client services are usually 
unique. Even if a common indicator could be identified and 
measured, the problem of attribution remains: how to determine 
that the technical "adviceu provided was the unique or the major 
contributing factor in the measured changes when the company 
itself must act on this advice. 
A study to assess the impact of consulting services on SMIs in 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala is recommended during the 
bridging phase. This should also include an examination of the 
methodological issues of data collection, time and cost. 
HAS THE PROJECT ADDRESSED SMI PROBLEMS? 
The proposed solution to address SMI problems is to help them 
access new technologies and technological information. However, 
the evaluator was unclear as to what was meant by this solution. 
The word lttechnologylt was frequently used throughout project 
documents and field visit interviews in phrases such as 
lltechnology transferM, "available technologies~, "technologies 
specific to needsl1, "cleaner technologyu, "modern technologiesv, 
"higher level of technical proficiencyu, "a technological 
brokerage serviceIt , llevaluate, acquire and manage new 
technologiesn, ntechnological sourcingt1 and "technology for 
competitivenessn. 
~Technologyu is this sense appeared to be a general term used by 
international development and government professionals to refer 
to the broad field of mechanical arts and applied sciences. This 
term, however, is not commonly used by business people or 
manufacturers. Their language centres around the three key 
interrelated business functions: marketing, finance, and 
production. The production function consists of the persons who 
are responsible for producing the goods for which the firm 
exists. Typically, this function employs the greatest number of 
people and is responsible for administering and effectively using 
the greatest portion of the firm's controllable assets. 
While an industrial support unit to SMIs could provide services 
to all three business functions, its expertise is generally 
concentrated in the operations functions of a plant. Here, the 
issues commonly assessed are the design of the production system, 
and the planning and controlling of operations, including 
facility location, plant layout, job design, work measurement and 
standards, compensation and productivity-based wage plans, 
aggregate planning and capacity considerations, purchasing and 
inventory management, material requirementsf planning, scheduling 
and controlling manufacturing operations, quality assurance, 
cost, investment and maintenance. 
The evaluator determined that the use of the word lltechnologyll 
clouded the simple but important work of the advisors - offering 
services and information related to production. This primary 
focus does not exclude other business functions; however, in 
terms of staffing, the majority of the technical advisors have 
background and experience in engineering and commerce, rather 
than in accountancy and finance. 
It is recommended that the unit's consulting services be 
described as basically what they are: services to the productive 
functions of an SMI. Therefore, the use of general-category terms 
like technology should be discontinued. 
EFFICIENCY 
THE PILOT PROJECT ASPECT OF CAISNET 
What was the Pilot Project? 
IDRC developed CAISNET as an llexperimentv and "a pilot projectm1. 
The recipients received funds for research activities and IDRC 
expected the results of these experiments to be reported in the 
progress reports. There were four elements under experimentation 
in the IDRC project design: 
(1) the diagnostic tools 
(2) the creation and sustainability of the national units 
(3) the creation and sustainability of the national units and a 
regional network 
(4) the regional network linked to Canada 
For a research organization that commonly funds experimental 
projects, the scope of the pilot project was surprising vague. 
The criteria for success were descriptive: tools developed and in 
use, the units and the network set up and functioning and links 
with Canada established. Indicators measuring the degree of use 
and the degree of functioning were not provided. There were no 
time limits for the experiment stated, nor were there any 
indications that the pilot project would be reviewed for a "go/no 
gon decision. 
The pilot project aspect of CAISNET was poorly understood by 
CAISNET members. Those interviewed were unaware they were 
participants in an experiment. Instead, they understood their 
relationship with IDRC as a long-term development partnership 
rather than that of holders of a short-term research grant. 
The conclusion of the evaluation is that the pilot project was 
poorly planned. Had the expected results within a defined time 
period been well understood, the experiment could have been 
better managed to achieve these results. 
Results of the Pilot Proiect: 
From a general perspective, the evaluation findings with respect 
to the four experimental elements conclude that one has been 
successful, one has failed, and two are unproven. 
The success has been the diagnostic tools, the failure has been 
the regional links to Canada, and the unproven elements are the 
sustainability of the national units and the regional network. 
Two lessons, however, have been learned from the national unit 
experiments to date. IDRC used two different models for 
sponsorship of the units: one where the unit was hosted by only 
one organization (Chamber of Industry of Costa Rica - UATI), and 
the other where the unit was hosted by a coalition of groups 
(CONICIT-UDATE) . The group coalition model attempted to create a 
unit which had the support of national private and public sectors 
players providing services to SMIs such as banks, government 
ministries, national science and technology councils, chamber and 
association organizations and universities. The unit's services 
were to be a "one windown service for all SMI needs. However, 
coordination discussions among these groups consumed an 
inordinate amount of time with the result that little time was 
spent in actually serving SMI clients. The evaluation concludes 
that the coalition sponsorship of a unit was "testedn and that it 
proved unworkable. 
The second discovery from the national units' experiment is the 
value of these services to SMIs. None of the FECAICA members 
offered specialized consulting services prior to CAISNET. 
However, all of the Executive Directors of the Chambers and 
Associations stated that they recognized the importance of the 
service to their members and to the sector. They stated that even 
if Canadian investment ended in September they would continue the 
unit with reduced staff. From this reaction, the evaluation 
concludes that the value of niche market consulting services to 
manufacturers has been demonstrated. Only their financial 
viability remains to be proven. 
The evaluation recommends that subsequent support concentrate on 
reaching financial viability for the units. 
SUCCESS OF THE DIAGNOSTIC TOOLS 
Five tools were developed by CODETI from 1991 to 1996 and 
transferred to the units. These tools were Analysis for Change, 
the Holistic Tool - The PIC, the FinanceMeter, and The 
Environmental Assessment and Improvement Tool. A fifth tool, 
QualiMeter, under licence to CODETI, was also transferred to the 
units. Transfer involved signing transfer agreements with the 
units, providing manuals and software, and training technical 
advisors in their use. 
The technical advisors use the tools for between 20% to 50% of 
their clients depending on client demand, technical advisor 
experience and unit strategy. The biggest users of the tools are 
inexperienced advisors and the units whose business strategy is 
consulting for continuous productivity improvements. The tools 
are least used by inexperienced advisors and units whose 
consulting revenue comes primarily from one-off problem-solving 
assignments. The original project idea was that the units would 
use the tools as their main consulting service; however, the 
units have found that the needs of the SMIs go beyond the general 
nature of the tools. 
In general, the advisors were satisfied with the transfer of the 
tools. However, some of the initial software was problematic, 
several questions in the tools were repetitive, and many were too 
general. The success of the training was less clear. Some 
advisors rated the training highly. Others indicated that there 
was little attention given as to how to write a report with the 
diagnostic information that would be meaningful to clients or how 
to interpret the data against industry norms. The evaluator found 
it surprising that none of the advisors could explain what the 
benchmarks were that were used in the tools. 
Overall, however, transfer of the tools has been successful. 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
This section reviews the steering committee, the coordinating 
unit and the network manager functions. 
Summarv of Findinss: The organizational structure of CAISNET has 
been a major inhibiting factor in the network's progress. The 
problem is its committee membership and management structure. 
THE CAISNET STEERING COMMITTEE STRUCTURE 
The current steering committee has seven members: three from 
Central America and four from Canada. Its members are: from 
Canada - The Alliance, APRO, Gatekeeper (vacant) and IDRC; and 
from Central America - FECAICA (two persons), and the CAISNET 
Manager. Its role and responsibilities at its bi-annual meeting, 
as defined under the FECAICA/PAR contract, are to: 
define the strategy and policy for the efficient functioning 
of the project 
approve-the workplan and budget that was presented by the 
network manager 
monitor the progress of the project 
The committee has met six times since November, 1995. It reviewed 
CAISNET progress in general and several specific activities with 
discrete budgets, but it did not approve any annual workplans or 
budgets. It spent a large amount of its time coordinating 
activities between Central America and Canada. 
CAISNET was the first donor-funded project of large duration 
undertaken by FECAICA and its members. They did not appear to 
have a clear understanding of how a project steering committee 
functions and is structured. The following information is 
provided to fill this knowledge gap. 
The llTv~icalll Proiect Steering Committee (PSC) 
A project steering committee is set up by donors for the duration 
of a project agreement or contract. Usually after project funding 
ends, so does the committee. The committee's purpose is to define 
the policy and strategy of the project in general terms, to 
monitor the progress to expected results, and to solve any 
implementation nblockagesN that may occur. 
There are two types of PSCs: those where the membership is the 
same as the project contractual parties, and those where it is 
different. Both of these committees perform the same functions as 
stated above. Their key differences relate to their approval 
authority. 
Where the contractual parties and steering committee members are 
the same, the committee can be an approving committee for the 
annual workplans, changes in project activities, pro j ect budget 
and progress reports. The written minutes of the PSC function as 
documentary evidence of contractual party consent to these 
changes. However, this is not the case where steering committee 
members are different from the contractual members. Here, the 
PSC1s role is to advise and recommend to the contractual parties 
on these issues. The PSC recommendations cannot be binding 
decisions because the committee cannot supersede the role of the 
donor and the grant recipient to make decisions about the 
project . 
When donor funded projects are intended to be sustainable, the 
project steering committee is usually the Board of Directors of 
the organization plus a donor representative during the period of 
collaboration. 
Project steering committees do not function as project managers. 
All projects have a manager who handles the day-to-day implemen- 
tation and administration of the project. The manager is 
accountable to the organization which signs the contract or 
agreement with the donor. She/he provides information and reports 
to the committee, but is not accountable to it. 
The Ina~~rowriateness of the Current Steering Committee (SC) 
The evaluation found that the current steering committee as 
constituted by FECAICA has an identify crisis and an authority 
vacuum. It is unsure which project it is monitoring and what 
authority its decisions have. 
There were five possible structures that could have been proposed 
for this committee depending on its intended function and its 
decision-making scope. The existing seven-person committee was 
inappropriately structured with respect to these five 
possibilities. It was not appropriate as a project steering 
committee for the FECAICA/PAR contract nor for the 
IDRC/FECAICA/CICR agreement. It did not meet the membership 
requirements for a CAISNET Board of Directors nor for a network 
operational and coordinating committee. Neither was it structured 
in the form of the original project steering committee as 
proposed by IDRC. Consequently, its recommendations and decisions 
carried no authority for the project participants who were 
affected by them. The five possible structures for the steering 
committee were: 
T h e  FECAICA/PAR C o m m i t t e e  of T h r e e :  If the SC were intended to be 
a project steering committee for the FECAICA/PAR contract (i.e., 
strengthening the network), its members would have been the 
signatories of the contract: the President of FECAICA, and the 
Manager of PAR, plus the Network Manager providing secretariat 
services to the committee. IDRC, The Alliance and APRO would not 
have been members on the committee unless invited. 
T h e  IDRC/FECAICA/CICR C o m m i t t e e  of Four: If the committee were 
intended to be a project steering committee for the IDRC and 
FECAICA/CICR agreement establishing the coordinating unit and 
regional activities, its members would have been the agreement 
signatories: the President of FECAICA, the Executive Director of 
the Costa Rican Chamber, a representative of IDRC and the 
Coordinating Unit Director, with the coordinating unit providing 
secretariat services to the committee. The Alliance and APRO 
would not have been members on the committee, unless invited. 
T h e  O p e r a t i o n s  a n d  C o o r d i n a t i n g  C o m m i t t e e  o f  Fifteen: If the 
committee were intended to be an operational and coordinating 
committee for CAISNET, its members would have been the five 
Executive Directors of the Chambers, the five unit directors, The 
Alliance and APRO, the network manager, providing secretariat 
services to the committee, plus the two donors. The current 
committee lacked the participation of the national units1 
directors and the Executive Directors of the Chamber and 
Associations, impeding its ability to be an effective activities' 
coordinating committee. 
The Network Board of Director's Committee of Six or Seven: If the 
committee were intended to be the Board of Directors of the 
Network, its members would have been the five Executive Directors 
of the Chambers (or the five Unit Directors), plus the Network 
Manager providing secretariat services to the Board. A 
representative from FECAICA may (or may not) have been on the 
committee depending on its role in the network. The donors would 
not have been members of this Board, since presumably the Network 
and its Board functions independent of donor funding. However, in 
the case of creating the network, (the IDRC agreements), or 
strengthening the network, (the PAR contract), a donor 
representative could be invited to join the Board for the period 
that the network and the donor were in collaboration. The 
Alliance and APRO would not be members of this committee, unless 
invited. 
The Original IDRC Structure - Committee of Ten : If the current 
steering committee were intended to be the committee initially 
established by IDRC, its members would have been the five unit 
directors, IDRC, and one representative from each of FECAICA, The 
Alliance and APRO, plus the Coordinating Unit Director providing 
secretariat services to the committee. When this committee was 
set up in May 1995, there were three national units - two 
sponsored by non-FECAICA members, (FEPYME and COHCIT), and one 
from a FECAICA member, (UATI-CR). At this time, the vision of 
CAISNET was that of a Central American network, not a FECAICA 
"netv. This committee had a more limited function than the 
FECAICA/PAR steering committee. It reviewed only the plan and 
budget of the coordinating unit and the regional activities. 
While there may have been reporting of the general activities of 
the units, the national units1 workplans and budgets were not 
subject to review, discussion, nor approval by this committee. 
Lessons Learned: The donors should ensure that project steering 
committee members are appropriate to the project agreements that 
are monitored. The decision-making authority of the committee 
should also be clearly defined. 
THE CAISNET COORDINATING UNIT 
The CAISNET Coordinating Unit was first ,set up in May 1995, 
through a grant agreement signed between IDRC and FECAICA/CICR. 
The President of CODETI was named as its first director. In March 
1996, under the FECAICA/PAR contract, FECAICA continued the 
services of CODETI as the coordinating unit and appointed 
CODETI1s President, Jorge Monge as the CAISNET Manager, in 
addition to his continuing role as the Coordinating Unit 
Director. 
The responsibilities of the coordinating unit remained much the 
same during these two funding agreements. It was to: 
assist in the set-up and launching of the national units 
and, in some cases, to assist Chambers in their management 
adapt or develop and test diagnostic tools for use by 
technical advisors 
train the technical advisors in their use 
coordinate activities on behalf of the national units with 
the Canadian partners 
assist the national units to improve their client services 
and their self-sufficiency 
establish and maintain regional linkages of benefit to 
CAISNET1s goals and purpose 
Of these tasks, only one required the exclusive contracting of 
CODETI - the development, testing and transfer of the diagnostic 
tools. Therefore, the evaluation of the performance of CODETI in 
fulfilling the tasks of the coordinating unit excludes the tools, 
even though in day-to-day practise the two were performed 
together. 
The Impact of the FECAICA/PAR Contract on the O~erations of the 
Coordinating Unit 
Although the responsibilities for the coordinating unit remained 
the same under the two funding arrangements, the FECAICA/pAR 
arrangements dramatically changed the accountability of the 
coordinating unit and its interactions with the national units in 
three ma j or ways : 
The first was an increase in regional and Canadian linkage 
activities. IDRC funding to the coordinating unit had been 
severely restricted for activities of this type. The PAR funding 
provided the network with its first opportunity to demonstrate in 
a significant manner its coordination abilities and its "network 
value addedw to SMI clients. 
The second was the substantial increase in administrative and 
reporting work under the FECAICA/PAR contract. The IDRC budget 
was straightforward to administer, with bi-annual reports of 
expenditures under standard categories: salaries, operating 
costs, project steering committee meetings, staff training, and 
tools1 research expenses. The coordinating unit reported only on 
its own activities, plus discrete activities involving mostly 
travel arrangements with the other units, with no requirement for 
proof of expenditure. By contrast, the FECAICA/PAR contract 
required (1) the signing of sub-contracts for almost every 
activity undertaken except travel, (2) a complex system of 
financial administration to handle the receipt of invoices in 
five different currencies from the units and Canada, the 
recording of these, and their eventual consolidation for 
presentation to CRC Sogema/PAR, (3) monthly financial submissions 
under standard cost categories (personnel, travel, training costs 
etc.) and under project activities (100, 200, 300 etc.) , (4) 
recording of reimbursements received and those pending, (5) 
quarterly progress reports in Spanish distributed to network 
members, and (6) bi-annual and annual reports, produced in 
Spanish and/or English for the steering committee and CRC 
Sogema/~A~ and distributed to network members (20 to 30 copies.) 
In addition, the coordinating unit took over the administrative 
burden of the national units so they did not have to deal with 
CRC ~ o g e m a / ~ ~ R  office on an individual basis. Where adminis- 
trative tasks had required 10% to 15% of the time of a two-person 
IDRC coordinating unit, they now required 30% to 50% of a four- 
person unit under the PAR funding roughly equivalent to one and 
one half to two person-years. This administration became more 
complicated when the Chamber of Costa Rica insisted on an 
administrative review of all invoices for previously approved 
budget activities. This was not in keeping with FECAICA/PAR 
agreements. 
The third major difference was the effect of the FECAICA/PAR 
contract on the behaviour of the network. Under IDRC agreements, 
the national units were highly autonomous and loosely affiliated 
as a network. More attention was given to the national units1 
performance than to the performance of the network as a whole. 
Under the PAR contract, emphasis shifted to the performance of 
the network represented by the consolidated efforts of the region 
(national units, coordinating unit and The Alliance), a 
consolidated CAISNET budget and expenditure position, and 
regional plans and performance to plans. The FECAICA/pAR contract 
structure assumed the national units acted in a smoothly 
coordinated and standardized fashion, with a high degree of 
interchange at each level of the network: the five Executive 
Directors, the five Unit Directors, the 17 technical advisors and 
the five information officers. Most importantly, there was also 
regional interchange at the level of services to SMI clients. 
The task of the Network Manager was to llmanagell this consoli- 
dated entity, represent it publically through meetings with other 
agencies, conduct network business through legal contracts and 
purchase agreements for services and goods for the network, and 
to report to CIDA through PAR and IDRC on the network's 
performance as a whole. 
It appears as if this consolidated network was not intended by 
the members of FECAICA, even though their membership federation 
organization signed and endorsed a bid to the PAR program and 
signed a contract with PAR in which this was the implied type of 
regional network that FECAICA was sponsoring. Though this high 
degree of coordination was never explicitly stated in one place 
in the bid document or the contract, the network coordination 
system was never described as its opposite - a network linked 
only through the Executive Directors or through the Unit 
Directors. 
Results and Effectiveness of the Coordinatins Unit 
The performance of CODETI in providing services as the Network 
Manager and performing coordinating unit functions cannot be 
easily separated from the fundamental problems associated with 
the lack of clarity around the network itself. 
CODETI assisted the sponsoring organizations in setting up six 
units, five of which are operational. The fact that one unit, 
(UDATE), became non-functional was due to the poor performance of 
the executing agency. 
When invited, CODETI assisted units with their business plans, 
marketing strategies, internal operations and self-sufficiency 
projections. CODETI1s president participates regularly in the 
unit technical committee in El Salvador where his contribution 
has been highly rated by the IDB, a unit funder. Increasingly, he 
attends meetings in Nicaragua and in Honduras. 
CODETI developed a system of reporting on network performance. 
The pressure to develop this system came, in part, from PAR which 
wanted consistent reporting on network results and impacts on 
SMIs performance. The other motivation for developing this system 
was an attempt by the President of CODETI to do his job - to be a 
manager and manage the units. Because the authority structure had 
not been properly defined, the units felt that CODETI was 
exercising "too much contr01~~ over their work and CODETI felt 
that the units were being uuncooperative~ because a manager must 
first know what the units were doing in order to supervise their 
work. The evaluator found that both points of view were 
justifiable. The project had no mechanism to resolve disputes 
such as these. In producing this reporting system CODETI failed 
to consult with the unit directors as to what was practical and 
reasonable to report in advance of designing the system. The unit 
directors, on their side, resisted any attempt at outside 
supervision of their work. A negotiated reporting system was 
finally established. It is the evaluator's viewpoint, however, 
that it can be further simplified. 
CODETI has coordinated regional training for the units and 
promoted the sharing of information through the Internet and Web 
access services. It has represented CAISNET to international 
donors, regional governments and other like-minded public and 
private sector groups and developed a regional modernization plan 
for FECAICA to be presented to donors. 
CODETI has facilitated the visits of Canadians to the region for 
technical assistance, research, and training activities, and has, 
as well, organized similar activities in Canada for regional 
participants. CODETI provided logistical and information support 
to this evaluation mission which was much appreciated. 
CODETI appears to have sought appropriate approvals for annual 
budgets and specific special activities and managed these 
activities within budget. It also appears to have kept adequate 
administrative records relating to the FEcAICA/PAR contract and 
to the IDRC/FECAICA/CICR agreement. It has met its monthly and 
quarterly, bi-annual and annual reporting requirements to 
Canadian donors in a timely manner. It has also provided adequate 
secretariat services to the CAISNET steering committee. 
The areas of least success of CODETIfs services have been in the 
regional activities and the regional links to Canada. However, 
the disappointing results of these activities cannot be attri- 
buted to any one party when everyone was involved. 
As the readers of this report are aware, there are serious 
conflicts between the members of FECAICA and the President of 
CODETI. In evaluating the performance of CODETI, the evaluator 
has taken great care to separate the performance of CODETI and 
the reasonable standard expected of a coordinating unit from the 
personal opinions voiced to the evaluator in the field mission 
about the character of the President of CODETI. This task was 
complicated because no proper statement of services expected from 
the coordinating unit as opposed to project activities which 
apply to all CAISNET participants, exists. 
The evaluator concludes that the performance of CODETI in 
carrying out its responsibilities as a service provider to 
FECAICA for coordinating unit services under the IDRC and 
FECAICA/CICR agreement and the FECAICA/PAR contract, given the 
poorly conceived notion of the network, was adequate. 
A major problem with the coordinating unit's performance had to 
do with the project's ill-defined power structure among the 
senior executives in its ambit: the Presidents of the Chambers, 
the Executive Directors of the Chambers, the Unit Directors, and 
the Project Director (the Secretary General of FECAICA), the 
Network Manager, and the Coordinating Unit Director. The project 
structure required a matrix management system - dual authority 
and accountability. However, FECAICA members1 organizations, like 
most Central American organiztions, are highly centralized and do 
not appear to adjust well to other types of authority systems. 
Finally, the leader for CAISNET - the person that everyone 
follows - was never identified. 
Manasement Issues of The Coordinatins Unit 
Accountability and Supervision: Under the FECAICA/CICR contract, 
the coordinating unit was sponsored by FECAICA. The coordinating 
unit director was responsible to the CAISNET project director who 
was the Secretary General of FECAICA. The Secretary General 
delegated to the Chamber of Industry in Costa Rica the respon- 
sibility to oversee the administration of the IDRC project funds 
only while retaining overall responsibility for the project in 
terms of implementation and results. 
While this helped to clarify the accountability structure on 
paper, the structure was not functional in practise. The 
Secretary General located in Guatemala could not easily supervise 
the work of CODETI. There was no weekly or monthly communication 
by phone, e-mail or communication in meetings over project 
status. FECAICA/CICR failed to provide the local cost 
contribution for staff and office operating costs, making it 
difficult for CODETI to function. CODETI, for its part, did not 
provide adequate information to CICR which would help them 
understand the context of their administrative supervision. Also, 
the coordination between FECAICA and Costa Rica to have an 
overview of CODETI1s work was not well worked out. In addition, 
IDRC did not assist in solving these problems when they became 
evident. 
Under the FECAICA/PAR contract, FECAICA and its members agreed 
that the Network Manager was responsible to and reports to the 
Steering Committee. This, too, was not functional because the 
committee was too busy with other network agenda items to discuss 
the performance of the Network Manager separate from the 
performance of the network. In addition, a committee meeting 
twice a year for less than ten hours cannot adequately manage a 
manager and review his performance. 
The project plan attached to the FECAICA/PAR contract referred to 
two positions: the Network Manager and the Coordinating Unit 
Director as if two separate people occupied these positions 
with the Coordinating Unit Director reporting to the Network 
Manager. However, when the resumes of the project personnel were 
attached to positions, the staffing relationship was the Network 
Manager and his assistant. This should have been clarified in the 
beginning. 
The finding of the evaluation is that FECAICA failed to put in 
place appropriate accountability and supervisory systems to 
manage the coordinating unit and the Network Manager. 
FECAICA recognized its responsibility to do so in May, 1998 and 
suspended project operations (but not salary support). The 
subsequent decisions taken to solve the problem were not based on 
a careful study of the management and accountability system and 
the roles of all parties, which they should have been. 
Contracting and Operating Cos ts :  To further complicate matters, 
FECAICA did not sign an adequate subcontract agreement with 
CODETI for its services. The CODETI/FECAICA agreement in the PAR 
contract describes the tasks and responsibilities to be 
undertaken. The expected activities and results of CODETIis 
services were not, however, separated from the activities and 
results of the project. 
Similarly, the budget for CODETIis services was not separated out 
from the project budget like the five national unitsi budgets 
were. Consequently, with CODETI1s costs comingled with those of 
the project, neither FECAICA nor the donors knew the true cost of 
operating the coordinating unit. 
The "PowerN and "Control o f  the Network Manager: The common myth 
of this project is that the network manager had power and 
control. In reality, he had very little. 
The FECAICA/PAR budget was approved by FECAICA and PAR. CODETI 
prepared the budget, but the final decision was taken by others. 
The Network Manager had the responsibility to achieve llresultsu, 
but no power or authority over the national units whose 
cooperation he required. The IDRC agreements required reporting 
to IDRC, not IDRC and the coordinating unit. In the agreements 
FECAICA signed with the Chambers, there was no mention of a 
network manager or a coordinating unit, nor the responsibility to 
cooperate or report to this unit. Any centralized vcontrolN 
exercised by the coordination unit was actually determined by the 
units which decided on their level of sharing with the center. 
The donors, however, assumed the coordinating unit was the 
network hub, and directed their questions to this unit before any 
of the national units were consulted. 
If there were any I1powerM or vcontrolN exercised by the network 
manager, it came from the position of being a coordinator and 
having access to overview information on the performance of all 
five units and, as well, being the first point of contact with 
the donors. 
This sharing of information was done through reports which hardly 
anyone read carefully. It could have happened more effectively if 
the steering committee had been properly structured and the 
national unit committees had met as frequently as had been intended 
THE NATIONAL UNIT COMMITTEE 
This committee was established by IDRC in its agreements with the 
Industrial Chamber and Associations. It had two names: the 
Project Steering Committee and the Unit Advisory Committee. Its 
normal composition was three members, a representative of the 
sponsoring organization, the Unit Director, and the coordinating 
unit director. A fourth member was added in El Salvador, the IDB 
representative. In two cases, the committee was supposed to 
include representatives from SMIs, government departments and 
other like-minded organizations. This never happened. 
Under the first IDRC agreements, these committee were suppose to 
meet bi-monthly. Under later agreements the meetings were 
quarterly and then on an Itas needed" basis. 
The purpose of these meetings was to: 
review and approve the unit's workplan and strategy 
monitor the progress of the unit 
approve any organizational or structural changes to the unit 
except decisions on hiring or dismissing a unit director. 
This needed the approval of the unit steering committee and 
IDRC . 
Despite its name, the committee did not function as a project 
steering committee. IDRC, the donor, was not a member of the 
committee. Several of the unit directors wanted the committee to 
function as a PSC. They were disappointed in the lack of Canadian 
attention and involvement with their units. IDRC, however, did 
not have the administrative travel budget to attend meetings in 
five countries. 
Only one committee met regularly, that of El Salvador, so that 
the IDB/ANEPE project could be coordinated with CAISNET. The 
committee members spoke highly of the positive benefits of donor 
coordination and outside technical assistance. The evaluator 
noted that the business plan, strategy, budgets and management 
information systems in El Salvador were the most highly 
developed. 
The other four units did not call national unit committee 
meetings because, in their opinion, they were not needed. 
The role of the coordinating unit director on this committee was 
not clear. Several unit directors thought he was an IDRC 
representative. IDRC stated clearly in correspondence to one unit 
that the coordinating unit director was there in a technical 
assistance capacity, not in a representational capacity. 
Clarification of this to the other units would have been helpful. 
The Executive Directors did not agree that IDRC should have 
control over the hiring and firing of the unit directors, as 
these were Hemployeesll of the Chamber. 
The evaluation recommends that the name for these committees be 
changed to Technical Advisory Committees and the coordinating 
unit director's role be clarified as a technical advisor. The 
committees should meet at least 3 to 4 times per year on a 
regular basis to review progress of the units with the aim of 
improving their practises. 
The evaluation recommends that the Chambers have exclusive 
authority over the hiring and firing of the Unit Director. The 
donors should, however, add a clause to their agreements stating 
that if the unit does not perform to expectations, the donor will 
cancel the agreement for non-compliance. 
THE "VALUE ADDED" BY THE NETWORK 
The major finding of the evaluation is that from the perspective 
of the SMIs, the primary target group of CAISNET, the regional 
network added "no valuen or "little value1# to this group from 
project activities to date. 
Nearly all of the CAISNET participants, however, believed that a 
regional network was valuable and important in the context of 
regional modernization and globalization. The issue, then, is how 
to determine what this value added will be and how it can be 
structured efficiently through a regional network. 
This section discusses the different concepts of the regional 
network for the purpose of assisting FECAICA and the steering 
committee to clarify the structure of the network that they 
intend to sustain after Canadian donor funding terminates. This 
section would not normally be part of an evaluation report but is 
provided to assist decision-makers with options. 
S~onsorship of the Resional Network: 
Historically there were two main ideas for the sponsorship of the 
regional network. These were: 
1 .  The Network with a Restr icted Membership: The sponsoring 
organizations of the national units would be restricted to the 
membership of the network sponsor. This is the concept presently 
in operation, where FECAICA has five members and each member has 
a national unit. 
2 .  The Network with a General Membership: This was the original 
idea of the network, whereby the network sponsor would be a 
sponsor for the benefit of the region. Under this concept, any 
country could have more than one unit with these units sponsored 
by any group which provides consulting services to SMIs and 
commits to providing these in a self-funding manner. Examples of 
such groups would be industry associations, chambers of commerce, 
university departments, research groups, government agencies, and 
private-sector SMI membership groups. 
The structure of CAISNET when the FECAICA/PAR contract was signed 
was that of a network with a general membership. In March, 1996 
there were three national units, only one of which was solely 
sponsored by a FECAICA member, (UATI in Costa Rica) . The other 
units in Guatemala and Honduras (sponsored by FEPYME and CONICIT 
respectively), had FECAICA members1 participation; however, 
FECAICA members were neither responsible nor accountable for 
these units. The network continued for nine months under PAR 
funding (30% of the project time period). Over this period, 
however, the non-FECAICA members were essentially asked to leave 
the network (FEPYME), or were ignored by the other units. They 
were effectively isolated from the Network, (CONICIT), partially 
because of poor performance but also because they did not "fitn 
into the emerging FECAICA network. 
The evolution of CAISNET into FECAICAuNETu essentially eliminates 
other regional groups which are not members of FECAICA from 
joining the network. The current FECAICA national units serve 
only five of the eight major industrial centers in the region. 
San Pedro Sula in Honduras, Panama City and Belize City do not 
have services. Panama and Belize are not members of FECAICA. 
Although AND1 has offices in San Pedro Sula, their activities are 
modest in comparison with the most active industry association in 
this region, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of San Cortez, 
This chamber made representation to the evaluator as being 
interested in sponsoring a unit similar to the existing national 
units in CAISNET. 
At this point in the project evolution, the concept of a regional 
network with a general membership may not be feasible. Since 
FECAICA and the CAISNET steering committee will, however, be 
required to reformulate their concept of and commitment to the 
network, it at least merits mention. 
What is a Network? 
A network is a group of interconnected or intercommunicating 
things, points or people. It can be informal, like a social 
network. Then, however, it would not be considered a project. 
Understanding what a network is requires an understanding of 
three things: who talks to whom (the structure of the network), 
and what is talked about (the network content). Also required is 
an understanding of what the cost of the network is in terms of 
time and money. 
In the CAISNET context, the primary purpose of the network 
content is that of providing benefits to SMIs. 
The evaluator has considered only the options for a network and 
how donors could support these. Other aspects can to be 
determined by CAISNET members. 
NETWORK OPTIONS 
There are basically six possibilities regarding the scope of the 
regional network vision. These are: 
1. No Network is Intended 
2. The Status Quo Network as of June 30, 1998 
3. A Virtual Reality Network 
4. A Virtual Reality Network with Occasional Activities 
5. A Functioning Network with Sustained Activities 
6. An Enlarged Network Based on Common Interests 
For each of these network models the role of FECAICA, the donors 
and the coordinating unit is discussed. 
1 .  No  Network was I n t e n d e d :  CAISNET is essentially national units 
only with no network among these units. The common activity among 
FECAICA members is to set up self-supporting consulting services 
to SMIs as part of each member's contribution to the modern- 
ization of their national industrial sector. Once achieved, 
FECAICA will then look for other common regional activities that 
their members can undertake. These may or may not involve the 
units or SMIs, but they will be common to FECAICA members and to 
the industrial sector which they support. 
Under this option, the coordinating unit would not exist. 
Instead, a technical assistance group to FECAICA members would be 
hired to assist national units achieve greater service efficiency 
and self-funding as rapidly as possible. Once the self-funding 
direction is firmly established, the advisory services would be 
phased out. These services could be provided from Canada and/or 
from the region. They would initially have full-time personnel 
but these would become part-time and/or periodic towards the end 
of the contract. 
The role of the donors is to assist an already existing regional 
network - FECAICA - to set up consulting services for SMIs 
through their member organizations. The end-of-project status 
would be sustained national units, each functioning independently 
of each other, with no coordinating unit and no network manager. 
The most efficient method of funding this would be through a 
technical assistance contract to a Canadian company to provide 
advisory services and transfer funds to the national units for 
their declining operational subsidies. The executing agency 
should be an organization experienced in setting up and running 
profitable consulting services. FECAICA and its members would not 
likely be qualified to manage this contract since they are the 
beneficiaries of these services and do not have consulting 
service expertise. 
2. The Status Quo Network: The network consists of five national 
units offering technical advisory and information services to 
SMIs plus a coordinating unit with a total regional staffing 
complement of 33 persons. The units typically consist of a 
director, two to four advisors, an information officer and a 
secretary. The units provide services to between 10% to 20% of 
the SMIs in each country and are supported by earnings and 
FECAICA members1 contributions. 
The coordinating unit sponsored by FECAICA has a director and 
three technical advisors. Its purpose is to assist in setting up 
and improving the services of the national units, to represent 
the network to other interested parties, to llchampionn and expand 
the network's services to SMIs through on-going regional 
activities, and to report to donors. The estimated annual 
operating cost of this network, excluding regional activities, is 
between US $50,000 to $100,000 for each of the five units plus 
$180,000 annually for the coordinating unit at a total of 
approximately US $440,000 to $600,000 per year. 
The role of the Canadian and sponsoring organizations is to 
continue to fund this network as it is presently structured. The 
evaluation findings do not support this option. 
3 .  A Virtual  Rea l i t y  Network: The virtual reality network assumes 
the operation of national units with regional support to SMIs 
coordinated and supported through the fax, phone, and Internet. 
The role of the "coordinating unitw is that of a technical 
assistance group to FECAICA members to help the units achieve 
greater efficiency and profitability in their services and 
conduct the preliminary research to identify Internet sites most 
helpful to SMIs and the units. The advisors will identify 
existing data sites that are set-up and maintained by others so 
that the units do not have on-going maintenance costs beyond the 
monthly network service charge. No data bases will be created. 
Once the self-funding direction of the units has been 
established, the advisory services would be phased out. The 
technical assistance services could be provided from Canada 
and/or from the region. They would initially have full-time 
personnel but these would become part-time and/or periodic 
towards the end of the contract. The executing agency would need 
to have experience in running profitable consulting services and 
in sourcing information through the Internet. 
The donor's role is to assist FECAICA members set up profitable 
and accessible consulting services for SMIs, with a focus on 
value added to SMI customers through access to information and 
contacts through the Internet. The end-of-project status would be 
national units with no network manager and no permanent 
coordinating unit. Donorst investment funding would be for 
training personnel, funding the advisory service, and providing a 
declining share of the subsidies required by the national units. 
The most efficient method of funding these activities would be 
through a technical assistance contract to set up and run the 
coordinating unit, and to transfer funds to the national units 
for the declining operational subsidies. The executing agency 
should be an organization experienced in setting up and running 
profitable consulting services and in organizing and 
administering low-cost, high value-added services for SMIs. 
The evaluator considers this to be a reasonable option for the 
network structure. This proposal may not, however, be of interest 
to donors who wish to support regional collaboration in a more 
significant manner. 
4 .  A Virtual  R e a l i t y  Network wi th  Occasional Regional A c t i v i t i e s  : 
This network vision assumes effectively functionins national 
units with regional activities for S M I ~  coordinated through the 
Internet, fax, and phone, and with any additional common 
activities funded through profits generated from the unitst 
revenue and/or through contributions from network members. The 
regional coordination activities for SMIs would be planned and 
coordinated by the unit directors. 
Under this option there would be no coordinating unit. A 
technical assistance group would be set up for the unit directors 
to assist them achieve self-financing as rapidly as possible, and 
to assist establishing a regional mechanism among the directors 
to decide on, fund and implement common regional activities for 
SMIs. Once one to two national units have achieved self-funding, 
i.e., the model has been demonstrated to be successful and one to 
two regional activities completed, the technical group would 
disband. 
In this option, the donor's role would be to assist FECAICA 
members set up profitable and accessible consulting services for 
SMIs, with the surplus unit funds channelled to facilitate value- 
added activities for promising SMIs throughout the region. The 
end-of-project status would be sustained national units, no 
coordinating unit and perhaps a network manager, or a unit 
director with responsibilities for common activities. Donors' 
investment funding would be for training personnel, funding the 
technical assistance provided by the coordinating unit, and for 
providing a declining share of the subsidies required by the 
national units and perhaps matching the units1 profits for common 
activities. 
The most efficient method of funding this would be through a 
technical assistance contract similar to the ones described 
earlier. The executing agency should be an organization 
experienced in setting up and running profitable consulting 
services and in organizing and administrating low-cost, high 
value-added services for SMIs from several countries. 
The evaluator considers this to be a reasonable option for the 
network structure. This proposal, however, may not be of interest 
to donors who wish to support regional collaboration in a more 
significant manner. 
5 .  A F u n c t i o n i n g  Network  w i t h  S u s t a i n e d  A c t i v i t i e s :  This network 
vision supports a medium to long-term goal that is carried out 
through a regional infrastructure. These goals might be the 
modernization of the Central American industrial sector (the goal 
of FECAICA), or improving the productivity and competitiveness of 
SMIs, (the goal of the units). Network members support network 
infrastructure costs and donor funding is secured to enhance or 
enlarge this infrastructure. The bare bones minimum of 
infrastructure is likely to be some combination of a coord- 
inating unit, a network manager, network meetings, and regional 
activities. 
The role of the coordinating unit would be to support the goals 
of the network through planning, coordination, implementation, 
and reporting, and to represent the network vision and its 
success to interested groups. The coordinating unit could also 
develop project proposals that support the network's vision for 
presentation to interested donors. This network would likely have 
a network manager who would be responsible and accountable to its 
sponsoring organization. The national chambers and association 
organizations would be responsible and accountable to this 
manager for their agreed to performance results, for reporting on 
their sustainability levels, and for any funds expended from a 
donor's contribution. The network manager could also be the 
coordinating unit director. These two functions could, however, 
be separated. 
The role of donors is to support the set-up of this network in 
partnership with network sponsors and to jointly fund network 
activities. The end-of-project status would be the same or 
improved regional infrastructure continuing but strengthened to 
operate in a more relevant and effective manner to achieve its 
goals. Usually donors would cover the equipment set-up costs of 
the network, help train its first staff, fund regional activities 
on a joint basis, and, as well, provide initial support for 
network operating costs, with this support diminishing over time. 
The most efficient method of funding this would be through a 
program funding envelope where two project contracts were funded 
under one program approval. The first project contract would be 
to the network sponsor for initial set-up, training and support 
to the regional activities undertaken in partnership. If the 
national units were part of this network vision, then technical 
assistance similar to the advisory services provided earlier 
could be funded. This project contract would need to be provided 
on a sole source to the network sponsor, something which may be 
difficult for donors to secure. 
The second project contract would be to a firm hired as a project 
manager and monitor which would be responsible through their 
contract for the funding of all core costs that are eventually to 
be funded by the network and the units. A project manager would 
be hired to ensure an acceptable level of reliable and timely 
financial reporting showing best efforts to generate earnings for 
the units and for the network infrastructure. 
The experience of CAISNET has indicated that financial reporting 
at the unit level, especially when several donors are involved, 
is not reliable enough to issue a contract for transferring these 
funds directly to the unit from the donor. 
The evaluator considers this to be a reasonable option for the 
network structure. It should be noted that this proposal would 
have a strong donor appeal not only to Canadian donors but to 
others who are interested in fostering regional collaboration, 
and economic modernization in a significant manner. 
6 .  A Larger I n s t i t u t i o n a l  Network Based on Common I n t e r e s t s  
This network vision is the original idea of CAISNET - the 
"Network with a General Membershipu discussed later. Essentially, 
it supports an institutional network of groups which share 
similar goals of providing support self-sustaining services to 
SMIs in the region. This idea may no longer be relevant because 
of FECAICA1s deep commitment to sponsoring CAISNET for its 
members only; however, the basic ideas are that: 
(1) appropriate organization could be the sponsoring 
organization for an industrial support unit; 
(2 any country could have more than one unit; 
(3) all groups with a unit would participate in the Project 
Steering Committee/Board of Directors of the Network. 
Under this network vision the coordinating unit would be the 
regional coordinating body with a board of directors composed of 
representatives from each unit. The board would then have a 
network manager to run the network, to ensure common standards of 
work and methodology, and to coordinate reporting and funding. 
The board would also be responsible for raising the funds to pay 
for the regional coordinating unit from membership quotas or 
donor project funds. The regional coordinating unit would sign 
contracts with each qualifying group, provide core funding 
support, provide training and technical support, monitor the 
units' performance to results and degree of self-sufficiency, 
manage the coordinating unit budget and staff, and provide 
secretariat services to the board. 
The donor's role would be to participate with the board to assess 
individual organizations wishing to qualify for the network, 
provide set-up support and initial core funding to those which 
qualify, and fund the initial operations of the regional 
coordinating body until members1 contributions to this regional 
body cover its costs. 
While this idea may not be relevant today, it merits considera- 
tion because of the possibility of sharing network costs among a 
larger number of units than the present five. 
Considerations for the Selection of a Network Model: 
The advantages generally are interchanges among members, regional 
integration, technical exchanges, joint training sessions, shared 
lessons learned from a similar method of services to SMIs, access 
to a wider information base, potential business and technology 
transfer opportunities, and cost savings through coordination and 
pooling of resources. 
The disadvantages are: common reporting requirements, higher 
degree of standardization to facilitate coordination, raising 
funds to pay for the coordinating unit, time and energy spent in 
coordination, forms of representation by the unit director which 
may not be in accordance with ones wished by other members, and 
the decision-making process must be with others. 
EXECUTING AGENCY ASSESSMENT 
Assessment of FECAICA as an Executinq Aqencv: 
FECAICA as an organization is well recognized and respected in 
the region. Its major impact has been its representation of the 
views of the industrial sector to the Central American Presidents 
as the region embarks on opening its markets and creating a 
greater degree of trade liberalization. As such, the CAISNET 
project is fortunate to have such a prestigious network sponsor. 
Yet, for all its powerful profile, FECAICA has virtually no 
organizational implementation capacity. It has no office space of 
its own. The three persons who are designated as the secretariat 
of FECAICA have other careers and do not work for FECAICA on a 
full-time basis. The President of FECAICA changes every year, on 
a rotational basis among the five FECAICA members. This assists 
in maintaining the political balance of power in the region. Yet 
there appears to be little continuity from one President to 
another and little corporate memory in terms of files, reports 
and previous commitments. Since CAISNET started, there have been 
three different Presidents of FECAICA, each one with a different 
attitude toward, knowledge of, and interest in CAISNET. 
Though FECAICA1s members represent the largest capitalists in the 
region, the federation itself has little in the way of financial 
resources. For the FECAICA/PAR project it was unable to raise the 
funds to provide a guarantee to CRC Sogema/Costa Rica to 
facilitate payments to CAISNET members. For the IDRC/FECAICA/CICR 
project, it was unable to raise $84,000 to contribute towards the 
local costs of the coordinating unit even though this amount was 
the lowest local contribution requested in the project. 
In addition, and most importantly, because of its federation 
structure FECAICA has no jurisdiction or supervisory role over 
any member's organization, activities or staff. Consequently, 
FECAICA has no institutional authority to ensure compliance with 
agreements. 
FECAICA1s level of fiduciary management of the FECAICA/PAR 
contract and the IDRC/FECAICA/CICR agreement was inadequate for 
reasons already indicated in this report. 
In addition, FECAICA represented its members on the steering 
committee yet failed to keep them adequately informed of key 
decisions taken at this meeting. 
The evaluation finding is that FECAICA as a federated institution 
is an appropriate endorser and sponsor for a network. FECAICA 
does not, however, have the management or administrative capacity 
to function as the executing agency for a development project 
contract. 
The evaluation recommends that no further contracts be signed 
with FECAICA, the federation, for the CAISNET project unless it 
develops a plan for its network acceptable to CIDA and IDRC which 
includes an adequate management and administrative structure and 
funding . 
Assessment of FECAICA Members as Executins Asencies for the 
CAISNET Proi ect 
On May 22, 1998, FECAICA and its members reviewed the situation 
of the FECAICA/PAR contract, and passed a unanimous resolution 
asking PAR to suspend the FECAICA/PAR contract for one month so 
that activities could be reprogrammed. The decision was also 
taken at this meeting that the Chamber of Costa Rica should 
assume the role previously held by the Secretary General of 
FECAICA in the supervision and monitoring of the FECAICA/PAR 
project. 
Subsequently, the Executive Director of CICR delegated its 
responsibility to the Director of UATI. 
The evaluator finds that delegation of the supervision of the 
project to any of the national units or the members of FECAICA 
will not solve the fundamental management problems of CAISNET. It 
is too minor an action to adequately address the major problems 
of this project. 
The evaluator recommends that delegation of the supervision of 
the project to any of the national units or to the members of 
FECAICA be discontinued and a full time CAISNET project manager 
be hired in its place to manage the project (see bridging 
proposal. ) 
The evaluator recommends that none of the FECAICA members be 
considered as executing agents for the new phase of the project. 
FECAICA members are first of all national membership organiza- 
tions. Their largest source of income is from membership fees. In 
return for these fees, the members expect the Chambers to 
represent the interests of the national industrial sector. While 
they have a mandate to participate in regional projects with 
national benefits, they have no natural mandate to manage them. 
Second, taking over the supervision from FECAICA also means 
taking over its financial obligations under these contracts. It 
is not likely that CICR is fully knowledgable about what these 
are. 
Third, the chambers do not have the human and physical resources 
to back up any person nominated to manage or supervise this 
project. Their accounting staffs are already stretched to the 
limit handling their own internal operations and expanding donor 
project portfolios. No chamber, with the exception of Nicaragua, 
has enough physical space to add staff to supervise the project. 
Fourth, except for their participation in FECAICA, very little of 
the Chambers' day-to-day work is concerned with regional issues. 
From a reading of the five annual reports of FECAICA members, 
their international emphasis is more on Mexico, Latin America, 
the Dominion Republic, Canada and the United States than Central 
America. While business consulting services for SMIs are 
important services, they do not rank as a high priority in the 
national agendas of the Chambers as outlined in their reports to 
members. 
Fifth, the management of CAISNET is a full-time job. So is being 
the UATI director. The two can not be adequately performed by one 
person. 
Sixth, under the FECAICA Federation, all members are considered 
equal in status. The selection of one Chamber with power and 
authority over the others could jeopardize the political balance 
that is one of FECAICA1 s major achievements. 
Seventh, the delegation of supervision for CAISNET to UATI seems 
to be directed towards an effort to control the coordinating unit 
only. There are other problems, perhaps not as serious, but 
problems none the less, in the other units, including UATI 
itself, which UATI/CICR are not addressing. The evaluator 
questions whether this supervision will be broad enough to deal 
with the entirety of CAISNET1s problems. 
Eight, under FECAICA's Federation structure, each member retains 
autonomy of operations and is accountable only to its national 
membership, not to any other regional or national body. How does 
UATI/CICR propose to supervise the internal departments of the 
other members with greater success than did CODETI? 
LINKS TO CANADA 
The expected results of the Canadian connection in this project 
were unspecified. In 1995, when the CAISNET Coordinating Unit was 
established, APRO and its members were reviewing their 
organizational structure and considering setting up a Canadian 
Technology Network. It appears as if IDRC1s purpose in funding 
APRO was to assist FECAICA in setting up CAISNET and to establish 
long-term linkages between two industrial support networks: the 
national network in Canada and the regional network in Central 
America for lltechnological exchangesI1 - exchanges which were 
unspecified. In 1996, when The Alliance assumed the APRO 
obligations as a result of the merger, more emphasis was placed 
on establishing business linkages between manufacturers than on 
technical exchanges. There were still no results attached to this 
Canadian connection. 
CAISNET was promoted as a Central America network with a 
continuing connection to Canada. Unfortunately neither FECAICA1s 
members nor The Alliance have adequate membership revenues to 
maintain a continuous, long-term funding commitment through fully 
dedicated staff and regular meetings. Although FECAICA and the 
Alliance signed a cooperation agreement during the project, this 
agreement was based on "best effortsN. The reality is that the 
Canadian link will last only as long as Canadian donor funding 
exists. These temporal links should not, therefore, be considered 
a fundamental characteristic of CAISNET that could be sustained. 
The recommendation is that the long-term, general connection of 
CAISNET to  Canada should be ended. CAISNET should be described as 
a regional network only. This network could, however, for a 
certain time period, and for defined results ,  have one or many 
Canadian connect ion ( s I . 
The value adde,d of CAISNET1s link to Canada must be assessed in 
terms of the benefits to SMIs. There were no business deals 
reported between clients of CAISNET and Canadian firms. The main 
beneficiaries of the Canadian connection were FECAICA and its 
members which are the delivery channel to SMIs, and not its 
primary target group. 
FECAICA executives were invited to Canada by the Alliance with 
project funds and provided with a training seminar in association 
management in conjunction with Canadian Manufacturers' Week. The 
Alliance's International Director visited the region for a 
sectoral survey of needs and priorities and retains excellent 
relations with FECAICA and its members. 
This has been an excellent experience for both organizations. The 
evaluator was consistently told by FECAICA executives that there 
should be more activities of this type in the project. While 
fully appreciating the value of these activities, such events 
provide little in the way of "value addedM to the SMIs and should 
not be part of an institutional strengthening project for FECAICA 
and its members. 
The expected business deals did not materialize for several 
reasons. The first was that the Canadian component in this 
project has continually been underfunded and the first activity 
to be reduced. 
The second was the limited size of the SMI target group. Eighty- 
six percent of the region's firms are under 20 employees. From a 
Canadian business perspective, these firms are unsuitable 
partners because of their low productivity and quality standards. 
The firms of interest to Canadians would be 4% of regional firms, 
the larger ones, with 100 or more employees, better capital- 
ization and stronger balance sheets. Although such firms are 
FECAICA members, they are not the target group of CAISNET. 
Third, there was a mismatch between the business needs identified 
in Central America and the expressed interests of the Canadians. 
The Alliance conducted a survey of members interested in working 
in Central America. The members who were interested were looking 
for distributors of their products, not for joint ventures or 
suppliers. On the other hand, Central American businesses were 
looking for export sales. 
Making connections between firms in different countries as a 
match-making service requires a high degree of coordination. 
There was a poor sharing of information between the Canadian 
Project Liason Officer, the Coordinating Unit, and the National 
Units. It is not surprising that SMIs did not connect. 
The evaluation finding is that the Canadian connection must be 
more focused on results and would be more of a technical 
assistance type of connection rather than the business deal most 
of the time. Notable exceptions could be if project activities 
had an industrial sectoral focus where both Canadian and Central 
American firms have something in common to exchange. 
The recommendation is that the long-term Canadian connection, 
should be replaced by a one-off project type of activity, where 
specific results are achieved in a given time period. This could 
be with The Alliance or with any other appropriate Canadian 
organization. 
THE NATIONAL UNITS 
OVERALL SUMMARY 
The national units as a group are providing needed specialized 
services to SMIs. A total of 506 clients have been served from 
January 1996 to June 1998. This was 6% above the IDRC target for 
this period but only 75% of the PAR target for roughly the same 
period. 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala, the oldest units, have 
built up client loyalty with repeat business comprising between 
30 to 50% of their services. Honduras and Nicaragua, which have 
started within the last twelve months, are showing acceptable 
results for start-up operations. 
The consulting services were to have several innovative features: 
• the use of the SUDIAC diagnostic tools as an cost effective 
aid to identifying problems faced by individual 
manufacturers. 
• a ~consortium" approach to client problem-solution whereby 
individual advisors draw on experts and technology in the 
local economy rather than building up this expertise in the 
unit itself 
• a "one stopN outlet for technological information and 
referral for SMIs 
• services to SMIs were increased beyond those of national 
industrial advisors through the benefits available from the 
Canadian and regional networks to which they were linked. 
• an aggressive cost recovery program geared to ensuring the 
financial sustainability of the unit 
The innovative features of the unit existed more on paper and in 
discussions of their potential, than in practise. The features 
that worked most successfully were the consortium approach to 
client problem-solving, especially when Canadian consultants were 
used, and the use of the SUDIAC tools. The tools were, however, 
more of an aid to the consultants than to the SMI. 
The least successful aspects of their services were the network 
features: the links to the region and to Canada. These did not 
materialize to any degree of significance. 
None of the units achieved self-sufficiency. Costa Rica and 
Guatemala were targeted to reach this goal by December, 1998. Due 
to differences in accounting practises and presentation of 
results, the "best guessn estimates of self-sufficiency are 
between 10% to 40%, earnings as % of total annual operating 
costs; and between 50% to 70% when earnings and National Industry 
Association contributions are considered. In conclusion, the 
units as a group are effective. 
The units are, however, less efficient. Unit start up, with the 
exception of El Salvador, has been unnecessarily slow. The units 
are endorsed by their Industry and Association sponsors yet they 
continue to be regarded as "foreign projectsn not fully 
integrated into the sponsors' organizational structure and run 
from a project perspective, not as a responsibility centre within 
the organization. 
More attention needs to be paid to unit annual planning, budget- 
ing, contract management, billing and collections. In addition, 
personnel policies and incentive schemes need to be reviewed to 
retain the well-trained staff working for the units. 
Overall Recommendations: Support to the five units should be 
continued; funding, however, should be contingent on certain 
fundamental changes in annual planning and budgeting, personnel 
policies, financial management, client services, operational 
procedures and reporting. 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE NATIONAL UNITS 
At the project's conceptual stage, three different options for 
the national unit structure and ownership existed. The long term 
implications of these options appear not to have been considered 
before they were included in the "network experimentl1. They are 
presented here for the consideration of decision-makers. 
U n i t s  as Independent  NGOs: The original idea was that the units, 
once they became sustainable, would become independent from their 
sponsoring organizations and set themselves up as NGOs with their 
own Boards of Directors. This explains why they were called 
"national unitsH, rather than their more accurate description as 
a department or division providing services to SMIs. 
Units as  National Coalitions: Another idea was that the unit 
sponsor would be a coalition of national organizations with 
existing programs for SMIs. By late 1997 this concept was 
effectively abandoned with the failure of UDATE (COHCIT) . The 
idea was, however, still active at the time the FECAICA/PAR 
contract was signed, as the COHCIT agreement was still in effect 
in April 1996, one month after the FECAICA/PAR agreement. 
Units a s  a Chamber or National Association Department: The third 
idea was that the units would disappear as a separate project and 
become fully integrated into the sponsoring organization as 
services to SMIs. This is the legal structure of the national 
units at present; however, the units identify more with their 
donor and project status than with the Chamber or Association 
sponsors. 
The remainder of this section covers various components of the 
units1 performances with appropriate recommendations. 
GOAL 
Goal of the National Unit: The goal of each unit is to improve 
the competitiveness and productivity of national SMIs through the 
provision of non-financial support services. 
Recommendation: This should be retained as the unit's goal. 
PURPOSE 
Sinsle-Pur~ose or Multi-Pumose Units: The units were intended to 
be single-purpose units providing basic consulting and informa- 
tion services. Two of the five units, Honduras and El Salvador, 
provide consulting and information services only. 
Costa Rica, Guatemala and Nicaragua are more multi-purpose 
member-service units providing SMIs with a range of services 
which are sponsored by the Unit and the Chamber. These include 
training courses, workshops, sub-contracting services, websites 
and for Costa Rica, management of the Chamber-sponsored annual 
Excellence Award Program. 
While these are services to SMIs, the use of the unit's staff 
time and energy spent organizing these events takes away the time 
available for consulting work. In addition, some of these events 
are funded by other donors (Taiwan, Holland, the OAS, and the 
ILO). It also appears as if the unit's staff time has not been 
billed to these donors as administrative fees for the running of 
programs sponsored by these donors. 
Recommendation: The Units retain the single-purpose focus of 
providing consulting services. 
Start UD: The five units have been operational for between 10 to 
36 months. Costa Rica and Guatemala were established in June and 
July 1994 respectively, El Salvador in September 1996 (IDB), 
Nicaragua in April 1997, and Honduras in May 1996 (IDRC) and 
November 1997 (PAR) . 
Two units, Costa Rica and Guatemala, are in their second phase of 
IDRC funding. In the first phase for Guatemala, the unit was 
sponsored by several national organizations without a clear 
understanding of what the role of each was. As a result, the unit 
suffered from poor staff turnover, inadequate facilities, and 
poor services to SMIs. Costa Rica, in its first phase, also 
experienced a high turnover of staff which was remedied through 
the introduction of an incentive system. Unfortunately both units 
began on a poor footing since the SMI services were provided free 
at the outset, making it difficult to charge for them later. The 
Costa Rica unit actually began to function more efficiently at 
the end of 1995. Guatemala replaced its Unit Director at the end 
of 1997 which brought about a more systematic approach to SMI 
services. 
The start-up for Nicaragua was delayed because of a pilot 
project, the aim and goals of which were not clear. The delays in 
Honduras were due to problems with securing adequate physical 
space. In addition, there was confusion between the national unit 
funded by IDRC and the one funded by PAR. The start-up of the 
units was inefficient due to poor project design and the 
unreasonable expectation of having a consulting service, which is 
essentially a business, run by a committee representing 
universities, research centres, government and private sector 
groups . 
Lessons Learned: Start-ups need to be planned and managed with 
simple organizational and administrative structures. Business 
services run by committees cannot be managed or sustained in the 
long run. 
TARGET GROUP COVERAGE 
The target group is SMIs with between 10 to 100 employees. This 
eligibility criteria appears to have been chosen without regard 
to national practises. Most of the countries consider a medium- 
sized company to be one with between 50 to 150 employees, while 
small-range companies have between 10 to 50. 
Between 60% and 73% of all clients served fall within the target 
population range as shown below from the most active units: 
SIZE OF SMI CLIENTS 
by Employee ~umber/Firm (1997) 
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As the units gain experience, unit directors have suggested that 
the target population is too restrictive with 96% of the 
population being small firms with under 20 employees. The major 
reason is larger firms can usually afford higher rates and longer 
contracts which benefit the drive for self-financing. The units 
have also found that having large, well-known industrial leaders 
as clients makes their services more credible to the smaller and 
medium-size firms. There will likely be a tendency for larger 
clients given the nature of the Chambers' membership. 
While donors are supporting these units, however, they should 
insist that small and medium-sized firms be targeted in all 
countries. The one exception should be Nicaragua, where the 
industrial sector is small and underdeveloped. Here, the unit 
should be providing services to all manufacturing firms. 
Costa Rica 





Recommendation: Small and medium firms be targeted in all 
countries except for Nicaragua where the industrial sector in 
terms of firms is so small. In Nicaragua the unit should be 
providing services to all manufacturing firms. 
No. 
2 
members hi^ Services and/or Sector Services: Four of the five 
units offer preferential consulting rates and services to SMIs 
which are members of the Chamber. Only one unit, El Salvador, has 
a policy that services are to be provided to any SMI which can 
pay whether or not they are members. They have no differential 



























up the membership of the National Industry Chambers or 
Associations. While donors are financing the units, there should 
be an equal access policy to all SMIs. Once donor funding ends, 
the Chambers can then set the rates as they wish. 
Recommendation: The donors should insist on one rate for all 
clients of the unit. Discounts for members should be discon- 
t inued . 
GENDER ISSUES 
Women's Participation - Firms Owned by Women: The units reported 
that less than 5 out of 506 firms were owned by women. The 
initial project documents stated that 80% of SMEs were owned by 
women, implying that this project would assist many women. While 
this may be true for SMEs, few women are owners/managers of 
manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees. This project 
target notion should be dropped. No national data is available on 
manufacturing firms owned and managed by women for any of the 
five countries. 
Chambers should be encouraged to sponsor a one-day forum on women 
in business/women in industry (for example, on International 
Women's Day, March 8th), to raise awareness of successful women 
in this sector and the variety of opportunities for employment 
and investment available. This could be built into annual 
workplans. 
In addition, many women work in the production areas of industry. 
More attention needs to be paid to the safety and health 
conditions for women (and men) in plant assessments. 
Recommendation: The Units/Chambers are to conduct a one-day forum 
to promote the participation of women in business/women in 
industry (for example on International Women's Day - March 8th) 
featuring prominent national women. The purpose would be to raise 
awareness and publicize successful role models in this sector and 
the variety of opportunities for employment and investment 
available. This is to be built into annual workplans. 
In addition, more attention needs to be paid to the safety and 
health conditions for women (and men) in plant assessments. 
CENTRAL AMERICAN COVERAGE 
CAISNET does not have national units in two Central American 
countries: Panama and Belize, largely because these are not 
FECAICA member countries. CIDA regional program officers had 
envisioned as wide a regional participation as possible. 
National unit offices are located in capital cities where 70%- 
85% of the SMIs are located. The only major regional city with a 
large percentage of SMIs not served by the network is San Pedro 
Sula. ANDI has an office here, however, the strongest and most 
active business and industry association, is the Camera de 
Comercio e Industrias de Cortes. This Chamber offers information, 
subcontracting services, seminars, and training. It does not have 
a specialized industry support unit and would be interested in 
partnering with CAISNET to have one established. 
Setting up an ANDI office in San Pedro Sula is not recommended at 
this time. First, the Tegucigalpa office is still in the early 
stages of growth and needs the full attention of ANDI. Second. 
ANDI has given less support to the national unit than the other 
five members. The current unit has inadequate physical space, 
equipment and secretarial support. In other units, support to the 
unit for operating costs has been paid by the chambers. Here, it 
has been provided by PAR. 
Recommendation: (1) FECAICA invite The Executive Director of the 
San Pedro Sula Chamber to join the CAISNET project. ( 2 )  The 
bridging project manager and the coordinating unit director be 
commissioned to meet with the Chamber to develop the plan for a 
unit to be sponsored by this Chamber on similar conditions to 
those of the other units. (3) Financing for the start up of this 
unit be recommended by FECAICA for inclusion in the new phase 
project. [Estimated cost over three years: $300,000 .I 
( 4 )  FECAICA open discussions with Panama and Belize to gauge 
interest in setting up national units. ( 5 )  The bridging project 
manager and the coordinating unit director be commissioned to 
meet with the Chamber or Association indicated by FECAICA to 
develop the plan for a unit on similar conditions to those of the 
other units. (6) Financing for the start up of this unit be 
recommended by FECAICA for inclusion in the new phase project. 
[Estimated cost over three years: $600,000.1 
CONSULTING =THODOLOGY 
The general consulting methodology, developed with the diagnostic 
tools is: 
1) use of a diagnostic tool by an advisor to assess the 
company's current performance. This involves a plant tour, 
discussions with senior management, financial and marketing 
staff, and production managers, supervisors and staff 
2 )  a written report to the company on the results of the 
diagnosis 
3 )  an oral presentation to the company including suggestions 
for improvements 
4) the company decides on and develops its plan for improvement 
5) the advisor is to monitor the company's implementation of 
its plan 
6) when needed, outside, highly specialized consultants are 
contracted for specific technical issues under the 
supervision of the unit's advisor. 
This method has been used by all units although the frequency of 
its employment varies among units. Advisors report that the tools 
are effective in helping inexperienced consultants determine 
general weaknesses, in helping the firms to prioritize areas for 
improvements, and as a marketing device to start a relationship 
with a firm. Units that use this method generally have a higher 
percentage of repeat business, (30% to 40%), requiring less time, 
energy and money spent on promotion, 
The most skilled implementors of this methodology are Guatemala 
and El Salvador. While Honduras and Nicaragua are following the 
method, their client base could be accelerated through coaching 
and mentoring sessions provided by experienced leaders. 
Costa Rica began using the diagnostic method. Recently, however, 
it has relied more on direct technical advice, the more tradi- 
tional consulting work. Both methods appear to be successful 
with the balance between the two methods dependent on each 
country's circumstances and client demand. Consequently, the 
tools should not be THE defining characteristic of the unit's 
consulting practise. 
Recommendations: (1) The El Salvador unit should mentor Honduras 
and the Guatemala unit mentor Nicaragua until they become 
proficient in use of the tools. The costs for this on-the-job 
training should be paid for by the remaining funds in the PAR 
contract. Estimated cost $6,000. Duration one week. (2) The units 
should not be defined by use of the diagnostic tools. These are 
but one of their consulting resources. 
TYPES OF CONSULTING ASSIGNMENTS 
CAISNET documents state that the units will consult in all three 
areas where firms could be weak: marketing, production and 
finance plus the two areas that are cross-cutting themes to 
these: strategic planning and human resources. The units have, 
however, specialized primarily in production and in strategic 
planning more than in marketing and finance. Requests for 
accounting and financial services were subcontracted out. No unit 
retains an accountant or financial analyst. 
As a result, one of the consistent weaknesses among the units 
services and reports to clients is the lack of financial 
information to assist them in making decisions regarding 
recommended actions. No firm should embark on investments for 
improvements unless the expected impact on profits has been 
considered. Generally speaking, with notable exceptions, the 
skill of staff members in presenting recommended actions in 
financial terms is weak. 
There is also a healthy tendency to market services to a 
particular sector so that advisors can see sectoral needs. 
The El Salvador unit, with a sales plan targeted to industry 
 sector,^, was able to identify a common supply problem among 
plastics manufacturers and assist the industrial association to 
purchase large quantities at a significantly reduced price. This 
came about from a careful study by the unit of the target firms 
in this sector. In addition, new advisors are being hired based 
on specific depth and experience in a sector. None of the 
industry sectors are specifically large in any Central American 
country. Expertise in one country can easily be shared throughout 
the network. 
Recommendations: (1) Unit advisors should be provided with a 
basic course in understanding and preparing financial analysis to 
assist decision-makers make decisions about future actions. 
Lessons Learned: While good consulting skills are a basic 
requirement, sector-specific knowledge gives unit personnel a 
competitive advantage. Unit teams should analyze their sectoral 
skills and those of their outside consultants, then consciously 
target industry sectors, and/or adjust their human resources to 
satisfy the sectors where consulting demand is the strongest. 
UNIT OWNERSHIP/ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRATION 
The National Industry Chamber or Association is ultimately 
responsible for the unit's program, staffing and funding. This 
Chamber of Association is, therefore, the owner of the unit which 
is a project. The units are incorrectly called I1nationalu units 
implying a separate legal entity. They are, in fact, departments 
or divisions of their sponsoring institutions' organizations. 
The units remain, however, as I1foreignl1 projects in these 
sponsoring organizations. The organizational charts of the 
Chambers and ~ssociations do not show the unit included in the 
organizational structure. Most of the unit staff are considered 
contract workers, not staff, therefore, they are not eligible for 
social benefits. Only one of the five Chambers considers the unit 
directors as equal in status to the other Chamber directors. 
Although the executive directors of the units stated that they 
valued the units, several unit directors and staff expressed the 
opinion that the unit/project was unwelcome at the Chamber and 
did not fit into traditional lobbying and political representa- 
tion activities. 
Recommendation: Donors should require formal acknowledgement by 
the National Chamber and Associations that they wished to sponsor 
and have a unit within their organization. This sponsorship would 
involve integrating the unit into the chamber with respect to its 
organizational structure, annual work planning, and accountabil- 
ity structure and staffing policy. 
If any FECAICA members do not wish to continue to own an 
industrial support unit they should make this decision as soon as 
possible so that a new sponsoring organization can be located 
over the bridging period. Or, alternatively, the unit can be 
legally registered as an organization, its constitution drawn up 
and approved, and its membership and Board of Directors 
established so that it can participate in the network on the 
strength of its own institutional performance. 
UNIT STAFFING 
A ntypicalu unit is staffed by a director, between two to six 
industrial advisors, an information officer, and a 
secretary/receptionist. There was no specified unit size when the 
units were set up. They could be as small as three persons: one 
director, one advisor and one administrator/secretary. 
The five units have a total of 29 staff, ten of whom are women, 
one unit director, one information officer, three advisors and 
all secretaries/receptionists, for a total of 34% of staff. 
NATIONAL UNIT STAFFING (as of June 30, 1998) 
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* the secretary is a receptionist only. 
Advisor 
El Salvador 
Four donors support 18 positions in the units covering 64% of the 
staff. The remaining eleven positions are supported by the 
sponsoring organizations through their counterpart contribution 


























SUPPORT TO UNIT STAFF 
Staff Turnover: The oldest serving employee is three and one half 
years, the newest, two months. Most have been in their positions 
between one to two years. The initial years of the project were 
plagued with high staff turnover due to unclear mandates, poor 
management of the unit, low salaries, and poor physical work 
conditions such as no phone or office facilities. The work force 
appears more stable now since most of these problems, with the 
exception of low salaries, has been rectified. 
The Unit Director: The five unit directors are highly educated 
(Masters and Ph.D.s), with suitable educational background, 
relevant industry and consulting experience, good command of 









Four unit directors have 8 to 10 years of production-related 
experience in industry or consulting and are therefore "credible1I 
with clients and industry associations. These directors have a 
business deal-making and entrepreneurial edge to their work, and 
they continue to manage and consult, spending between 20% to 40% 
of their time with clients. The other director, though less 
experienced, is bright and enthusiastic and enjoys the full 
support of the Chamber in his work. 
* the secretary is a receptionist only 
With the units as small as they are, at least eight to ten days 
per month of the director's time should be spend in consulting or 
on promotion of the unit's work to potential clients. Increasing- 
ly, however, the directors are being drawn into work and politics 
of the Chambers1 that does not directly relate to their unit's 
line of business. In addition, they are spending too much time in 
administration of the unit because of poor use of the secretarial 
position in administrative support work. As a result, they are 
not performing one of the most important tasks of a director, 






























Recommendations: (1) At least 40% to 50% of the director's time 
should be spent in consulting work with clients and/or in 
promotion of the unit's services to potential new clients [ 8  to 
10 days/monthl. Another 20% to 40% of his time should be use for 
quality control and client feedback [4 to 9 days], with 
management and administration responsible for 20% to 30% of the 
director's time [4 to 7 daysl . 
Technical Advisors: The "idealn profile of a unit advisor was 
first envisioned as someone who was a recent university graduate 
in engineering or business with a working knowledge of English 
and the ability to publish articles. While this profile "fitsN 
with the idea of CAISNET as a research and pilot project, it is 
an inappropriate background for consulting to SMIs. 
CAISNET has 14 advisors. In observations during the field visits, 
it was clear that the most successful advisors were those with a 
university degree in engineering and business and 8 to 12 years 
or more of experience in a manufacturing plant, preferably as the 
head of production. The second most successful advisor profile 
was that of someone with a university degree in engineering or 
business combined with private sector experience in either 
consulting or university teaching. 
The least successful advisors are those who are educated but 
inexperienced in industry and/or consulting. It was also noted 
that younger advisors tend to lack credibility with their 
clients. Unfortunately the low salaries initially set by the 
Chamber and Associations as well as the donors, were inadequate 
to attract the higher calibre of workers needed. 
Recommendation: The job qualifications for the technical advisors 
are to be changed to a requirement for eight to ten years of 
production and/or consulting experience for senior advisors. The 
qualifications for junior advisors are to be scaled accordingly. 
Existing staff without these qualifications are to be retained, 
but new staff should meet the new selection criteria. 
Individual or Team Work for Advisors 
Four of the units assign one advisor to an SMI client. Guatemala 
is the only unit that carries out work assignments based on a 
two-person team approach. This has considerable merit and bears 
considering. The advantages are: 
1. a second opinion, enabling a higher degree of confidence in 
the diagnosis and recommendations 
2. a more holistic, multi-service service approach to the SMI 
client using, for example, a marketing and a production 
person 
3. continued client service if one advisor leaves, is ill, or 
is working with another client. Several firms complained 
that they were frustrated by educating newly-assigned 
advisors about themselves and having to pay the unit for the 
consultant's time, even though from their point of view, the 
unit should have already known this baseline data about the 
firm. A two-person team insures the firm is always served by 
an advisor who is aware of the company's background and 
previous service by the unit. 
4. this team approach provides opportunities for the appren- 
ticeship training of junior consultants to a senior and more 
experienced person, ensuring a level of standardization 
among unit advisors through the mentoring process. 
5. the company becomes accustomed to receiving two persons from 
the unit so that the appearance of a Canadian or a regional 
consultant is not seen as an special event, but rather as 
the general approach of the consulting unit. This can be in 
many combinations: the director and an account manager, a 
senior consultant and a junior, a unit staff person and an 
outside advisor, an advisor and a Canadian expert or an 
advisor from another regional unit. 
6. two persons to review and agree on the report and to provide 
quality assurance on the report for its technical content 
and its language, style and organization. 
The disadvantages are: 
1. consulting rates cannot be raised much higher to pay for two 
people. The unit consultants do, however, have a large 
amount of non-billable time available. Use of this option 
would mean that there would need to be better scheduling of 
consultants and a better use of staff time. 
2. requires more coordination of personnel. 
Recommendation: The units should consider experimenting with this 
method of consulting for six to twelve months to determine its 
effects on the quality of service and revenues. 
The Information Officer: From the initial IDRC project design, 
each unit was to include the position of an information officer 
whose salary was paid for by the Chamber or Association. There 
was also a requirement to hire an information officer as part of 
the FECAICA/PAR contract. There are four information officers in 
the project. Only Honduras has not filled the information officer 
position. All of these positions are funded by the Chambers and 
Associations. 
The job description and tasks for this person are not well 
defined, however, nor are they integrated into the consulting 
services provided by the advisors. Most of the information 
officers provide general services to the Chambers and 
Associations, handle the computer problems of the unit with 
software and hardware, or assist the manger in keeping unit 
performance data up-to-date. 
Most units have some sort of information: magazines, books, trade 
journals, files by industry, etc. These, however, often contain 
outdated information or information that is relevant to the 
advisors but not to the SMI clients. A full-time salaried person 
should not be hired by the unit to find and organize information 
sources for the staff. Most of the chambers have information and 
library services which advisors should have access to for parti- 
cular needs. In addition, advisors should maintain their own 
files on information that they need. 
Recommendation: The information officer position should be 
eliminated from the unit staff and another technical advisor 
hired (or an accounts manager hired - see following recommen- 
dation). 
Any information needs the units have can be hired out to a 
student on a short-term contract or acquired by the technical 
advisors in their non-billable time. The information requirements 
of firms should be costed into their contracts and the technical 
staff's time spent, (perhaps at a lower rate), to locate the 
information that clients need. The unit's performance data base 
should be set up and maintained by the secretary. 
The Secretarv/Rece~tionist: From the initial IDRC project design, 
each unit was to include the position of a secretary. Four of the 
five units have full time secretaries. Honduras has a reception- 
ist only who basically works for another Association project. The 
two positions in Costa Rica and Guatemala are funded by Canadian 
support and the two in El Salvador and Nicaragua are funded by 
the sponsoring organization. 
Although called unit secretaries, the women in these positions 
function as personal secretaries of the unit directors. Their job 
descriptions should be reviewed so they become administrative 
assistants providing professional services to the units. Along 
with this increase in responsibility, there should also be an 
increase in their salaries. 
The administrative assistants should be in charge of making 
corrections to the consultants' reports and formatting these 
reports so they have a professional appearance. These reports are 
products of the unit and need to look professional as well as 
contain credible technical knowledge. 
The administrative assistant should also be in charge of the 
unit's contract registry book, contract management, preparation 
of invoices, reporting on daily accounts receivable, collection 
status of accounts, and the control sheet for consulting 
deliverables due and delivered. 
Recommendations: The secretarial positions should be reclassified 
as an administrative support position and the job description 
expanded from director's services to unit services including 
support of the technical advisors and to the unit's contract and 
invoice/collection processes. The salary for this position should 
be increased. In addition, the secretary should be provided with 
training in advanced word processing skills. 
Additional Staffins: A Financial Administrator: Once the volume 
of financial transactions warrants this, the unit should consider 
hiring its own financial administrator on a part-time basis to 
manage the unit's accounting books, its bank account, donor 
agreements and funding, accounts payable, invoices, collections, 
and preparation of the cash-flow forecast for the director's 
review. This would help prevent the Chambers from "borrowingn 
donors1 funds when their cash-flow is low. This should, however, 
be tied to the keeping of separate account ledgers for the unit. 
Recommendation: The units should consider hiring a financial 
administrator on a part-time basis to provide financial 
administration and contract billing and collection services for 
the unit for the unit's separate accounting books and its 
separate bank account. 
STAFF TRAINING 
Staff members were provided with three types of training: 
training in Canada, regional courses, national courses, and on- 
the-job consulting training by visiting Canadian experts. 
The national courses were "paid forn by the Chambers and 
Associations and involved letting unit staff occupy empty seats 
in Chamber seminars and workshops given for members. Although 
advisors found these courses to be helpful, they were not always 
informed of their availability nor given an opportunity to 
indicate their interest. This is a missed opportunity, as the 
unit advisors could also use these sessions to promote the unit's 
services and make potential client contacts. 
January to December 1996 
I I 
TRAINING COURSES: 1996 to 1997 
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In total, 28 training courses were held from January, 1996 to 
June, 1998 throughout the region. Total participation was 181 
staff. This averages out to between 7 to 8 courses each for the 
director and technical staff. Few if any courses were provided 
for the secretaries. Approximately 70% of the courses were 
related to the use of the five diagnostic tools, with the balance 
being more meetings rather than training sessions related to the 
planning and coordination of regional activities in benchmarking, 
BTOs, and project strategy, work planning and reporting. Most of 
the sessions were held in-country with the technical advisors and 
unit director; however, seminars and planning meetings for 
directors were held in one member's country, as were IS0 9000 and 
IS0 14000, to maximize the use of the Canadian consultantls time. 
This practise should continue. 
The most popular courses were the IS0 9000 and IS0 14000 courses 
because of their course content. The technical advisors 
interviewed stated that the courses involving the tools were not 
as well planned as they expected. There was little time to ask 
questions, no guidance on how to write up a diagnostic report, 
and no information on the scale on which the firms were measured. 
In addition, there was no practical demonstration, in a plant, of 
how the tools were used. 
In general, the training addresses advisor's needs only partially 
as the SUDIAC tools are only one of the many consultantls tools 
used. 
Technical advisors indicated they would like to receive courses 
in up-to-date methods of designing and assessing the efficiency 
of production systems, work measurement and standards, compen- 
sation and productivity-based wage plans as well as courses in 
planning and controlling operations: aggregate planning and 
capacity considerations, purchasing and inventory management, 
material requirement's planning, scheduling and controlling 
manufacturing operations, quality assurance, cost, investment and 
maintenance. 
In addition, there is a need to improve their skills in 
consulting: business writing, report writing, rapid appraisal, 
use of the computer to improve consulting, editing and 
presentation skills, selling skills, and coaching skills to 
companies. 
Training courses in Canada were held in 1995 and 1996 in which 
advisors went to APRO members. These were general on-the-job 
types of courses, with no specific course outline. While the 
experience in Canada was personally rewarding for the advisors, 
their job skills were not enhanced in relation to the expenses of 
this training because the characteristics of SMIs in Canada are 
very different from those of the region. For this reason, these 
training courses should be discontinued. 
In May 1997, The Alliance hosted a training session in Canada for 
eight executive members of FECAICA, the Chambers and Associa- 
tions. This, strictly speaking, had nothing directly to do with 
improving the competitiveness of SMIs, as the sessions were 
geared to improving the work of the industrial associations. 
Again, while this was an important introduction to The Alliance 
and helped to cement the relationship between FECAICA and The 
Alliance, the training session had little to do with the goals 
and purpose of the project. Such courses should be continued 
under an institutional strengthening program of The Alliance with 
FECAICA and its members, but should not be continued under 
CAISNET proper. 
Recommendations: Training courses are still advised for the 
technical staff in topics related to financial costing, 
production, and consulting techniques. The secretaries should 
also be offered courses in computer skills to upgrade their 
administrative capabilities. Courses in Canada should be 
discontinued. 
Seminars for the executive members of FECAICA and the individual 
industry chambers and associations should be discontinued under 
CAISNET funding as they are not in keeping with the goal and 
purpose for the project. 
Obligations Following Training: There is a heavy demand for IS0 
9000 training by unit advisors because of SMI enthusiasm to 
become certified. There is also a personal incentive for advisors 
to take the course to add "valuel1 to their curriculum vitaes for 
future employment. There is a legitimate concern by unit 
directors that technical advisors will complete the IS0 9000 
training courses and then shortly thereafter leave the units to 
become consultants. 
Recommendation: All unit employees who have taken IS0 9000 
training or have taken it before December 31, 1998, are to sign 
an agreement with the Chamber/Association that they will continue 
to work for the unit for 24 months following completion of the 
courses offered in 1998. The agreement is to specify that if 
anyone leaves before this time, the cost of the course, US $1,500 
per person plus travel, hotel and per diem costs paid on their 
behalf, will be repaid to the unit. No person will be accepted 
into the upcoming course without a faxed copy of this signed 
agreement being placed on file in the coordinating unit's office. 
The only instance in which a trained person who leaves before 24 
months would not have to pay is when he/she is dismissed by the 
unit . 
Note: the evaluator met with the IS0 9000 and IS0 14000 trainers. 
They recommended that IS0 9000 training be continued but that the 
region wait for the second version of environmental training IS0 
14002 to be issued as this is more comprehensive. 
UNIT REVENUES 
It was impossible to make a reliable estimate for the consulting 
revenues earned by the units. There are several reasons for this. 
The first is the inconsistent financial reporting practises used 
by the units. Some report revenues as before incentives are paid, 
others report net revenues after commissions are paid. Some 
recognize revenue when it is earned, others when the cash is 
received. Secondly, there are different reports of revenues 
including the reports to IDRC, the reports of the coordinating 
unit to PAR, and the reports presented to the evaluator during 
the mission. These three different records of the same revenues 
are not consistent. 
The semi-annual or annual reports to IDRC include a list of 
and the money that has been collected. During visits to the 
offices these amounts of monev could not easilv be verified 
revenue records kept by the units, nor from a ;apid apprais 
contact records, accounts receivable and collection records 
all units. In addition, it is not always clear from the 
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Recommendation: There should be an agreement with the Chamber's 
and Association's auditors as to the basis on which revenues will 
be reported. Their full consulting income should be deposited in 
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OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
The TORS of the evaluation required that recommendations be 
provided for the improvement of the operational performance of 
the units. These have been organized into seven categories: 
annual planning, personnel policies and compensation, financial 
management, client services, operational procedures, reporting, 
facilities and equipment. 
ANNUAL PLANNING 
Unit Annual Plans and Budsets: The units have several plans and 
budgets. The usual plans are those for each donor based on the 
agreed to activities for the year. These plans are based on 
expected expenditures to project budgets. While adequate for each 
donor, they are incomplete as the financial plan for the unit 
because they do not include the expected client earnings and the 
contribution from the chamber or association. In addition, these 
plans and budgets are usually drawn up based on the fiscal year 
of the donor, rather than the fiscal year of the unit and 
sponsoring organization. This makes it extremely difficult for 
the unit's financial plan to be integrated into the normal 
planning cycle of the chamber and association. 
Costa Rica October 1 to September 30 
El Salvador January 1 to December 31 
Guatemala July 1 to June 30 
Honduras January 1 to December 31 
Nicaragua July 1 to June 30 
In addition, many of the budgets do not include adequate budget 
notes including monthly cost assumptions and the names and 
monthly salaries of the persons employed by the unit. 
Recommendations: A complete plan and budget is to be drafted for 
each unit based on the fiscal year of the Chamber or Association. 
The assumptions of the budget in terms of donations, sales and 
costs are to be detailed in the accompanying notes to the budget. 
These plans are in addition to the donor plan and budget based on 
approved donor budgets. Reporting to the donors is to be against 
this approved plan, as well as to the donor donation budget. 
PERSONNEL POLICIES AND COMPENSATION 
Job Descri~tions: Several of the unit staff indicated that they 
did not have current job descriptions which included the terms 
and conditions of their employment and their salary and benefitsf 
level. 
Recommendations: Job descriptions for all of the positions in the 
unit are to be prepared and reviewed by the coordinating unit 
staff and director. They should also be formally approved by the 
Executive Director of the Chamber. 
SALARIES 
Several of the salaries of the units have been established by 
different donors with the result that advisors with similar 
educational background and experience are paid differently. 
Within the same unit some are paid in US dollars, some in 
Canadian dollars, and others in local currencies, creating wide 
differences in salaries when there are currency devaluations. In 
addition, the salary scales for the unit have been set without 
regard to Chamber or Association personnel policy, and without 
consideration of salary scales paid to personnel with similar 
qualifications and experience in the local economy. 
Recommendation: The coordinating unit director is to be asked to 
carry out a review of the salaries of each of the units for 
presentation to unit directors and executive directors of the 
chambers for decisions on salary scales. The review will include 
a study of the job descriptions of the unit, a review of the 
Chamber/Associations existing salary scales, personnel policies 
and benefits, review of the compensation policies of similar 
industrial consulting services, and any other relevant 
information. 
The unit salary review is to be presented to the director, 
executive director and personnel manager of the Chamber for a 
thorough discussion and rationalization of the personnel policy 
and salary scales of the unit. 
INCENTIVE SCHEME 
The units have an incentive scheme based on the advisor's 
receiving 10% of the amount of the account receivable when it is 
collected. This scheme is not, however, based on the usual 
consulting practise, which is to provide bonuses to all members 
of the unit based on the performance of the unit at the end of 
the fiscal year and the relationship of its performance to its 
plan. 
Recommendations: The unit is to review its incentive scheme, and 
to change it along with its personnel compensation scheme to 
reflect modern business practises. 
Authoritv and Res~onsibilitv of the Unit Director: The unit 
directors are responsible for the performance of the unit but 
they do not have the authority to carry out their work. Not all 
directors have signing authority for (1) the unit's bank account, 
( 2 )  contracts and invoices for the unit's services, and (3) the 
purchases and expenditures agreed to under the unit budget. 
Recommendation: The Chambers and Associations are to grant the 
Unit Director the authority to carry out the work of his/her 
position and are to put in place system's checks and balances 
(monthly reports etc.), to ensure that the work is being carried 
out competently. 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
Financial Reports: None of the units have separate accounting 
records for their operations, even though the units are 
functioning as a different and unique type of business compared 
with the other activities of the Chambers. Consequently, it is 
impossible to determine the financial results of the operations 
of the units from the consolidated financial statements of the 
Chambers and Associations. Indeed, none of the annual audited 
statements of the Chambers reviewed by the evaluator showed 
earnings by the units separately even though they were reported 
separately to donors. 
There are two investors in these units: the chambers and the 
donors. Yet neither investor can determine whether or not its 
scarce capital is well utilized under the current financial 
presentation. 
Recommendation: The Chamber is to provide an audited report to 
the donors on the total operations of the unit including its 
assets, liabilities, income, expenses, sources and uses of funds 
and the transfers between the chamber and the unit. This is to be 
prepared at the time of the annual chamber audit. 
Unit Bank Account: The units have several bank accounts depending 
on their agreements with donors. These are, however, mainly for 
the receipt of donor funds. None of the expenditure reports to 
donors include reconciliation with these bank accounts, for 
example, showing a photocopy of the bank statement which 
corresponds to the reported balance on hand. It appears as if the 
earnings of a unit are not deposited into these accounts, but in 
some cases are added to Chamber general revenues. Two units have 
ltsustainability accountsu in which a percentage of earnings has 
been deposited to be used to maintain the unit after donors' 
contributions have ended. There is no guarantee, however, that 
these funds will be used in this manner. In some instances, unit 
directors have had no money to make necessary office supply 
purchases. 
Recommendations: Each unit should have one bank account in which 
all funds should be deposited and from which all expenses are 
paid. Two signatures should be on the bank account: the 
accountant of the Chamber and the unit director. The unit should 
be required to report on its earnings and expenditures and donor 
contributions. These figures should be reconciled with the 
statements for the bank account. 
If this system is adopted, the recommendations is that IDRC agree 
to release the sustainability fund to be used as working capital 
for the unit. 
Authorization of Expenditure: While the unit has a budget, the 
unit director in most cases has no authorization over the 
expenditures of this budget and must seek executive director 
approval to make expenditures already agreed to in the budget. 
This seriously reduces the director's efficiency in running the 
unit. 
Recommendation: The Chamber and the Association are to agree to a 
level of discretionary spending for the unit director. The 
Chamber is to manage the unit based on its plan and budget, 
rather than on approval of each individual expenditure item. 
Unit Audit: None of the donor agreements have requested audits of 
the unit's financial results. This should be an automatic 
requirement when donors are providing subsidies to bring services 
to self-sufficiency. 
Recommendation: An external audit of the unit's financial 
operations is to be completed at the same time as the external 
audit of the Chamber/Association. Results of the unit audit, 
including the auditor's opinion, are to be provided to the donor. 
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES 
Contracts, Invoices and Pavment Manasement: Several units are not 
aware of their accounts receivables outstanding, nor do they have 
an administrative system that allows them to determine how much 
of a contract has been billed, collected, and how much remains to 
be paid. 
Recommendations: The units are to set up a numbering control 
system for their contracts and invoices, and a computerized 
control system where contract opening and closing, invoices and 
collections are entered and monitored. 
CONSULTING SERVICES 
Consulting Rates: All units bill on an hourly basis. No unit 
had, however, a written rate schedule. Only El Salvador charges 
the same rate for all SMI clients as had been specified in the 
universal access concept of the original project design. 
Discounts range from 25% (Costa Rica) to 50% (Guatemala). The 
Costa Rican rates are the highest, at between US $25 to $40 per 
hour, billed in American dollars. The Ministry of Economy and 
SMIs visited indicated that these rates were high for the 
maj ority of SMIs . 
CONSULTING RATES 
Recommendation: Donors should insist that rates be the same for 
all clients of the units while they are subsidizing them. A rate 
policy for the various services should be developed and written 
down and discussed with the coordinating unit. The Costa Rican 
unit is to review its rates based on feedback from its clients. 
Time Use: Very few of the advisors are aware of the actual time 
taken to complete a task versus the time that has been billed to 
the client. While the client costs are to be "reasonableu and 
~accessibleM, the advisors and the unit directors need more 
awareness of actual time taken versus time billed to improve 
their contract estimates. Not all of a consultant's time taken on 
an assignment can always be fully billed to a client. Inexper- 
ienced consultants, poor writers, and those with only basic 
computer skills will take longer to complete assignments than 
consultants who are more proficient in these areas. Successful 








Recommendations: Advisors should draft up time budgets when 
preparing contract quotes, and record their time for their own 
use to improve their time-management skills. 
Daily Rates 











Contracts: Some of the unit's contracts have been developed on 
the run. They have not been reviewed by lawyers and the Chamber 
or Association directors. These should be like a master contract 
with standard clauses in the first part of the contract and the 
terms of reference of the work assignment attached as an annex. 
Once the terms of the master contracts have been agreed on, they 
can be placed in the computer of each advisor, and they be 







Several SMIs indicated that the terms of their contracts were 
quite vague. From the rapid appraisal made of the contracts, the 
evaluator would agree with this. The terms of reference should 
include : 
the name of the advisor(s) who will carry out the work 
a list of activities that will be done by the advisor(s) 
a list of activities that the company will complete during 
this period and what the company agrees to do to assist the 
advisor (s) 
a time budget for the assignment broken down by activities 
including the number of hours for the plant visit and the 
time for meetings, the number of hours for research and 
information gathering, the number of hours to prepare the 
report, and the time to present the report. 
A section with the title "deliverablesN should be added to 
the terms of reference. "DeliverablesW are the products of 
the work. The term can include reports and, as well, 
training sessions for x hours for y number of persons, etc. 
the estimated date for completion of each of the 
deliverables and for the contract should be specified. 
billing details are to be provided 
The contract should include the name and telephone number of the 
unit director with a statement that the director will call to 
discuss the progress of the assignment with the client and that 
the client is encouraged to call the director to discuss any 
aspect of the work. 
Recommendation: The contracts between the units and the companies 
should be reviewed by layers, the Chamber, the Association and 
the Unit Director to ensure that they are adequate. The terms of 
reference for each assignment should be attached as an annex to 
each contract and be written so as to be more "client friendlyn. 
BILLING AND COLLECTION PRACTICES 
Although the units are advocating modern business practises for 
their clients, all units are using antiquated billing practises. 
Invoices are hand- delivered and are therefore always associated 
with plant visits. At least 30-50% of an advisor's contracted 
time is spent in writing diagnostic reports, planning in-plant 
training sessions, and preparing plans. When the billing is 
associated only with plant visits, clients are more likely to 
associate hours worked with hours spent in the plant. For this 
system the delivery of invoices is dependent on a plant visit 
which is time and-labour intensive for billing. 
Collections have in most cases also been handled by plant visits 
or dropping into offices to pick up cheques. Again, while this 
may be the "current cultural practise1!, every effort should be 
made to have messengers pick up and deliver invoices, have 
invoices faxed or cheques directly deposited into the bank with 
proof of deposit faxed to the office. 
Contract Monitoring 
After the unit contract has been signed and returned, the 
secretary should be responsible for: 
- filing all contracts 
- preparing a control sheet to monitor contract start and end 
date, expected/actual billing dates and amount billed 
- preparing and issuing all invoices 
- monitoring outstanding accounts receivable 
- monitoring payments received and deposited into the bank as 
well as contract and billing status 
- the report should be updated weekly and provided to the 
director. 
Recommendation: The secretary is to take over the contract 
monitoring system and update it weekly. 
Unit files: Client files contain confidential information. The 
technical files should be separated from the contract and billing 
files and each set of files should be stored in a cabinet which 
can be locked. The technical advisors should keep only working 
files in their desks. All technical reports should be stored in 
filling cabinets. 
Recommedation: The unit is to review its handling of confidential 
business information and contracts and upgrade it for security. 
FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT 
Computer Eauipment: Generally the units have adequate equipment. 
More laser printers are, however, needed for the issuing of 
professional looking reports. In addition, the units could 
benefit from overheads and screens for client presentation, 
rather than reading from their reports as was reported by some 
SMI clients. 
Recommendation: See bridging report. 
Office Space: None of the five units have adequate office space 
in comparison to what is needed and in comparison with what other 
Association Departments with comparable levels of public 
responsibility have. 
Adequate office space would include a reception area for a 
secretary, an office for the director, separate offices for the 
consultants if possible, or at the very least, one room with 
partitions between the desks. 
The office space was to be part of the Chamber/Associationsl 
contribution. The contribution was never budgeted or specified, 
however. 
The units require adequate space for: 
- locked filling cabinets for files 
- reception area 
- quiet space for consultants to prepare reports and make phone 
calls to clients 
- an office for the director 
- a meeting room 
- space for common office equipment (photocopier, fax) 
- storage space for overhead projector and screen. 
The project has paid for an e-mail connection. In some cases, 
however, this has been for Chamber use and not the unit use. The 
connection should be for the unit use with access within the unit 
off ice space. 
Recommendation: The space needs of the unit are to reviewed and 
adjusted so that staff members have adequate working conditions. 
THE DIAGNOSTIC TOOLS 
This section describes the tools and the issues around their 
transference and ownership. 
DESCRIPTION: WHAT ARE THESE TOOLS? 
The CAISNET tools are called SUDIAC, the Spanish acronym for the 
Unified Industrial Diagnosis System for the Improvement of 
Competitiveness. The SUDIAC system is "a kitu - a consultant's 
toolbox - of analytical methods to assist the technical advisors 
in their diagnosis of the condition of SMIs. There are three 
types of tools: an entry level tool, a holistic tool and 
specialized tools. 
The entry level tool, called !!The Analysis Towards Changen, 
assists the technical advisor in determining the SMIsl attitude 
towards change. This tool is infrequently used because the 
advisors find that firms will not pay for it. Advisors do, 
however, use the concepts of this tool to assist their work with 
clients. 
The holistic tool - "The PICN - is the most commonly used tool. 
It evaluates eight functional areas of the firm: strategic 
planning, production and operations, quality assurance, 
commercialization and marketing, human resources management, 
finance and accounting and environmental management. Based on a 
rating assessment scale in response to questions, the advisor 
identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the SMI through 
comparison to norms, prioritizes them, and writes a report on the 
findings for the company, proposing a plan for improvements. PICs 
usually require between 36 to 40 hours of consulting work to 
complete. At market prices, the company would be invoiced between 
US $600 to $1000 for this report. Units do, however, commonly 
provide this service at a deep discount, (for US $150 to $300), 
or for free, in anticipation of a longer-term contract. 
There are four specialized tools: the QualiMeter, the 
FinanceMeter, the Manufacturing Tool, and the Environment 
Assessment and Improvement Tool. QualiMeter was developed by the 
Quebec Society for Quality. CODETI holds the exclusive license to 
reproduce, distribute and commercialize this tool for Central 
America and the Caribbean. The Qualimeter, because of its North 
American origins and its connection to IS0 9000 certification, is 
the most commonly used specialized tool. The others are 
infrequently or never used. 
Who develo~ed these tools? 
With the exception of Qualimeter, the President of CODETI, Jorge 
Monge, developed these tools from 1991 to 1994. The tools had 
been originally introduced by IDRC in Singapore and Malaysia. 
CODETI took these models, adapted them to the Central American 
reality, translated them, and, in addition, developed new tools. 
IDRC paid for the research and testing of these models in Central 
America as part of two project grants: one to CONICIT and the 
other to FECAICA/CICR. Both grants named Jorge Monge as the 
researcher who, (among other duties), was responsible for 
development of the tools. 
How were the tools transferred? 
Once the tools were developed, CODETI signed a transfer agreement 
with the Chamber and Associations. These agreements, signed 
between 1996 and 1997, acknowledged CODETI as the owner of the 
tools and the only one with the right to make changes to the 
tools or sell them. The Chambers received the right to use the 
tools for a two year period, renewable annually. The transfer 
cost varied per tool, between US $6,500 to US $10,000, which 
included the manuals, software, training and the right to new 
versions. 
The cost to each unit for a complete set of the six SUDIAC tools 
would have been between US $40,000 to $50,000. The Chambers did 
not pay for these tools in cash. Rather they agree to have their 
units use the tools through consulting services at US $25/hour, 
until the cost of the tools was covered. This was the equivalent 
of between 260 and 400 hours (32 to 50 days) of consulting work 
per tool, or 1600 to 2000 hours (200 to 250 days). 
The transfer agreements were similar in structure to licensing 
agreement contracts. In a grant project, however, they served no 
practical purpose. The research and development costs, manuals 
and training cost for the tools essentially represented by the US 
$6,500 to US $10,000 cost of the tools was paid for by donor 
funds, not by the units, or by CODETI. Revenues earned through 
use of the tools went to the Chambers and units, not CODETI or 
the donors. 
CODETI signed these transfer agreements in 1996 and 1997. None of 
them have been cancelled. Apparently, they have been automati- 
cally renewed. 
How were the tools used? 
The units have made use of these tools. The degree of use varies, 
however, depending on the skill and ability of the unit's 
advisors and the business strategy of the unit. Inexperienced 
advisors relied most heavily on use of the tools. Experienced 
advisors, with well honed diagnostic tools, did not use the tools 
nearly as much. 
In 1996 and 1997, when the tools were first introduced, they were 
used in 18% to 60% of all consulting assignments. Now, however, 
their use has slipped to between 10% to 50%. 
The initial issue of the tools had a complicated computer 
software program. Several units modified this program with the 
assistance of CODETI or by themselves. One unit, notably El 
Salvador, improved the tools by deleting repetitive questions and 
adding more pertinent ones. 
The SUDIAC tools are not the only ones used by the units although 
they are the most common ones. Other units, notably Guatemala and 
El Salvador, have introduced alternate tools from other local and 
international sources. 
What is the demand for the tools? 
There is no demand for the tools by SMIs. 
SMIs assume that the methodologies of the tools are a part of 
their advisor's skills. They prefer to pay for a consultant's 
solutions to problems, rather than to pay for a report that only 
outlines their problems. 
Those firms which agreed to pay for a diagnostic tool found the 
analysis too general to be of assistance in solving their 
problems. The evaluator reviewed five diagnostic reports and 
confirmed this observation. 
The diagnostic tools have been commonly cited as a cost-effective 
aid for SMIs to identify their problems. The evaluation could not 
verify this. Very few companies have purchased the tools and used 
them independently, without the advisors. The diagnostic tools' 
benefit is to the advisor and to the unit. Use of the diagnostic 
tools encourages repeat business as it adopts a long-term 
perspective to working with the company rather than the type of 
consulting which is a one-time, problem-solving specific 
approach. 
The tools must, however, be carefully used. In many cases they 
are too general to identify practical solutions to problems that 
the businesses have. General advise is not considered by SMIs to 
be "good valuen for the money spent on consultants. The benchmark 
by which a firm is measured to determine its score is neither 
clearly described nor understood, so advice based on a comparison 
with this norm could be poor or misleading to a firm. 
The correlation between having a completed diagnosis and becoming 
more competitive is misleading. While the tool identifies areas 
on which to work, this identification can in no way demonstrate 
that one firm will be more competitive than another. 
WHO OWNS THE TOOLS? 
The evaluator was asked to determine who owns the tools. The 
answer is: still unknown. 
The Chambers, on behalf of the units which use the tools, claim 
ownership since the tools are considered part of the CAISNET 
project in which they are participants. 
CODETI claims ownership under the intellectual property laws of 
Costa Rica, because they were developed by its President. The 
tools have been legally registered in the name of CODETI, the 
Foundation. 
The IDRC lawyer who worked on the tool ownership file has left 
the Centre and the other IDRC counsel consulted would not give an 
opinion because he was unfamiliar with the file. 
The evaluator is not an expert in intellectual property laws in 
Canada or Costa Rica. Based on the contractual agreements, 
however, it would appear as if CODETI, CONICIT, FECAICA, the 
Units, IDRC and CIDA have a claim to these tools. The only 
CAISNET player who has no claim on these tools is CRC S o g e m a / ~ ~ ~ .  
Although CODETI developed the tools, the Foundation did not pay 
for their research and development. These costs were covered 
under IDRCJs agreement with CONICIT. The evaluator did not review 
this agreement, but normally institutions have a claim to the 
intellectual property goods of their employers or sub-contrac- 
tors. 
IDRC has never signed a grant agreement with CODETI for the 
development of these tools. Had it done so, the ownership would 
not likely be an issue. 
The IDRC agreement with FECAICA/CICR has no intellectual property 
clause, a surprising omission for a research organization. The 
agreement, however, does state that project goods, referred to as 
"project equipment and materialsw, are the property of FECAICA 
and CICR. If the tools are considered a "goodv of this project, 
then they would be owned by FECAICA/CICR unless CODETI/Jorge 
Monge had an agreement specifying otherwise. 
The FECAICA/PAR contract contains an intellectual property clause 
which is standard in all contracts related to CIDA funding. This 
clause states that all intellectual property developed under the 
contract is the property of the Government of Canada. The third 
version of the Holistic Tool, the FinanceMeter and the 
Environment Assessment and Improvement Tool, were completed 
during the FECAICA/PAR contract, therefore, the tools might be 
considered the property of CIDA. 
The FECAICA/PAR contract defines intellectual property and 
clearly states that CIDA, not CRC/Sogema, is the owner of any 
property financed under the PAR contract. 
The Units claim ownership of the tools because under their 
agreements with CODETI, the tools are considered paid for after a 
certain amount of consulting time has been spent using them. El 
Salvador, Costa Rica and Guatemala have likely completed the 
number of hours needed to claim ownership of the tools. 
Unfortunately, however, accurate records that could be used to 
establish to substantiate this claim do not appear to be 
available. 
Only one tool appears to be clearly owned by CODETI, the 
QualiMeter. The evaluator did not, however, review a copy of 
CODETIis agreement with the Quebec Society for Quality. 
The recommendation is that this issue be settled as soon as 
possible. There is an urgent need to do so. Since CIDA and IDRC 
have a potential claim as owners, these donors should jointly 
hire an outside lawyer as mediator. Ideally, this person will be 
fully bilingual (Spanish-English), a specialist in intellectual 
property law in Canada, and be someone who has has knowledge of 
and experience with the intellectual property laws of Costa Rica 
and the other Central American countries. This mediator will 
review the legal depositions of these seven groups attesting to 
their claim. The results of this mediation should be binding on 
all parties concerned. 
It is recommended that IDRC's legal department add an intellec- 
tual property ownership clause to all of its future agreements. 
CAISNET CONTRACT HISTORY 
The following chart lists the governing contracts and agreements 





























































The estimated financial position of the FECAICA/PAR contract is 
shown below. The evaluator did not review the FECAICA/PAR 
financial records. 
CAISNET PROJECT 
PAR REMAINING FUNDS 
ESTIMhTED AT AUGUST 26/98 
CAISNET-PAR ORIGINAL BUDGET 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES UP TO 31 JULY 
ESTIMATED FUNDS REMAINING 
as of 1st August 
PROJECTED EXPENSES: AUG & SEPT 
BALANCE ESTIMATED AT SEPT 30/98 
IDRC FUNDING 
The following chart shows IDRC advances for its grant agreements. 
While advances are not expenditures, they are a close 
approximation for expenses in a project as complex as this. 
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The following chart outlines the estimated local contributions in 
Canadian currency equivalents. None of these figures were placed 
beside budget items. There was no consistent reporting on 
expenditures of these amounts for the network as a whole, 
although several units reported figures to IDRC. 
These figures were not confirmed by the evaluator. 
LOCAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
BUDGET FOR CAISNET 
CONTRIBUTOR 









There was none. 











The budgets were either for all for units, for the coordinating 
unit, or for institutional strengthening. There was not, however, 
a total project budget for CAISNET. 
SUSTAINABILITY OF CAISNET 
NATIONAL uNITS/COORDINATING UNIT 
What is the definition of the sustainabilitv of CAISNET? 
The necessary and sufficient conditions to state that CAISNET had 
achieved sustainability would be: 
an efficient management and administration of each unit and 
the coordinating unit 
each unit and the coordinating unit has at least sufficient 
revenue to cover their costs. The sources of revenues could 
be a combination of earned revenue, project donations, or 
contributions by sponsoring institutions 
evidence that the "networkM between the units and the 
coordinating unit and among the units is operating to 
support its goals 
CAISNET would not exist if the coordinating unit did not exist. 
Without this unit the five national units would be essentially 
FECAI c m x .  
What was the Orisinal Sustainability Plan for CAISNET? 
There was no sustainability plan for CAISNET in the beginning. 
There was, however, an expectation on the part of donors that the 
network would become sustainable. When this was to occur, how 
much donor support would be required to reach this level, and 
what operating level of earnings would be required by the 
network, was not, however, ever specified in agreements. 
For the five national units, only the Costa Rican and Guatemalan 
IDRC project approval documents give a sustainability date, 
December, 1998. Neither of the two units were aware of this 
specification, however, nor was it included in IDRC grant 
agreements. 
Similarly, there was no plan for the sustainability of the 
coordinating unit. IDRC project approval documents stated that 
revenues to support its operation would come from network 
revenues, National Chambers and Associations of Industry and 
Central American Governments. There was, however, no date by 
which IDRC funding would end, nor were there any details about 
which operating costs would be covered by other sources of funds. 
The FECAICA/PAR agreements between FECAICA and its members stated 
that they would guarantee the sustainability of their units and 
contribute towards the sustainability of the coordinating unit 
and the network. No plan was ever drawn up to do this, however. 
Though FECAICA/CICR signed to be the sponsor of CAISNET under the 
IDRC agreement, FECAICA personnel and members interviewed stated 
that they did not know how on-going costs would be funded because 
the issue simply had never been discussed. 
The options for sustainability of the CU would be one or a 
combination of: 
the costs shared equally by all five FECAICA members as an 
additional membership charge 
an annual service fee charged to each CAISNET unit to cover 
the CAISNET coordinating unit's costs 
What would h a ~ ~ e n  to CAISNET if Canadian sup~ort ended? 
The Executive Directors of Guatemala, Costa Rica and El Salvador 
indicated that they considered the pilot project showed the unit 
could be successful. They stated that they would attempt to 
continue the service but with reduced staff, (1 Director, 1-2 
Technical advisors, and a part-time or shared secretary, with 
other staff members working on contract on as-needed basis). The 
directors for Honduras and Nicaragua confirmed their support for 
the unit. They stated, however, that there had not been enough 
client services to decide whether or not there was a demand in 
their country for these services, even though they stated there 
was a need. 
None of the executive directors indicated that they were in a 
position to provide funding to pay for the coordinating unit, 
although when their units became self-sufficient they were not 
opposed to the idea of helping to cover the expenses of the unit, 
provided that they had some control over the unit's budget and 
some say in the regional activities that were being carried out. 
For the coordinating unit, the directors felt that the network 
could be maintained though Internet, phone and fax communications 
on an as-needed basis. They stated, however, that the coordina- 
ting unit played a useful role in helping the units set up, 
become operational and carry out regional activities. 
What are the estimated recurrins costs of CAISNET? 
It is impossible to determine a precise figure for the estimated 
annual operating costs of CAISNET. The reasons for this are the 
following: 
the five units report to their various donors - IDRC, BID, 
PAR - on their expenses to project budget only. No one 
reports on the total operating costs of the unit 
there is no common understanding of what comprises 
"recurring costs" that would need to be covered by the 
earnings of the unit and/or the contribution of the 
sponsoring organization when donor funding ends 
the reporting of !learningsw from clients is not consistent 
in all units. Some units report money collected net of 
incentives paid to staff or net of money paid to an outside 
consultant. These recurring costs of the units are, 
therefore, understated, as are the actual earnings. 
The following assumptions have been used to estimate the costs of 
a unit in US dollars: director's salary of US $1,700 per month, a 
technical advisor's salary of US $1,200 per month, a secretary's 
salary of US $500, and social benefits @ 40% of salaries. In 
addition, office supplies US $1200 per year (US $120 month), 
communications US $3,000 per year (US $250 month), plus $200 per 
year for each additional advisor, promotion US $1,200 per year 
(US $100 mo) plus $300 per year for each additional advisor. 
The assumptions below assume a unit of a director, secretary and 
the number of advisors as shown below. 
BEST GUESS ESTIMATES OF COSTS US $ 
The start-up costs for the units are assumed to be US $25,000 for 
equipment purchases, initial training of staff, needs assessment 





In 1997 the total revenues for all five units reported to IDRC US 
$117,622 which is about 20% of the estimated cost of one unit. 
The rough sustainability calculation is, therefore, 20%. 
The coordinating unit has been asked by the steering committee to 
report on sustainability of the units for the calendar year 1997. 
Their reports shows that Costa Rica was covering 14% of its 
costs, El Salvador 16% of its costs, and Guatemala 19% of its 
costs. The total costs of the units were not considered, however, 














$14,800 per month or $177,600 for the Director, three technical 
advisors, office rent and operating costs (see bridging report.) 
These costs are fully funded by donors. 
The evaluator finds that the units and the network have not had a 
sharp managerial focus on providing business services to SMIs. 
Recommendation: The network should be funded for the bridging 




A Committee is an Inappropriate Project Partner: The coordination 
of the activities of national institutions supporting the SMI 
sector is best done in a committee, not in a project structure. 
A project requires one institution which is responsible for the 
project in its entirety. 
Institutional Assesment Required: The selection of a project 
sponsor requires an institutional assessment of the partner's 
capacity as well as a project plan. 
Project Design Structure Should Encourage Institutional Adoption 
of Project: If the expectation at the end of a donor's funding is 
that the project will continue as part of the institution's 
services, the project design should reflect this goal. The 
position of project director should be designed into the existing 
organizational structure, staff salaries and benefits should be 
decided based on the organization's salary scales and employment 
conditions, and the project budget expense lines should be the 
same as the organization's accounting system. 
The End-of-Project Status Should be Clear at the Beginning: 
Assumptions about the end-of-project status in terms of results 
should be clearly stated. 
Self-Sustaining Projects Require Management and Monthly Financial 
Reports Like Any Business: Setting up a project to become self- 
sustaining is like starting a business. If donors are not 
prepared to take on this type of management, they should not plan 
projects of this type. 
Contract Structure Should Be Carefully Checked to Ensure it Does 
Not Distort Project and Institutional Structures. At best it 
should have no negative effect. 
The existence of seven separate contracts for CAISNET did not 
support the intended idea of a network. Because the national 
units had no contractual responsibility to the coordinating unit, 
it was difficult to require common standards and operating 
procedures among the units. 
Other lessons are highlighted in the report. 
ANNEXES 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NETWORK 
[The evaluator invited Jorge Monge to prepare this history of the 
early years of the CAISNET project as he is the only person from 
the original founder's group still working on the project.] 
BACKGROUND 
In the late eighties IDRC, through its Corporate Initiative 
Branch (CIB) - Ottawa and LARO, funded various projects on 
applied research and development in Latin America. As part of 
these initiatives, IDRC/CIB-LARO and the Science and Technology 
Department of the Organization of American States (OAS), convened 
a meeting to evaluate the results and discuss proposals on how to 
promote the applied technology development of the region. During 
the meeting researchers from institution of Costa Rica and Brazil 
joined efforts and submitted a proposal to IDRC for the estab- 
lishment of CODETI'S initiative for Central America and the 
Caribbean in order to promote north-south and south-south 
transfers of technological knowledge. This proposal received the 
support of IDRC/CIB-LARO through a grant approved in 1991 on 
behalf of the Government of Costa R~C~/CONICIT, where CODETI1s 
office was located. 
CODETI was established, following a legal investigation, as a 
legally registered Foundation in Costa Rica with a Board of 
Directors composed of representatives from the government, 
private and academic sectors. CODETI started to work in the 
region as a pilot project with the main goals of promoting the 
transfer of technology based on specific cases and evaluating the 
feasibility for the establishment of a Central American and 
Caribbean Network to promote the industrial and technological 
development of these regions. Studies were conducted during the 
initial stages in order to evaluate SMMs' demand for the 
industrial services offered by CODETI and the possible future 
network. Based on the findings, CODETI suggested promoting the 
establishment of national industrial support units and to start 
working in common methodologies in order to provide technical 
assistance in a regional network. Thus IDRC, through LARO and 
PRISM (the former CIB) - Ottawa, supported CODETI in the design 
of an initiative for the establishment of a regional industrial 
support project in Central America which led to the creation of 
NISUS/CAISNET in 1994. 
In 1993, based on CODETI project findings and recommendations, 
IDRC and CODETI decided to seek the establishment of a partner- 
ship with Central American regional institutions to develop the 
regional network and the national industrial support units. 
During the pilot phase, CODETI performed an evaluation of 
suitable institutions at the national and regional levels for 
IDRC and assisted IDRC in approaching these institutions to 
discuss the units and network initiative. Since these Central 
American institutions had structural weaknesses, the project was 
also seen as a way to further institutional-strengthening based 
on specific project objectives. Among the 15 institutions 
considered, IDRC and CODETI approached the four most suitable 
ones - ICAAITI, CEFOF, FECAICA and FEDEPRICAP. It was finally 
decided to work with FECAICA and its national industrial chambers 
and associations since its membership was close to 20% of the 
SMMs in the region. These institutions needed to be modernized 
to enable SMM members to face the challenges of free trade 
agreements. Moreover, neither FECAICA nor any of its five 
national members were carrying out any cooperation projects at 
that time. 
During the first network pilot project which started in 1992, 
CODETI/PRISM-LARO were considering different organizational 
models. Based on CODETI1s project findings, the unit in Costa 
Rica was designed under a single institutional model choosing the 
CICR as the host for the unit. The President of CICR at the time 
was also FECAICA1s President and supported setting up of a 
regional network. The units of Guatemala and Honduras were set 
up under a consortium model with FEPYME and COHCIT as grant 
recipients respectively. In the Guatemalan case, the Chamber of 
Industry (CIG), a member of FECAICA, was also a member of the 
unit's institutional consortium. In 1994, IDRC approved the 
funding for the units in Guatemala and Honduras through PRISM and 
for the unit in Costa Rica through PRISM-LARO. Later, in 1996, 
IDRC/SMMEIT (formerly PRISM), in Ottawa, funded the unit of El 
Salvador and in 1997 the unit of Nicaragua. 
At the same time IDRC and CODETI initiated negotiations with 
FECAICA for the establishment of a regional "networkn among the 
units to provide for the regional approach to industrial support 
described above. CODETI agreed with FECAICA1s President at that 
time to propose building a partnership with the goal of promoting 
the industrial and technological development of the region. An 
agreement was signed between FECAICA and CODETI to promote the 
establishment of the RED ATI-CODETI. later called CAISNET. 
CODETI worked in the design of the network project based on 
studies carried out in the inception phase. From this it was 
clear that the methodological approach to be used needed to be be 
one based more on technology-demand than one that was supply 
driven. This was more likely to help SMMs identify their needs. 
The decision was made to work on the development of diagnostic 
tools to this end. CODETI then started the designing of an 
Industrial Diagnosis System for the improvement of SMMsl 
Competitiveness (SUDIAC is the Spanish acronym), developing and 
adapting different methodologies and tools under different IDRC 
grants . 
In the technology transfer area, the work done through CODETI 
provided the background and rationale for the inception of 
another initiative, the Institutional Management Training Program 
(IMP), looking for the promotion and transfer of technology from 
Canadian institutions to ones in Central America and the 
Caribbean region. CODETI organized and hosted IMP'S initial 
meeting in Costa Rica which was attended by some of APRO's 
members such as the Saskatchewan Research Council (SRC) and the 
Canadian Research Insititute of Quebec (CRIQ) . Under this 
initiative CODETI facilitated training directors of the Guatemala 
and Costa Rica units at the Nova Scotia Research Foundation. In 
addition, the directors of technology-transfer offices from Costa 
Rican Universities and the Guatemala-based Technological Central 
American Institute (ICAITIU), received training in British 
Columbia, Manitoba, and New Brunswick centers. IMP supported 
IDRC1s goal of continuing to build CODETI1s framework for linking 
the units with Canadian institutions which could provide 
technological backstopping for specific industrial needs. 
Based on the agreement signed between FECAICA and CODETI and the 
approval by the Board of FECAICA of the project concept in 
November, 1994, CODETI proposed to IDRC-PRISM the holding of a 
meeting in order to finalize the CODETI-CAISNET network proposal 
with the participation of CMA, IDRC, APRO, FECAICA, CODETI, the 
Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP) and the Canadian 
Environmental Industry Association (CECA). The meeting was 
conducted and hosted by IDRC and took place in February, 1995, 
with the participation of APRO's CEO, SRC, CRIQ, CODETI, FECAICA 
and IDRC. The outcome of the meeting was the decision to submit 
to IDRC a proposal for the second phase of the initiative for the 
industrial and technological development of Central America which 
was firmly established then under the name of CAISNET Project 
Proposal, for which final financial and project approval was 
received from IDRC in March 1995. 
The original CAISNET budget was for an 18 month $2.2 M proposal. 
Due to budget cuts, however, IDRC could only provide $394,000 
towards this initiative which includes the Canadian costs. The 
IDRC budget was designed to include the Canadian partners - APRO 
- in order to fulfil the criteria for the PAR proposal for CIDA1s 
Project. PAR was formally launched in 1996. The CMA was asked to 
be a member of the newly established CAISNET Steering Committee. 
Scaled back were elements relating to technology transfer, joint 
ventures, Canadian support and monitoring to preserve the 
essential elements: establishing the coordinating unit as a 
network hub, supporting the national units in start-upland 
testing and adaptation of the diagnostic tools. 
Later that year, CODETI1s President visited two APRO members, 
APRO1s head office, and participated in the meeting in Ottawa at 
which the Canadian Technology Network was launched by the 
Government of Canada. The meetings held served as preparatory 
work with IDRC and the Canadian partners to enter into the first 
bid of the PAR program that was going to take place at the end of 
the year. CODETI then prepared a preliminary draft proposal and 
with IDRC support, through the allocation for the remaining CAP 
funds from CODETIfs first grant, a work session was carried out 
to discuss this draft in Montreal with the participation of 
representatives from SRC, ITC, CRIQ, APRO, CEO, CODETI and IDRC. 
The proposal was further developed by CODETI and submitted for 
discussion and approval to the CAISNET Steering Committee 
(FECAICA, IDRC, APRO, CODETI, CMA) during its first meeting held 
in Costa Rica in November, 1995. CODETI finalized the proposal 
which was officially submitted to the PAR Program for first 
tender of $1.7 M on December 1995. PAR approved the project after 
budget negotiation. The total amount of the project was $ 1.6 
with the PAR contribution of $1.1 M. 
CONTACTS 
CANADA 
The Alliance of Manufacturers and Ex~orters Canada 
Trevor Cornell, The Alliance - CAISNET Canadian Coordinator. 
Doreen Ruso, Vice President, International Trade, The ~lliance. 
Aida M. Viveiros, Project Officer, International Trade 
Development, The Alliance of Manufacturers & Exporters Canada. 
XCG Environmental 
Robert Brioschi, Consultant, XCG Environmental Engineering 
Specialists. 
Robert R. Wood, Project Manager, XCG Environmental Engineering 
Specialists. 
C~DA, Canada 
Margaret Ford, Central America Regional Director. 
David Keitlin, Central America, Program Manager. 
Pierre Marion, Project Director. 
Guy Mercier, Analyst, Nicaragua and Honduras. 
Irene Richer, Enterprise PRO for Africa Branch and PRO for the 
CCIC Project . 
Philippe Schubert, Project Manager, Central American Electricity 
Project. 
Randy Trenholm, Industrial Cooperation, Central America. 
Doris Wong, Enterprise PRO for America's Branch. 
Consultants to CIDA 
Yvon Parent, Project Monitor, CIIC. 
Pierre Tanguay, Consultant for PAR, Mid-Term Review. 
Prosram Bolivar 
J. Williams Siebes, Director General. 
Exwort Develo~ment Comoration 
Luc Dupont, Central America. 
CRC Sosema (CEA for PAR) 
Andre Carrier, Project Coordinator. 
IDRC 
Brent Herbert-Copley, Senior Program Specialist. 
COSTA RICA 
UAT I 
Ing. Barbara Campos, Bolsa de Sub Contratacion Industrial, Camara 
de-Industrais de-costa Rica. 
Ing. Carlos Duran, Asesor UATI, Camara de Industrias de Costa 
Rica 
Walter Lopez, Director UATI, Camara de Industrias de Costa Rica. 
Gustavo Munoz Montoya, Asesor UATI, Camara de Industrias de Costa 
Rica. 
Ing. Omar Zuniga Mora, Asesor Tehnico, Camara de Industrias de 
Costa Rica. 
CODETI 
Yorse Monse, President, CODETI. 
~irGa ~avarro, ~eneral . Manager, CODETI . 
PAR -
Henry Castro, Asistente Administrative del Programa P.A.R., 
Programa P.A.R. 
Jean Marc Lampron, Director Asistente Programa P.A.R., Programa 
P.A.R. 
CICR 
Carlos Montenegro Godinez, Subdirector Ejecutivo, Camara de 
Industrias de Costa Rica. 
c y  
Armando Rojas Esquivel, Coordinador, MEIC (Ministerio de Economia 
Industria y Comercio) . 
~f
Arq. Saddie ~uiz, Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia. 
Association of Small and Medium Enterprises. 
ASOPYME, Ana Isabel Acevedo, Coordinator. 
FUNDES , Jose Leon. 
Other Prosrams 
Imelda Arias del Cid, LL.M., Abogada y Notaria. 
Eldon Glenn Caldwell, Consultant, ProMeC S.A. (Proyectos de 
Mej ora Continua S .A. ) . 
Msc. Ivan Calvo Axofeifa, Consultor, Planificacion, Gestion y 
Evaluation. 
Silvia Castro, Subdirectora, Procesos (Programa Centroamericano 
para la Sostenibilidad Democratica). 
Clients of UATI 
Laboratory Griffith, Marcel Benites. 
Industrias Picaros, Marco Barrantec. 
PINCASA, Carlos Pena Coto. 
Marco Vinicio Barrantes Alpizar, Gerente de Ventas y Mercadeo, 
Industrias Picaros Ltd. 
BID -
Jose Manuel Lizano V., Especialista Financier0 Local, Banco 
Interamericano de Desarrollo. 
Gustavo Lopes, Oficial de Inversiones, Corporacio Interamericana 
de Inversiones. 
Sitoo Mukerji, Director Office of Science and Technology, 
Organization of American States. 
CIIC 
Real Trudel, Director, Iniciativa Canadiense Para La 
Competitividad Industrial. 
CIDA 
Antoine Chevrier , Consultant (Developpement) , Ambassade du 
Canada. 
James Melanson, Counsellor (Development), Canadian Embassy. 
EL SALVADOR 
ASI 
Jorge Arriaza, Gerente General, Asociacion Salvadorena de 
S IAPE 
Silvia Bucher, Directora del Programa, SIAPE (Sistema Integrado 
de Apoyo a la Pequena Empresa). 
Clients of UATI 
Ing. Jorge Diaz Vasquez, Gerente General, Industrias READI. S.A. 
de C.V.. 
J. Eduardo Umana Cerros, Gerente de Operaciones, Caremsa de C.V.. 
- 
UATI 
Ing. Sebastian Flores, Tecnico Consultor, Unidad Nacional de 
Asistencia Tecnica a la Industria. 
Other Proqrams 
Arnoldo Jimenez A., Director Ejecutivo, Asociacion Nacional de la 
Empresa Privida. 
Jose Mario Magana, Gerente Tecnico, Camara de Comercio e 
Industria de El Salvador. 
UNAT I 
Ing. Victor Manuel Rodriguez, Tecnico Consultor, Unidad Nacional 
de Asistencia Tecnica a la Industria. 
Ing. Ramon A. Viera, Director/Coordinador, ASI/SIAPE/CAISNET. 
GUATEMALA 
CIG -
Luis Pedro Toledo, Director Ejecutivo, CIG 
UTEPYMI 
Ing. Leticia Alvarez Echeverria, Directora, UTEPYMI. 
Ing. Hector Byron Garrido, Asesor Tecnico, UTEPYMI. 
Ing. Julio R. Garcia Vettorazzi, Asesor Tecnico, UTEPYMI. 
Ing. Alma Judith Ortiz, Asesor Tecnico, UTEPYMI. 
Ing. Carlos Alex Olivares O., Consultor de Empresas, (former 
Director UTEPYMI.) 
Leticia Alvares de Urriola, Directora, UTEPYMI. 
Ing. Elba Maria Villanueva, Asesor Tecnico, UTEPYMI. 
Clients of UTEPYMI 
Cubrecamas Sosa, Geovanny Sossa. 
Empacadora Venturina, Julio Roldes. 
FECAICA 
Roberto Velasquez Oliva, Asesor Tecnico, FECAICA. 
Carlos Enrique Rivera, FECAICA. 
CIDA 
Mr. Edward Doe. 




Lic. Mauricio Mejia, Director Ejecutivo, ANDI. 
Felipe A. Peraza, Presidente, ANDI. 
Honduras Association of Small Business 
Jose Isabel Argueta, Propietario, Transportes Terrestes "Argu 
etan. 
Marco Moncada Ayestas, Gerente, Industria la Grandeza. 
Fausto Zeron Cardenas, Gerente, Servicio Electric0 "NapolesH. 
Nectali Martinez, Indemah Es Mueble. 
UNAT IH 
Ing. Rommel A. Barahona, Director, UNATIH. 
Jose Fernandez G., Gerente Propiotario, Fernandez Industrial. 
Ing. Carlos Pineda, Asesor Tecnico Industrial, UNATIH. 
Edwin Rivera Rodriguez, Asesor Tecnico Industrial, UNATIH. 
David Castillo, Silvia de Paz 
Other Prosrams 
National Association of Small and Medium Industry, San Pedro 
Sula. Marco Moncada, President, and other executive members. 
Other Consultants 
Peter K. Stokoe, Principal, Sustainable Futures. - 
CIDA 
Narda Melendez. Asociacion Andar. 
Aline J. de ~iila, Oficial Consular, Consulado de Canada. 
NICARAGUA 
CADIN 
Dr. Gilberto Solis Espinoza, Secretario Ejecutivo, CADIN. 
UNAP I 
Ing. Marvin Cruz O., Asesor Quimico Industrial, UNAPI. 
Lic. Cecilia Garcia M., Especialista en information, UNAPI. 
Ing. Carlos Espinosa Gonzalez, Director, UNAPI. 
Ing. Benito J. Lacayo O., Asesor Industrial, UNAPI. 
Lic. Maria Patricia Castillo Landeros, Gerente Administrativa 
Financiers, UNAPI . 
Other Programs 
Ricardo J. Alvarado N., Director Ejecutivo, Programa Nacional de 
Apoyo a la Microempresa. 
C IDA 
Daniel Gagnon, Director, Oficina de Cooperacion Canadiense. 
Aracely Trejos T., Fondo para la Equidad de Genero, Oficina de 
Cooperacion Canadiense. 
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Codeti - Caisnet. Presupuesto Mensual de Desembolso (propuesto 
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Industrial Support Network Central America. Financial Analvsis 
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Canadian Manufacturers1 Association. Proposal Outline. 
December 7, 1995. 
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Technical Report and Financial Statement of the Canadian Partner. 
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Industrial Support Network Central America. Proi ect Budset 
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Industrial Support Network Central America. Proi ect Summary. 
March 20, 1995. 
Industrial Support Network Central America. Financial Analvsis 
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Alliance of Manufacturers & Exporters Canada. Alliance News 
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Industrial Support Network Central America (Costa Rica Component) . 
Financial Analvsis ~orksheet/~emorandum. June 12, 1996. 
Caisnet - Codeti. Provecto Caisnet Acuerdos del Steerinq 
Committee. June 13, 1996. 
IDRC. IDRC Financial Rewort Re~ortins Requirements. June 1996 - 
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Ministero de Economia, Industria y Comercio Ministro . Carta De 
Entendimiento. October 24, 1995. 
Alliance of Manufacturers & Exporters Canada. Job Description 
Central American Liaison Officer for Caisnet Proiect. 
December 2, 1997. 
Industrial Support Network Central America. Financial Analysis 
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Caisnet . Caisnet Report Update of Activities for Period October 96 
- Mav 97. October 20, 1997. 
Development and Strensthenins of a Technolosical Assistance 
Resional Network. - CAISNET Work Program and Fifth Steering 
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a Setiembre 1997. 
Costa Rica 
IDRC. Proiect Summarv Industrial Suwwort Units (Guatemala/~osta 
Rica) 11. July 2, 1996. 
IDRC . Proi ect Budset Summarv Industrial Suwport Units 
(Guatemala/~osta Rica) 11. July 2, 1996. 
Camara de Industrias de Costa Rica. Unidad de Asistencia Tecnica 
a la Industria Plan de Nesocios - Sesunda Etapa Enero de 1997 a 
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Camara de Industrias de Costa Rica. Unidad de Asistencia Tecnica 
a la Industria (UATI) Plan de Nesocios Ano 1997 v 1998 (En Colones 
Costarricenses) . 
Camara de Industrias de Costa Rica. Informe Tecnico Provecto 
"Unidad de ADOYO Industrialu Costa Rica. Enero a Junio 1997. 
Camara de Industrias de Costa Rica. Informe Tecnico Provecto 
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IDRC. Memorandum of Grant Conditions Camara de Industrias de 
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IDRC . Recipient RAP Budset Industrial Support Units 
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Panama FEDEPRICAP. Inventario v Analisis de la Situation de la 
Mediana Emwresa Productiva en Centroamerica Informe de Costa Rica 
Volumen VI. Abril, 1996. 
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Acta de la Reunion del Gru~o Tecnico de Fecaica. San Salvador, El 
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Sistema Integrado de Apoyo a la Pequena Empresa. Codeti - Caisnet . 
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Asociacion Salvadorena de Industriales. Estatutos. 
Codeti - Caisnet. Cawacitacion Para el Es~ecialista en 
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(AS1 in£ orma asi) . November 25, 1996. 
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1996. 
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Junio 6 de 1996. 
Asociacion Salvadorena de Industriales. Reauerimientos del Reworte 
Financier0 Del IDRC. San Salvador, 11 de Abril de 1997. 
Asociacion Salvadorena de Industriales. Re~orte Tecnico Periodo 
~ept/96 - Febrero/97. San Salvador, 11 de Abril de 1997. 
Industrial Support Unit: El Salvador. Financial Analysis 
Worksheet/Memorandum. March 25, 1997. 
Asociacion Salvadorena de Industriales UNATI. Convenio ASI/IDRC 
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IDRC. Memorandum of Grant Conditions Asociacion Salvadorena de 
Industriales El Salvador. March 6, 1996. 
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February 15, 1996. 
Programa de Apoyo a Iniciativas Regionales Programa PAR Cooperacion 
Canadiense. Federacion de Entidades Privadas de Centroamerica y 
Panama FEDEPRICAP. Inventario v Analisis de la Situation de la 
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Volumen 111. Abril, 1996. 
Organizacion de las Naciones Unidas Para El Desarrollo Industrial 
(ONUDI) . Asenda Para la Modernization Industrial en Centroamerica 
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Camara de Industria de Guatemala. Muni Municipalldad Guatemala. 
Resistro Civil. January 8, 1997. 
IDRC. Memorandum of Grant Conditons Camara de Industria de 
Guatemala, Guatemala City, Cuatemala. January 16, 1997. 
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Volumen 11. Abril, 1996. 
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Panama FEDEPRICAP. Inventario v Analisis de la Situacion de la 
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TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE 
EVALUATION OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SUPPORT NETWORK 
(CAISNET) AND THE 
FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR A CENTRAL AMERICA REGIONAL SME SUPPORT 
INITIATIVE 
1. Background 
1.1 General Context 
There are a number of important Canadian aid initiatives, 
targeting the productive sector, currently ongoing in Central 
America. These initiatives were planned and undertaken at 
different times, by different groups/organizations and with 
different foci. Some of them are coming to termination in the 
near future and our preliminary observations tend to indicate a 
substantial impact that warrants further support. Two of these 
initiatives, led respectively by CIDA and IDRC, are complementary 
and integrated. They are presented as separate below for record 
purposes but will be referred to under the single name of 
CAISNET, as an initiative implemented by FECAICA (the Regional 
Chamber of Industry for Central America) and the ALLIANCE of 
Manufacturers and Exporters of Canada. CIDA and IDRC wish to 
undertake jointly an evaluation of this initiative and determine 
the feasibility of a new regional initiative supporting the 
modernization of the productive sector and building upon the 
overall Canadian related investment in the region. Summary 
information on this investment follows. 
1.1.1 PAR 
PAR (Programa de Apoyo a las Iniciativas Regionales) covers the 
whole region of Central America, including Panama and Belize. It 
has a budget of $14 million and is half way through 
implementation. PAR is focused on equitable economic 
modernization. It does not seek to modernize the economy as much 
as to bring groups of small producers into the modern economy. 
The focus is centered on equity to ensure the long-term value of 
the project. 
This relates to one of the initiatives undertaken under PAR. The 
Canadian partner, ALLIANCE of Manufacturers and Exporters of 
Canada, is working with national technology support organizations 
through FECAICA to provide technology support to small 
manufacturers. This activity, initiated by IDRC (International 
Development Research Center) earlier (see below), is aimed at 
strengthening the institutional base in Central America and 
provides specific support to small factories to help them 
convert, modernize, or upgrade systems and equipment. 
1.1.3 CIIC 
This relates to a new bilateral project with Costa Rica called 
the Canadian Initiative for Industrial Competitiveness in Costa 
Rica. The project has a budget of $9.5 million and was mobilized 
in the early summer of 1997. It will provide financing assistance 
to small- and medium-size enterprises to access services and 
equipment for the modernization of their operations, to become 
more efficient and competitive in an environmentally-sound 
manner. It will also identify institutional constraints or 
bottlenecks to the modernization of the productive sector. The 
project's strategy requires the Canadian Executing Agency to work 
with local partners already dedicated to support the 
modernization of small and medium size enterprises. The project 
will also promote Canadian technology in Costa Rica and the 
region. 
1.1.4 Regional Electrical Energy 
This project, with a budget of $25 million, was mobilized in the 
fall of 1997 and will last for 5 years. It will (1) assist as 
needed in the practical implementation of reforms already under 
way in each Central American country, intended to lead to 
improved efficiency, private sector participation, and 
improved predictability and equity in the supply of electricity 
and (2) help the countries take advantage of the cost savings 
possible through regional collaboration in electricity. The 
project, while maintaining a regional focus, will also be able to 
carry out activities specific to only one or more 
countries. This flexibility is necessary due to the great 
disparity in the level of electrical development between the 
different Central American countries. It is expected that this 
project will generate a lot of opportunities for the productive 
sector, including cooperatives, to contribute to expanded popular 
access to electrical energy. 
The CAISNET initiative is sponsered by both IDRC and CIDA through 
PAR as mentioned above. CAISNET is coordinated by FECAICA (the 
Federation of Chambers and Industry Associations of Central 
America) and CODETI (which manages the Network on a day-to-day 
basis and has developed a range of diagnostic tools used in the 
Units, called UNATIS, located in national Chambers/Associations 
of Industries). In turn, the network is linked with the Alliance 
of Manufacturers and Exporters of Canada, in order to provide 
technical assistance and training for Units staff and to develop 
business opportunities between Central American and Canadian 
firms. One important product of this project has been the 
development of a SME diagnostic tool which is relatively easy to 
use, appears to focus on real problem areas and the use of which 
provides a source of income for the UNATIS. IDRC/CAISNET has a 
budget of $1.8 million over 4 years and is planned to end in the 
fall of 1998. 
2. Reasons for the Evaluation and Feasibility Study 
2.1 Reasons for the CAISNET evaluation 
Although the contributions by IDRC and CIDA(PAR) to the CAISNET 
initiative are separate, both efforts are complementary to one 
another and have become well-integrated over time. Funding from 
both sources is scheduled to terminate by the fall of 1998. It is 
a formal requirement for IDRC to undertake an evaluation of such - 
initiatives, not only to draw lessons from the experiment 
but also to identify options for the sustainability of the 
outputs/results achieved, including the possibility of continued 
IDRC support. On the PAR side, a mid-term review of the 
initiative has already been completed and served to re-align some 
of its activities. A further evaluation would not be absolutely 
necessary other than to draw lessons for the future. 
2.2 Reasons for the Central America Regional SME Support 
Initiative Feasibility Study 
The design team for the Canadian Initiative for Industrial 
Competitiveness in Costa Rica (CIIC) had considered the potential 
for replicating the CIIC in the region. However, available data 
was insufficient to establish the readiness of the other 
countries of the region for such productive-sector support. It 
was therefore proposed and approved, as part of the CIIC approval 
document, that the project's budget would provide for the 
feasibility study of such a regional initiative to be undertaken. 
It was only later that the project team realized the extent of 
the complementarity between CIDA and IDRC1s initiatives, hence 
the now-proposed joint approach. Based on the conclusions and 
recommendations of the feasibility study, decisions will be made 
by CIDA and IDRC regarding the launching of a regional 
initiative in support of SME development and modernization, 
including a focus on the elimination of related constraints, and 
regarding the implementation of bridging activities between the 
completion of the current CAISNET activities by IDRC and PAR, and 
the launching of an eventual regional project. 
3. Clients of the Evaluation and the Feasibility Study 
3.1 The Evaluation Study 
The primary and secondary clients of the evaluation are CIDA/PAR, 
IDRC, CAISNET, FECAICA, ALLIANCE, CODETI as well as partner 
Governments of the region. Secondary clients are SMEs, 
institutions and organizations that are also directly or 
indirectly involved in Canadian initiatives. Their expectations 
are: determination of the performance of CAISNET and 
recommendations to improve this performance and to ensure growth - 
and sustainability. 
3.1.1 More specifically, expectations of the primary clients 
are : 
3.1.1.1 To know whether the project is achieving its planned 
results, within budget and on schedule. If not, 
indicate the reasons and remedial action required, if 
applicable; 
3.1.1.2 To determine whether the UNATIS can survive and prosper 
once the project has terminated and under what 
conditions; 
3.1.1.3 To determine the degree to which the project has 
contributed to the institutional strengthening of local 
host organizations (Camaras, Industry Associations, 
etc.) and of CAISNET; 
3.1.1.4 To identify constraints that are not addressed through 
the project and which may be slowing down or blocking 
SME development. 
3.1.2 Expectations for the secondary clients are: 
3.1.2.1 To determine the degree to which the project has 
contributed to the institutional strengthening of their 
local host organizations (Camaras, etc.); 
3.1.2.2 To determine the level of satisfaction of the SMEs 
which have used UNATIS1 services; 
3.1.2.3 To determine the contribution of the project to the 
facilitation and the setting-up of partnerships between 
Canadian and Centro-American firms. 
3.2 The Feasibility Study 
The primary clients of the feasibility study are CIDA, IDRC and 
partner Governments of the region. The secondary clients would be 
all the eventual beneficiaries of such a regional initiative, 
i.e., the productive sector and all the institutions and 
organizations that relate to it. Their expectations are the 
identification of constraints experienced by SMEs nationally 
and/or regionally, inadequately dealt with by existing 
projects/programs, and identification of possible corrective 
measures. 
3.2.1 More specifically, primary clients expectations 
include : 
3.2.1.1 Identification of constraints (institutional, 
regulatory, organizational or others) affecting or 
blocking SME development and progress; 
3.2.1.2 Identification of programs/projects addressing such 
constraints or obstacles; 
3.2.1.3 Identification of entities having launched initiatives 
to resolve the difficulties faced by SMEs; 
3.2.1.4 If no initiatives are in place with which CIDA/IDRC 
could be associated, identification of potential 
measures that could contribute to alleviating 
constraints, including institutions that could 
participate to specific initiatives, budgets and any 
further actions required for completing the feasibility 
analysis of the identified measures, as required. 
3.2.2 Expectations of secondary clients are: 
3.2.2.1 Identification of measures to facilitate SME 
development; 
3.2.2.2 Proposals to remedial actions through donor 
initiatives; 
3.2.2.3 Participation in the definition of such initiatives; 
3.2.2.4 Design of actions for putting initiatives in place. 
4. Scope and Focus 
4.1 CAISNET Evaluation 
4.1.1 Scope: To assess whether the objectives and expected 
results of the project are being realized as planned. More 
specifically the following issues will be addressed: 
4.1.1.1 Are UNATIS satisfying the needs of their target markets 
and to what extent, including gender equity and 
environment requirements? 
4.1.1.2 Are UNATIS operating efficiently within Cameras and 
Associations of Industries and satisfying the 
administrative and operational requirements of host 
organizations? 
4.1.1.3 Are UNATIS developing a sustainability basis within and 
outside the CAISNET operational context for the post 
CAISNET project phase? 
4.1.1.4 To what extent do the diagnostic tools developed by 
CODETI/IDRC contribute to the effective functioning of 
the UNATIS, to what extent will it form the basis for 
sustainability of the UNATIS in the future, and is 
there an appropriate intellectual property framework in 
place to govern its dissemination? 
4.1.1.5 Are UNATIS contributing to the efficiency and 
operational capacity of CAISNET for the strengthening 
of Central America institutional and private business - 
industrial networking? 
4.1.1.6 Are UNATIS facilitating the establishment of 
partnerships between Canadian and Centro-american 
firms? 
4.1.1.7 Overall, are these leading towards the kinds of results 
expected from the project? 
4.1.1.8 Did the project improve the productivity and 
competitiveness of small- and medium-size Central 
American enterprises? 
4.1.1.9 Are small-and medium-size enterprises more competitive 
due to the project interventions? 
4.1.1.9.a Have the project's interventions proven to be 
sustainable? 
4.1.1.9.b Based on the evaluation of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the project, recommendations will be 
made with regard to whether the project should be 
continued after the planned deadline of September 1998. 
If affirmative, appropriate arrangements under which it 
should be pursued will be recommended. 
4.1.2 Focus: The main issues of focus are: 
4.1.2.1 Concerning UNATIS: 
Capacity of UNATIS to evaluate, target, reach and service 
the SME market. 
Determination of the capacity of UNATIS to identify the 
specific needs of SMEs 
Capacity of UNATIS to satisfy identified needs and SME 
demands 
Quality of service and degree of satisfaction of SMEs, 
especially returns to firms. 
Track record to date: number of SMEs serviced, improvement 
of operations and bottom line of SMEs, credibility in 
business circles and with Canadian companies and 
organizations 
Sustainability (cost recovery, chambers~/associations~ 
support and exploration of other avenues) 
Capacity for networking and quality of these linkages 
Promotion of gender and social equity 
Development of partnerships with Canadian companies 
Promotion and support of environmentally-respectful 
industrial activities 
Integration of UNATIS to FECAICA SMEs' promotion and 
development support activities 
Efficient management of IDRC and PAR resources 
Cooperation with other service providers (private, public, 
institutional, etc. 
Development of expertise of UNATIS 
Corrective actions as appropriate 
4.1.2.2 Concerning FECAICA: 
Establishment of networking arrangement in support of UNATIS 
Utilization of networking facilities by UNATIS and SMEs 
Setting up of linkages regionally 
Setting up of linkages with Canadian institutions and/or 
organizations such as Alliance of Manufacturers and 
Exporters of Canada 
Identification, facilitation and development of partnerships 
between SMEs and Canadian companies 
Strategic positioning of CAISNET on the regional and local 
markets 
Development of cooperation with other donors, bilateral and 
multilateral 
Competitiveness/complementarity of CAISNET vs other donor 
initiatives and/or private sector activities (consulting - - 
firms, NGOs, etc.) 
Development and implementation of systems, procedures and 
administrative and financial arrangements for managing 
UNATIS, CAISNET networking and partnering activities 
countrywise and regionally. 
Efficient management of IDRC and PAR resources 
Corrective actions as appropriate 
The above issues will be addressed in the context of approved 
project budgets, inputs/outputs definitions, targeted results and 
identified indicators, and project documentation used by IDRC (a 
project operation plan, annual plans, etc.) . If no specific 
indicators have been identified, they will be established 
at the time of the evaluation. 
4.2 Feasibility study for a Central America Regional SME 
Support Initiative . 
Based on the evaluation findings and recommendations, guidance 
will be provided as to the feasibility of any possible future 
initiative, its form, focus and cost. This should take into 
consideration the following: 
Identification of institutional and other constraints 
not addressed and/or underestimated, impacting 
negatively on SME development and performance; 
Determination of whether and how such constraints could 
be eliminated or alleviated; 
Determination of whether and to what extent existing 
Canadian programs such as CAISNET, PAR and CIIC could 
be used to address these constraints; 
If not, determination of measures that are required; 
Determination of whether joint IDRC/CIDA initiatives 
would be feasible to bring about corrective/alleviating 
measures ; 
If yes, recommendation of action plans for IDRC/CIDA; 
Alternatively, recommendation of measures for 
independent future programming as advisable; 
Reviewing of other donors' initiatives in the SME 
field; 
4.2.9 Identification of potential collaborative ventures with 
such initiatives, as may be applicable; 
4.2.9.a If a future regional CIDA project appears 
feasible and is recommended, what will be the interim 
bridging activities required to maintain gains already 
made? 
